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Reportage on Gremitskikh's 15 Aug Briefing

Peace Envoy Sent to Mideast

LD1508152990 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Moscow dispatched an envoy to the Middle East on Tuesday in an effort to settle the crisis unleashed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told reporters today.

Special government envoy Mikhail Sytenko will consult the leaders of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and several other Arab countries on the Gulf crisis.

He is expected to visit Baghdad, Gremitskikh said.

Sytenko is an authoritative diplomat and a prominent expert on Middle East problems, he said.

Sytenko has for several years served as United Nations undersecretary general.

Soviet Evacuation From Kuwait

LD1508163290 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—The evacuation of Soviet nationals from Kuwait and women and children from Iraq "is a priority for the Soviet leadersip," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said at a briefing here today.

Quoting the Soviet Embassy in Kuwait, he said that the first group of 230 Soviet evacuees are leaving for Baghdad today.

Gremitskikh said that a special working group, led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov, was set up on President Mikhail Gorbachev's instructions to organise the evacuation of Soviet nationals from Kuwait and Iraq.

Speaking of related problems, he singled out the fact that tensions in the Gulf make it impossible to use ships and airports in Kuwait, Baghdad and Basra and that Iraqi authorities have banned vehicles with number plates issued in Iraq from leaving the country.

Belousev, the spokesman revealed, sent a special message to the Iraqi leadership. Intensive contacts are being maintained with it through the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow.

Embassy in Kuwait 'Functioning'

LD1508175490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Soviet military specialists did not participate and could not have participated in the planning of Iraq's military operations. This was stated today at a briefing in Moscow by Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's information directorate.

There are no Soviet advisers in Iraq that would be located with staffs and subunits planning military operations.

Answering a question about the possibility of the closure of the Soviet embassy in Kuwait, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that it is functioning. From the viewpoint of international law, he pointed out, the question of the closure of embassies and other state institutions can arise in the event of some specific state or other recognizing the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.

The diplomat appraised the announcement by U.S. President George Bush on the lifting of previous restrictions on the numbers of representatives of Soviet trade, economic, and business circles permitted to work and reside in the United States as a sign of the cleansing of Soviet-American relations from the legacy of the past.

Bush Decision on Trade Quotas

LD1508154190 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—President Bush's decision to lift quotas on the number of Soviet trade and business representatives in the United States is a sign of the cleansing of Soviet-American relations from "the vestiges of the past," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said today.

The step is in line with agreements reached in Malta and Washington to expand Soviet-American trade and economic cooperation, Yuriy Gremitskikh said.

"We regard this move as a testimony of the U.S. Administration's implementation of agreements reached at summit meetings," he said.

Afghan Anti-Drug Efforts

LD1508161190 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—The Afghan leadership is engaged upon a crackdown on drug trafficking, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told journalists here today.

Anti-drug efforts are gaining in scope in Afghanistan where territories controlled by the Afghan rebels serve as the basis for large-scale cultivation of narcotic-containing plans and the production of narcotics.

More than 23 tonnes of hashish, about 20 tonnes of opium and over two tonnes of heroin have been confiscated in Afghanistan over the past four years. The Afghan authorities have thwarted the smuggling of large shipments of narcotics to West European countries and the Americas.

Gremitskikh told journalists about an Afghan national programme to combat the production, smuggling and use of narcotics. The programme, published in Kabul on August 11, envisages in particular the destruction of narcotic crops and narcotic-processing equipment, a ban on the sale and acquisition of the seeds of narcotic-containing plants and measures to encourage peasants to grow other agricultural crops.

Internationally, Gremitskikh said, it is planned to invite the countries and international organisations concerned to build new and enlarge existing facilities to fight drug trafficking, and to promote Afghanistan's accession to international conventions.

It is also planned to make efforts towards opening international anti-drug missions in the country.

Afghan Drugs Trade

LD1608100390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] The fight in Afghanistan and drugs. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke on this theme to Soviet and foreign journalists.

[Begin Gremitskikh recording] The fight against the drugs business, which has become a problem which alarms the whole of mankind, is moving onto a tangible scale in Afghanistan; territory which is under the control of the armed opposition is a base for wide-scale cultivation and production of narcotic substances. As is well-known, the Afghan and Islamic parties, which are involved in cultivating narcotic-containing plants and the production of narcotics on Afghan territory and bordering regions in Pakistan, annually produce up to 850 tonnes of raw narcotic materials, and also supply 85 percent of heroine used on the European market, and 70 percent of the heroine used on the U.S. market.

Opium production is the most profitable business for the field commanders of the Afghan opposition, which receives an income of up to $1,800 a year from every hectare of narcotic-containing plants, which is 17 times greater than the profit received by a peasant from a hectare of wheat. The most major producer and smuggler of narcotics among the leaders of the Afghan irreconcileables is the chief, as he calls himself, fighter for the purity of Islam, Golboddin Hekmatyar, whose party cultivates narcotic-containing plants in 10 Afghan provinces, owns processing laboratories, and suggles narcotics on a large-scale abroad.

In Kabul, on 11 August, a national program was published: "The Fight Against the Production, Smuggling, and Use of Drugs." The program envisages the destruction of crops and processing equipment for the plants mentioned. It is planned to undertake efforts to open subdivisions of international antidrugs missions in Afghanistan.

The Afghan authorities have already destroyed thousands of hectares of crops of narcotics-containing plants. In the last four years alone more than 23 tonnes of hashish, around 20 tonnes of opium, and more than two tonnes of heroin have been seized. The competent bodies have thwarted the smuggling of large shipments of narcotics to West European countries and the American continent. [end recording]

'Constructive Spirit' Desired in Vienna Talks

LD1508163490 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—There is now a brief technical recess at the Vienna talks on confidence and security building measures in Europe. The situation at the talks is now being analysed in the capitals of the participating countries.

One would like to hope that, as a result, all the sides will elaborate additional proposals making it possible to resolve the remaining problems soon and in a constructive spirit. There is less than three months to go before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Paris.

It should be recognised that positive results have already been obtained: The sides agreed to develop some provisions of the Stockholm accords on confidence building measures, reached consensus on the exchange of information on military budgets, and there is appreciable progress in the establishment of a single communications system.

There has been headway over problems concerning the establishment of a conflict prevention and military information exchange centre. The negotiators agree that such a centre may become an element in the set of new patterns of security in Europe. Elements of agreement in approaches to the determination of a sphere of activity for such a centre have also appeared.

However, what has been done is not enough for the document, which is being prepared for the Paris summit, to be genuinely substantive and to constitute a significant step forward in strengthening European security.

One should feel particular concern, in my view, over NATO countries' persistent negative stand on the question of spreading confidence-building measures over to the activities of naval and air forces and on limitations on such activities.

Can one ignore these problems when elaborating a new package of confidence-building and security measures?

I think that to evade this way of posing the problem is to seek to ensure some special advantages for the side which has the balance of forces, say, in the naval field, tipped in its favour.

NATO as is known, has an edge in this field. Therefore, in the absence of changes in this respect, the Soviet Union and its allies will remain seriously concerned over the closed nature of the naval activities of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Soviet side, considering the time element, tried to formulate anew its attitude towards naval forces. At this stage it is suggested limiting oneself so far to accords on the following: exchanges of statistical information, notifications and monitoring covering naval activities conducted jointly with land forces, as well as amphibious operations, and the holding of a seminar within the CSCE framework to discuss naval doctrines.

One would like to hope that these new proposals will help the negotiators make considerable headway in elaborating the document on confidence-building measures.

It is important for Western negotiators to appreciate this comporomise version and, for their part, move closer to the Soviet position.

Events Breathe 'Second Wind' Into CSCE

90UF0428A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "A Second Wind: The Common European Process—A Key Factor in a Changing Europe"]

[Text] **It is not fashionable to celebrate anniversaries any more. But in this case life itself reminds us of the importance and, moreover, of the crucial nature of an event that occurred 25 years ago. On 30 July 1973 leaders of the 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada met together for the first time. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki on that day and became a remarkable landmark not only in European but also in world history.**

The meeting in the capital of Finland on that day laid the basis for the common European—or Helsinki—process, which became the channel for constructive dialogue between East and West, a catalyst for their rapprochement. Perhaps the only thing we can fully evaluate now, looking back over the past decade and a half, is the boldness and innovativeness of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki. We can feel how this document was largely ahead of its time and now is in even greater harmony with the age.

In the rapidly changing Europe it is as though the Helsinki process got a second wind and became a mechanism helping to combine dynamics and stability and more fully reveal the positive potential of the ten fundamental principles registered in the Final Act. These are the principle of sovereign equality of states and their sovereign rights, including the right to freely choose and develop their own political, social, economic, and social systems; the nonapplication of force or the threat of force; the inviolability of borders; the territorial integrity of states; peaceful regulation of disputes; nonintervention in one another's internal affairs; respect for human rights and the basic freedoms; equal rights and the right of nations to decide their destinies; cooperation among states; and conscientious fulfillment of commitments under international law.

We shall not forget that these formulas were proclaimed even during the Cold War years when the confrontational slogan "Whoever is not for us is against us" prevailed in both the East and the West.

Can we really be surprised that the common European process has experienced ups and downs, that the next meetings of the states participating in the CSCE states in Belgrade and Madrid were drawn out not for months but for years? But, however slowly, things still progressed. In Stockholm at the Conference on Measures for Strengthening Confidence, Security, and Disarmament in Europe the first cracks were made in the block walls of hostility.

After Helsinki the most important landmark in the chronicle of the CSCE was Vienna. It took the common European process to a qualitatively new level. In the military area negotiations began among the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on conventional arms in Europe and there were also negotiations among 35 states on further measures for bolstering confidence and security in the development of the Stockholm agreements. The agreements on human rights and contacts among people were truly a breakthrough in the humanitarian and legal area.

The Soviet idea of a common European home contributed to the success of the Vienna meeting. If security can be called a foundation for such a home, its bearing walls were all-around cooperation. Recent years have been marked by a series of special meetings among participants in the CSCE in various areas of their interaction. In London there was an Information Forum where they discussed the idea of transforming Europe into a space of public information and openness. In Paris and Copenhagen there were conferences on the human dimension of the CSCE....

The end of the cold war increased the role of the common European process as a stabilizing factor and the most effective instrument for interaction among the 35 states. The current order of things, which is based on agreements of the postwar period as well, is becoming increasingly removed from European reality.

At the Moscow conference of the political consultative committee the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states spoke out in favor of creating a new, common European system of security and a unified Europe of peace and cooperation, and they considered it necessary to revise the character and the functions of the Warsaw Pact.

It is gratifying that the appeal to politicize the military groupings confronting one another in Europe found a positive response in the London NATO declaration. The North Atlantic Alliance suggested that to the Warsaw Pact that they adopt a joint declaration in which they would solemnly declare that the two blocs were no longer enemies and reject the application of force.

Under the current radically changing conditions there has arisen the possibility and need to give new impetus to the common European process. One recalls last autumn and M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Italy. "In light of the events of this past year it is becoming more apparent that it is desirable to have an all-Europe summit meeting," stated the USSR president in the Roman municipality. "It would be possible to think about moving up its dates and holding it not in 1992 but, say, as early as 1990." At first there was mixed response to the Soviet initiative. But the rapid changes in Europe and above all the process of unification of Germany made this idea so crucial that general agreement on it was reached quickly. Participants in the CSCE decided to convene a meeting of the high leaders of the 35 states on 19 November in Paris.

Participants in the Paris meeting will confirm their support for the Final Act of 1975 and sign agreements on conventional arms in Europe and also measures for strengthening confidence and security. It is expected that in Paris they will finally approve the directives for continuing these negotiations, but not separately (with groups of 23 and 35 states) but with all participants of the CSCE. There is also agreement that the time has come to create permanent institutions for the Helsinki process and working organs.

This has to do primarily with making the meetings of the representatives of the 35 countries regular. The Soviet Union, for example, suggests convening a forum of high leaders—the Council of Large Europe—every two years, and the committee of foreign affairs ministers every year, forming a permanent secretariat of the CSCE, and in the capital where it is located, creating an advisory council consisting of the 35 ambassadors accredited there.

The common European structures for security and cooperation certainly do not always have to be created from the beginning. Take, for example, the European Council which has been in existence for more than 40 years. This most representative organization of intergovernmental and interparliamentary cooperation on the continent, which unites 23 states, could contribute to the development of the Helsinki process in a humanitarian-legal direction.

There are also ready elements of future common European structures in the area of security. Participants in the Paris meeting will discuss the suggestion to create a center for exchange of scientific and technical information and prevention of conflicts. With the current level of openness it has become necessary to gather and disseminate information on the activity of armed forces, coordinate control measures, and mediate when disputes arise. The Soviet Union suggests locating such a center, which would give a complete picture of the strategic military situation in Europe and the movements and actions of all forces, in Berlin. It could be instituted on the basis of the existing monitoring mechanisms of the four powers in Germany.

The question arises: Could the transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO announced by both military blocs lead to a situation where, having become mainly political organizations, they would merge into a unified system of European security? This idea is being put forth by the eminent West German Social Democrat E. Bahr. He suggests uniting the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and on the basis of them transforming the CSCE into an alliance with all the necessary working organs and structures. A different opinion dominates in London, Paris, and Washington: The CSCE should be augmented but by no means should it replace NATO.

Those who associate having nuclear weapons with the status of a great power are the main ones who insist on the North Atlantic alliance as an indispensable guarantee of security. "In a disarmed Europe where economic power is coming into the foreground," writes the British newspaper THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, "a united Germany will have no equals.... It could even demand the elimination of the nuclear weapons of England and France as payment for remaining nonnuclear itself." The comments of the French newspaper LA MONDE about the recent negotiations between Gorbachev and Kohl are also remarkable. "The Soviet Union, if one may put it this way, has made long-term capital investments," it writes. "Gorbachev will have the opportunity to refer to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany as an example to follow. Will the German public not soon insist that the same thing be done with the American, British, and French troops? And will Germany not refuse to have on its territory weapons that do not belong to it and which it refuses to produce?"

Of course it was not easy for the Soviet Union to reach a compromise on the question of the military and political status of the future Germany. But the agreements reached in Arkhyz blaze the trail to the demilitarization of Europe. Under their influence there will be fewer nuclear weapons and foreign garrisons on the continent and the role of military force will decrease as political and economic factors in security become more important. And this tendency is in the interests of both the

Soviet Union and Germany. It is no accident that in the West European capitals they have started talking about a "new Rapallo" and recalling the commotion aroused among the powers of the entente by the rapprochement between Soviet Russia and the Germany of the Weimar Republic in 1922.

Those who for more than 40 years have been hypnotized by the phantom of the "Soviet threat" will have to be bitterly convinced that their most reliable military allies in Europe and Asia have become their most threatening economic rivals—such is the heavy price of the cold war for which both the East and the West have to pay.

The best solution is to take advantage of this second wind which the common European process has been given under the new conditions in order to resolutely replace the balance of power with a balance of interests and to take advantage of the path laid over 15 years from Helsinki to Paris as a trampoline for reaching new horizons of interaction among the 35 states with respect to all areas of the Final Act.

UN Conference on Arms Reduction Held in Moscow

Yakovlev Addresses Forum

PM1508151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversion: Ideal and Practice"]

[Text] Conversion is an important part of disarmament, which can help make this process permanent and irreversible. More than 130 politicians, experts, industrialists, and businessmen from 40 countries gathered in Moscow 13 August to assemble the best world experience of transferring the military-industrial complex to a peaceful footing.

They are participating in the UN conference "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Sphere in the Era of Arms Reduction." The forum is being conducted by the UN disarmament department with the assistance of the Soviet Peace Foundation and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Messages from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar were read out at the opening.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, USSR Presidential Council member A.N. Yakovlev noted that mankind reached the threshold of the 21st century before it acquired the wisdom and the level of civilized maturity to be able to voluntarily begin the practical process of real disarmament. It must be understood that conversion is not an aim in itself and not a compulsory payment for past errors and former political goals and priorities. It is not even simply a demand of life. The conversion of military production facilities and spheres of activity can and must be an integral part of the creation of a better world—on a national and global scale, he stressed.

The UN conference ends 17 August.

Press Briefing Conducted

LD1508195990 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 15 TASS—Participants in the international conference "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Sphere in the Era of Arms Reduction," currently in session in Moscow, today broke into working groups to discuss various aspects of military production conversion.

At a news conference during a break between sessions, Peter Richards, a representative of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), emphasised that the participants focused on the problem of redistributing manpower resources freed as a result of converting military-oriented factories to consumer goods production.

Speakers at the news conference stressed that today's session of the conference was notable for the pluralism of views.

The conference has seen arguments between supporters of the market variant of effecting conversion and the authors of the draft government programme for conversion. It was outlined by USSR State Planning Committee First Deputy Head Valentin Smyslov at Tuesday's session.

Among the points of the programme which sparked the most heated debate at the session, was the provision on state aid to the converted businesses, the majority of which remain under the authority of the USSR Defence Ministry.

"These factories should be self-supporting," said Alexey Izyumov from the Soviet Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute. "It is necessary, above all, that market incentives be put into operation." He believes that the success of military conversion will hinge on these principles.

Responding, USSR State Planning Committee representative Viktor Kotov said the government intended to give aid to the converted factories only within two to three years, after which "these factories wil have fully mastered consumer goods production and will not need aid any more."

He drew participants' attention to the Soviet bill on military production conversion. It includes several serious measures to give social aid to working people who may suffer as a result of conversion.

Shevardnadze Letter on Arms Transfers Published

PM1608110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

["E.A. Shevardnadze Letter to UN Secretary General"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] The Soviet Union considers that the inclusion on the UN agenda of the problems of restricting international sales and supplies of conventional weapons is a logical development of the trend toward the internationalization of the dialogue on most important questions of world politics and one of the avenues of the shaping of a new model of security in conditions of further progress toward mutual understanding and reciprocal action.

Conventional arms supplies are an often dangerous channel for the the spread of the arms race to different parts of the world. They broaden access to weaponry in its most diverse forms and increase the destructiveness and bloodiness of regional conflicts. The spread of conventional weapons is also closely associated with the problem of nonproliferation in three dimensions: nuclear, chemical, and missile. Because they become competitive and, in a number of instances, essentially uncontrollable, arms supplies often fuel mistrust, reduce the level of predictability in world politics, and run counter to the current positive development of the international situation.

Diverting resources from socioeconomic development programs, expenditure on the acquisition of arms is an additional burden on the economies of many developing countries, complicates the foreign debt problem, and, as a result, makes balanced and stable world development more difficult.

The Soviet Union advocates seeking new approaches to the question of international sales and supplies of weapons while taking full account, of course, of states' inalienable right to individual and collective self-defense enshrined in the UN Charter. In our view, this search must become an integral part of efforts to cut back the arms race, settle conflicts, solve socioeconomic problems, achieve a qualitatively new level of trust, and generally strengthen guarantees of states' security.

For our part we reiterate our readiness for dialogue on restrictions on conventional arms sales and supplies with the United States and other supplier states, also with recipient states, and also with regional organizations, bearing in mind that all efforts—bilateral, regional, or global—by being mutually complementary and encouraging each other, would promote the development of a productive negotiating process.

It is our conviction that the authority of the United Nations Organization must be involved in full measure in resolving these questions. The United Nations has a mandate from the first special General Assembly session on disarmament, which mapped out basic guidelines for the international community's efforts in this field.

First and foremost the problem of restricting international sales and supplies of conventional weapons requires the application of the principle of making a transition from overarmament to reasonable sufficiency for defense, whereby the possibility of creating offensive potentials would be ruled out, and the imposition of limits on the proliferation of the most destructive and destabilizing means of making war. The creation of an effective multilateral regime governing the nonproliferation of certain types of missiles and missile technology, in particular, would be of great significance. Another urgent measure is the prohibition of supplies of types of weapons covered by the convention on prohibiting or restricting the application of specific types of conventional weapons that can be considered as causing excessive damage or are indiscriminate in their action. There is evidently also a need for an understanding that accords on reducing arms in some parts of the world must not open the floodgates for military rivalry in others.

Progress in the matter of restricting international supplies of conventional weapons is inseparable from asserting glasnost and eliminating excessive secrecy. Here too openness would make it possible to elucidate the real situation, remove many concerns, and see more clearly the possibilities for getting to reasonable sufficiency.

We advocate that questions of arms sales and purchases be examined in the supreme legislative organs of UN member-states in accordance with adopted national legislation governing the procedures for arms supplies or purchases. We for our part envisage elaborating a corresponding all-Union law and submitting it for examination by Soviet legislators.

The USSR supports the idea of creating at the United Nations a register of arms sales and supplies and is ready to participate in elaborating its parameters. In our view, thought should be given to states submitting to the United Nations data on supplies of the main categories of weapons such as combat missiles and missile complexes, tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, and warships and combatant craft. It would also be possible to analyze the possibility of UN member-states publishing annually—without detriment to their security as either exporters or importers of arms—information on the scale and country spread of export supplies of arms and military equipment and aid in organizing their production, creating (upgrading) facilities for military purposes, training military personnel, and also other services of a military nature. For their part importing countries could also submit information linked with the acquisition of weapons. We hope that this would encourage the joint elaboration with all interested countries of a common regime of transparency in the sphere of international arms transfers.

A combination of measures of openness in the context of arms supplies with states' participation in a standardized UN statistical reporting system for military expenditure would also be important. Such an approach could help to create an objective picture of the military potentials of arms-producing and arms-importing states alike.

In our view thought must also be given to regional approaches to the restriction of international arms flows. Consideration here must of course be given both to states' requirements for self-defense and also to the specific features of each region.

Another approach which looks promising is reaching an understanding on specific procedures for self-restriction and mutual restraint on the part of either suppliers or recipients of arms in the field of regions of conflicts in the context of their political settlement. The potential for this is now very real—on the basis of respect for freedom of choice and a collective quest for a balance of all parties' interests.

The activation of mechanisms of self-restriction in arms supplies and purchases, together with the implementation of the principles of openness here, up to and including the conclusion of corresponding agreements and the submission of the necessary information to the UN secretary general, would bolster the quest being made inside and outside the United Nations for ways to settle regional conflicts. And as a result it would be possible to reach a situation where the restriction of such supplies on a reciprocal basis or the introduction of a moratorium on them would become an integral part of any package of commitments for a political settlement of conflict situations. In this context thought could also be given, in our view, to the creation under the UN secretary general of a mechanism for investigating instances of the supposed violation of Security Council decisions or international accords in the sphere of the restriction of arms supplies.

The United Nations could also make a contribution to the important matter of regulating the re-export of arms and also play a role in the struggle against the illegal circulation of arms, which is often closely linked with terrorism and the drug business. In the context of elaborating international accords on combatting the arms "black market" there could also be a discussion of, in particular, measures to strengthen national systems for monitoring the production and export of arms. Nor do we rule out here the possibility of organizing reciprocal action and cooperation between states' customs and law enforcement services—as in the problem of the illegal circulation of drugs.

The implementation of measures to achieve openness and restrict the weapons trade would open up the prospect of the elaboration under UN auspices of a draft convention on the restriction of international arms sales and supplies.

To date the quest for common accord in the sphere of the arms trade has not yet reached the stage of negotiated decisions. But we are convinced that through the joint efforts of states it is possible to find a constructive distillation of interests and thereby bring an additional element of stability to the international situation and contribute to the reliability of a peaceful period in the history of mankind.

With respect,
[Signed] E. Shevardnadze

July Events Improve East-West Atmosphere

90UF0591A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jul 90 Second Edition p 7

[Article by Anatoliy Karpychev: "Countermovement: Reflecting on Events in July"]

[Text] ...And we apparently have not yet become fully aware of what has happened in East-West relations this year.

Yet there has been much that is significant and to some degree repetitive, to which the politicians and historians will be returning time and again. Let us leaf through the calendar once again. The 28th CPSU Congress in Moscow and the session of the NATO Council in London. The West German mark is acquired by every family in the GDR. The meeting of the "Seven" in Houston. Visits to the USSR by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the European Community Commission Jacques Delors, NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner, and G. Andreotti, chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers. In addition to this, there were negotiations in Paris on the "two-plus-four" formula. This was more than enough for one month, especially a summer month when, according to the canons, political life dies down until autumn.

But the "principle of adequacy" does not mean anything here; sometimes a half year will include enough events and unexpected occurrences to last for 10 years during calmer times. July 1990 falls completely into this category.

Why am I speaking about this so confidently? In July one could see fairly clearly, perhaps better than ever before, the outlines of a movement one might call the countermovement. Naturally, it did not begin from nothing. Apparently its time had come. I recall that at one time the West was standing at the crossroads. They were ambiguous about signals from our country about perestroyka, the new thinking, and the difficulties of the situation: They sized up the situation, gave it some thought, and asked about the stability of Gorbachev's position: Will the "conservatives" suddenly win? There have been enough of these "suddenlys." And they are continuing today. But in spite of them, from our side there were enough appeals for a countermovement. We no longer consider the United States or its allies to be our enemies, we are in favor of developing partnerships, but the other side, in spite of its good attitude toward perestroyka and Gorbachev, has been in no hurry to respond.

This response was heard openly and even solemnly in London, where the session of the NATO council took place. Heads of states and governments sent Moscow a responsive signal which was—I am not afraid to use the word—"epochal": The North Atlantic alliance no longer considers us to be their enemy. "We want to have the Soviet Union as our partner and our friend," added NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner in July while on a social visit to Moscow.

If NATO recognizes that the cold war is over and extends a hand of friendship to its former opponent—this means something. As I read the London declaration that contains these words and when I go through the speeches of the state leaders at the session I find it somehow hard to believe that the standoff has ended and "hawks" can become "doves." We have become accustomed to the hopeless situation to such an extent that even now that the time has come for insight and hopes of peace we are still afraid to believe it. Nor do the NATO members conceal the fact that it will take a lot of effort to "overcome the legacy of decades of suspiciousness."

Today in the West people are talking about the "disappearance of the enemy" and singing the praises of the North Atlantic alliance—saying what good "chaps" they are. It is being called "the most successful defensive alliance in history." Be that as it may, the anti-Soviet nature of NATO in the recent past was one of its characteristics. One cannot live on memories today and the question is how to live in the future. In July all the main figures in the transnational dialogue had an opportunity to express their understanding of the countermovement.

What signs of this movement could one name?

The proposal to adopt a joint declaration and solemnly proclaim in it that we are no longer the enemy.

The invitation to President Gorbachev as a representative of the Soviet Union and representatives of other countries of central and East Europe to come to Brussels and enter the North Atlantic council.

The invitation to the governments of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania not only to visit NATO but to establish regular diplomatic ties with NATO.

The recognition that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should play a more appreciable role in the future of Europe.... Participants in the conference in London supported the idea of holding meetings of heads of states participating in the CSCE this autumn in Paris at which they could sign an agreement on reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

The London countermovement moved to Houston a couple of days later where the heads of the "Seven" developed capitalist countries gathered.

In the Houston economic declaration the participants certified that they had discussed the situation in the Soviet Union and exchanged opinions regarding the message received from Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev the night before in which he presented his plans in the area of economics.

The "Seven" agreed that now the Soviet Union should be granted technical assistance. As a concrete measure it was decided to ask the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and a number of other organizations, in conjunction with the European Community Commission, to "study the Soviet economy carefully." Incidentally, when he was in Moscow in the middle of July the chairman of this commission, Mr. Delors, declared in a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev that during August he would like to prepare his report for the European Council with an analysis of the Soviet economy and concrete proposals regarding large-scale cooperation. If I am not mistaken, the Western leaders are allotting six months for all the work of "studying the Soviet economy."

"Does this method not actually mean the postponement of the adoption of a political decision?"—President Bush was asked at a press conference.

"No, this is not an attempt to delay anything," answered the President. "This is a step in the direction of contributing to the reforms. And I want to make it clear to President Gorbachev that he should regard the results of this summit meeting as very positive. This is a step which will be useful for the Soviet Union on the level of reforms. In his letter President Gorbachev asked for assistance in many areas. We have already begun bilateral cooperation, as have other countries as well, trying to help the Soviet Union. Thus in reality we have undertaken cooperative efforts."

The countermovement I am talking about is a matter of filling the political dialogue with concrete cooperation. It is what U.S. Secretary of State Baker calls "areas of mutual advantage." This is not a matter of someone sacrificing their own interests or asking for a handout. Attention is drawn to this because both in our country and in the West some people are not above speculating on the basis of a number of agreements. The myth is being spread that the Soviet Union is prepared to enter into any transaction for the sake of credit and economic aid, which it needs in the extreme. This is an out-and-out lie. This speculation has to do especially with the agreements reached during Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow. As you will recall, we have spoken in favor of having the united Germany decide for itself the question of its entry into NATO. Actually, we said "yes" and created the appearance that we had made a large concession. What was it? There is the question.

We shall be realists to the end here as well. I have already mentioned the fact that the events of July included the introduction of the German mark throughout the GDR.

This occurred in keeping with an agreement on economic, currency, and social unification. It is obvious to me that while politicians are resolving disputed issues in their discussions, the FRG mark is doing this work in practice, beneath the surface. I do not think we can turn back to the Berlin wall.

Another myth is that the West wanted to placate Gorbachev when they made the decision to end hostilities. Supposedly, having been placated, both because of this and the possibility of obtaining credit, he "rejected" his allies. In my view, Manfred Woerner gave an exhaustive response to this in one interview:

"People who propound such views are not very farsighted. They do not understand that the time for 'teaching' nations using tanks and troops has passed. They do not understand that through its wise and expedient decisions the USSR has acquired real friends in the West who would not have been so otherwise. The Soviet Union has lost nothing except what would have been lost anyway, and it has acquired friends both inside and outside Germany."

It would seem that the school problem about the locomotives (or ships) coming from various points to meet one another has changed from a mathematical to a historical one. Much depends on who is driving these locomotives, their speed, and their knowledge of the route. But the point is that after 40 years of confrontation the path will not be easy. We are all taking it for the first time. It is important that we do not miss each other. There is a choice of variants, but there is no turning back.

I recall that when looking back over 1989, politicians and observers called it the year of Europe.

Today we can boldly speak of its continuation. It cannot be ruled out that we will call the nineties the decade of Europe. The dialogue between the two superpowers has led this process to a countermovement of European countries, unions, and blocs. The world is approaching entirely new parameters, which one might say we had not dreamed of yesterday.

Renewal of China-Indonesia Relations Welcomed

PM1508110090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

["Viewpoint" by Oleg Skalkin: "New Chapter Opened"]

[Text] Against the backdrop of the alarming reports from the Arab East, good news is particularly heartening. China and Indonesia have reestablished diplomatic relations. The other day during an official visit to Indonesia Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, signed a memorandum in Jakarta opening a new chapter in relations between the two Asian countries.

It is supplemented by other documents regulating their relations in various spheres. For instance, the longstanding dispute about the repayment of Indonesian debt to China has been favorably resolved. The agreement on the status of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is also of considerable importance. There are more than 3 million of them in the country, and the Chinese community's ties with their homeland have often been interpreted in a biased fashion among Jakarta official circles, at times prompting a painful reaction. At any rate, that is how it used to be.

Together with the memorandum a trade agreement was signed which envisages reciprocal granting of most-favored-nation status—this is an incentive for the countries, whose annual trade turnover stands at $1 billion.

All this, it would seem, is the ordinary business of international relations. But the point is that normal relations between Indonesia and China have not existed for 25 years. At other times Jakarta has accused Beijing of interference in its internal affairs and has even tried to submit an account for its involvement in the 1965 coup attempt. The PRC has invariably rejected the grounds on which these charges are made. And although the documents signed the other day in the Indonesian capital make no mention of the substance of the long-standing dispute, as far as can be judged from news reports, their appearance speaks for itself. We must assume that time has settled matters. At any rate, it has made it possible to approach the problem of bilateral relations from the standpoint of the present day—which, of course, has little to do with the atmosphere existing in the region and the world in the far-off mid-sixties. The signing of the political memorandum in Jakarta took place in the presence of Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, and President Suharto. The Chinese leader's visit took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship.

Assessing this turnaround in relations with the neighbor on the other side of the South China Sea, President Suharto spoke weighty words. The restoration of friendship between Indonesia and China, he stated, shows the world that talks should always prevail over confrontation. "There are no differences that cannot be resolved, there are no old wounds that cannot be healed," he added.

It seems to me that this conclusion drawn from the experience of relations between two ancient and great peoples is worthy of international attention. Particularly in our present-day world, where certain statesmen sometimes lack restraint and wisdom and engage in adventures fraught with serious consequences.

Thus, the Sino-Indonesian normalization has become a fait accompli. This journalistic phrase has rarely been used in a more positive context. But normalization is also inevitably becoming an active factor in regional policy. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Singapore and the PRC, for instance, is now considered to be a resolved issue in the region. And a particularly large amount of forecasts are being made about the prospects for revitalizing the talks on settling the military conflict in Cambodia. Naturally, people talk about their problems. And in Southeast Asia there is no more urgent task than to solve the Cambodia problem. Both sides, as is well known, are actively participating in the process of bringing long-awaited peace to Cambodian soil. Thus, Indonesia's ANGKATAN BERSENJATA believes that China could play an active role in ending the conflict in Cambodia by stopping its support for the "Khmer Rouge." On the other hand, if agency reports are accurate, Premier Li Peng stated in Jakarta that he would do everything possible to convince the "Khmer Rouge" that peace negotiations are the best way to end the Cambodia conflict. The very near future will show how all this will be specifically reflected in the talks on a peaceful settlement. But the prospects for eliminating the last "hot spot" in Southeast Asia have probably never been so hopeful.

I cannot fail to note that the positive aspects of the Jakarta decisions wholly accord with the spirit and letter of the Soviet proposals on the Asia-Pacific region. They are part of our desire for more stable peace in the region and the creation of an atmosphere of trust and general security there.

Northeast Asia

Defense Minister Yazov Greets DPRK Counterpart

PM1508120590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Greetings from USSR Defense Minister Yazov to DPRK counterpart O Chin-u on the "45th anniversary of Korea's liberation"]

[Text] To Comrade O Chin-u, DPRK minister of the People's Armed Forces and vice marshal of the Korean People's Army

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

Accept my sincere congratulations on the 45th anniversary of Korea's liberation.

The defeat of the Japanese militarists in August 1945 created real preconditions for the Korean people's liberation and their development on the path of social progress.

The relations of friendship and cooperation that arose between our countries and armies at that period meet the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Korean peoples and are a factor for stability in the Far East region.

I wish you, Comrade Minister, and all servicemen of the Korean People's Army successes in military labor, good health, and well-being.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

ROK Official Interviewed on Trade History, Ties

SK1608051490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Interview with Yi Sun-o, director of External Trade Division of ROK Ministry of Trade and Industry, by reporter (Vladislav Tunayev) from the "Focus on Asia" program; place and date not given—read by announcers]

[Text] [Announcer] What type products does the ROK export?

[Yi Sun-o] Since the mid-eighties, we have been exporting automobiles and household electronic appliances. These include television sets, tape recorders, computers, (?electric ovens), video cassette recorders, refrigerators, and [word indistinct] as our major export items. [passage indistinct]

[Announcer] How many years has the ROK been doing business with and what is your Trade and Industry Ministry's policy toward the Soviet Union?

[Yi Sun-o] The Soviet Union is a developed industrial state. The inventions made by Soviet enterprises are of a high standard and widely regarded. The Soviet Union is facing considerable difficulty in supplying the necessities of life for its people. Therefore, the consumer goods made in the ROK will meet the demands of Soviet consumers. The exchange of goods and knowledge will be beneficial to both our countries.

The total volume of trade between our two countries amounted to $300 million in 1986, $600 million in 1989, and this year it will be increased to [word indistinct]. However, in view of the [words indistinct] of foreign trade, our business contact with the Soviet Union is very small. Nevertheless, the potential for developing cooperation is very great.

[Announcer] It is natural that the scope of cooperation should be extended. What are the obstacles?

[Yi Sun-o] We look forward to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the near future. As yet, there is no guarantee for investment. There are very limited prospects for visits to your country by our businessmen. We have not yet succeeded in avoiding double taxation. Therefore, there will not be much capital invested to develop economic relations. We were granted the right to catch fish near Kamchatka, and we had been catching fish there before the 200-mile (?economic) waters were declared. But we have a feeling that we are being discriminated against compared to Japan and Vietnam who have such a fishing right.

We do not want Soviet natural resources to come pouring into the ROK like torrents. We are planning to invest to develop work in Soviet territory. Our Trade and Industry Ministry is studying the possibility of (?economic support) for ROK exporters who are ready to go into the Soviet market. We will be able to allow the Soviet (?importers) to defer their payment due to the Soviet shortage of foreign exchange. We are ready to give (?financial support) in such cases.

We intend to import technological processes in such fields as space research, pharmaceutical industry, and the petrochemical industry.

I think relations between our two countries as a whole can become a model of mutually advantageous economic cooperation.

RSFSR Minister, Japanese Envoy Confer on Ties

PM1608082390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under the "World in Events" rubric: "Meeting in RSFSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] A talk took place 9 August between I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, and S. Edamura, Japanese ambassador to the USSR.

During the friendly talk the sides exchanged opinions on the prospects for developing Russian-Japanese relations.

Near East & South Asia

Arrests Follow Assassination Attempt on Saddam

LD1608112890 Moscow TASS in English 1108 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Cairo August 16 TASS—Mass arrests among the officers' corps of the Iraqi Army and some categories of civil servants were made in Iraq last night, the MENA news agency reports.

Referring to witnesses who crossed the Iraqi-Jordanian border today, MENA notes that arrests followed an abortive attempt on the life of President Saddam Husayn of Iraq by a group of junior officers.

According to the agency, Husayn's closest aides were also involved in the attempt.

Emergency Declared in Baghdad

LD1608120190 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Cairo August 16 TASS—A state of emergency has been imposed in Baghdad. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers are patrolling city streets.

Army patrols are guarding ministries and key government offices as fresh contingents arrive in the capital. There have been reports of a purge among officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

The MENA news agency reports that the number of those arrested runs into dozens.

Referring to witnesses who crossed the Iraqi-Jordanian border today, MENA notes that the state of emergency and arrests followed an abortive attempt on the life of President Saddam Husayn by a group of junior officers.

According to the agency, Husayn's close aides were involved in the attempt. Arrests were also made among civilians. The situation in Baghdad is reported to be very tense.

Fighting in Kuwait, Arrests in Iraq Reported

LD1608135490 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Malyarov]

[Text] Cairo August 16 TASS—Kuwaiti resistance fighters continue their activity against the invading army. Monte Carlo Radio reports that several explosions were heard last night at Iraqi military facilities in and around Kuwait city.

According to the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, many soldiers have deserted from the Iraqi Army in Kuwait in the past few days. The main reason is the unwillingness of young soldiers to participate in a new senseless war.

The newspaper AL-AHRAM reports today that Iraqi authorities have arrested the Kuwaiti ambassador in Baghdad and the entire diplomatic staff of the embassy.

According to the MENA news agency, there is a shortage of food in Baghdad. President Saddam Husayn has introduced capital punishment for food profiteering.

A Morrocan military contingent numbering 1,200 has arrived in Saudi Arabia. A Syrian staff group has begun operations there. It has to arrange the deployment of Syrian troops and coordinate actions with the Saudi leadership.

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia has appealed to several Islamic states for help.

Egypt refused to let an Iraqi dry cargo ship through the Suez Canal. Egyptian authorities explained that the ship's crew refused to pay the toll in hard currency.

Earlier, Egypt announced that, taking into account the status of the Canal, it has no right to close it for Iraqi ships and ships of third countries heading for Iraq.

Soviet Reaction to Gulf Crisis Reported

Plan 'Consultations'

JN1408194590 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1700 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Article by Mustafa Bakri from Cairo]

[Excerpts] Over the next few days the USSR will hold regional and international consultations on a new Soviet initiative to end the Gulf crisis. This was stated by the new Soviet ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Polyakov, who met yesterday with Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid.

Informed Egyptian sources said the ambassador told the Egyptian minister that the Soviet Union is now studying certain ideas to settle the Gulf conflict. These ideas are based on a withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf after obtaining assurances or guarantees from Iraq that it will withdraw from Kuwait and refrain from threatening the security of the other Gulf states. Polyakov stressed that his country will hold direct contacts with President Saddam Husayn once the new Soviet ideas have been put into their final form. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, Egyptian security forces have been deployed heavily in the Tal'at Harb square since early morning, preventing a demonstration that the Anti-Zionism Movement intended to stage in the center of the Egyptian capital to express solidarity with Iraq and denounce foreign intervention in the Gulf. The newspaper AL-SHA'B, mouthpiece of the opposition Socialist Labor Party, condemned foreign intervention in the region and called on the Arab masses to declare solidarity with Iraq against any potential foreign aggression.

Military Role in Iraq Explained

PM1508155990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Nikityuk, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate, by correspondents N. Burbyga and V. Litovkin; date and place of interview not given: "What Are Our Servicemen Doing in Iraq?"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant General V. Nikityuk, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate, answers this and other questions put by our correspondents.

[IZVESTIYA] Vladimir Pavlovich, how many Soviet military advisers are there in Iraq? What do they do? What is their contribution to the development of the Iraqi Army?

[Nikityuk] We have not had and do not have any military advisers in Iraq. Only military specialists are there. And their functions are fundamentally different. Advisers are called upon to resolve questions of building the Armed Forces, while specialists give assistance in mastering and operating the military hardware supplied under contract.

There are approximately 200 Soviet military specialists in Iraq. More precisely, there are 193 today, as I speak with you.

The senior officer is Major Gen. Anatoliy Vasilyevich Bannikov. I will take this opportunity to point out that the rumors that [Volga-Urals Military District Commander] Colonel Gen. A. Makashov is in charge of our specialists there are unfounded. Bannikov's subordinates have not taken and do not take any part in building the Iraqi Armed Forces or planning their combat use and have not given and do not give assistance in the operational training of troops and staffs. They have never ever appeared in areas of combat operations. Not now nor during the years of the Iraq-Iran war.

They include college and military course teachers and specialists in the installation and operation of hardware and in its repair, as well as in simulators and the equipment of proving grounds, tank training areas, and gunnery training facilities.

[IZVESTIYA] You have said that specialists help in mastering our hardware and equipment. But how much armament have we supplied to Iraq? What did we get in return?

[Nikityuk] Yes, under the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation we supplied Iraq with a considerable quantity of armaments and combat hardware for the purpose of strengthening its defense capability. I wish to emphasize that these deliveries began at the time of the Iraqi people's struggle for their independence and were actively continued during the repulsing of Israeli aggression.

What kind of weapons are they? Missile complexes of the surface-to-surface type, T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, and diverse antitank armaments. For air defense and the Air Force—antiaircraft missile systems of various ranges, MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft, Mi-24 helicopters, and other hardware. For the navy....

[IZVESTIYA] Pardon me, but you have not mentioned Tu-22 and Tu-16 bombers....

[Nikityuk] They were supplied in the early seventies. Their operational life ended long ago.... So, patrol escorts and various launches were supplied for the Navy.

In addition, Iraq has purchased large consignments of arms and combat hardware from France, Italy, the FRG, Brazil, the United States, and other countries. They are mainly modern aircraft of the Mirage type, warships, control, communications, and electronic warfare systems, and other weapons.

Unfortunately, I cannot name the quantity of weapons and combat hardware supplied from the Soviet Union. It is not a question of our secrecy. The Soviet Government has certain obligations to the Iraqi side not to divulge such information. This is not only our secret.

Nor can I tell you the sum of money for which deliveries have been made. That, too, is a joint commercial secret. I can tell you only that Iraq has fully compensated our country's expenses. As a result we have obtained considerable amounts of foreign currency.

[IZVESTIYA] But these figures are widely known. The 1990 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Annual stated that Iraq has bought $25 billion worth of arms abroad, and that 53 percent of this sum is accounted for by the Soviet Union. France comes second, followed by China, Brazil, Egypt, and Czechoslovakia. Tell me, can this information be trusted?

[Nikityuk] I can only add that SIPRI is a nongovernmental, independent source which enjoys great international prestige. Its data can be taken into account, but it has to be understood that they are not absolute. We take note of them in our work, but the General Staff, naturally, relies on other information.

[IZVESTIYA] Let's return to the question of arms deliveries. Who makes the decisions to this effect in our country? What else have we sold Iraq? The foreign press has repeatedly mentioned that Iraq possesses chemical weapons. Did we supply them?

[Nikityuk] The decision on arms sales to a specific country is not taken by the USSR Ministry of Defense or the General Staff, but by the supreme state organs. Until recently it was the Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers, now it is the USSR President and the USSR Council of Ministers.

The military merely takes part in the examination of the Iraqi Government's requests for arms and combat hardware deliveries and draws up their proposals jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Finance, and others, and the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee].

As for chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has never supplied them to anyone, nor has it rendered assistance in production technology transfer. And that includes Iraq. We have only supplied antichemical defense means to that country—gas masks, rubberized protective suits, various dosimeters, and chemical decontamination facilities.

[IZVESTIYA] What ballistic missiles are we supplying to Iraq? What assistance are we rendering in their modernization?

[Nikityuk] We have supplied tactical and operational-tactical "surface-to-surface" missiles with a range of up to 300 km. That was in the early seventies. Since then we have sold no more missiles to Iraq, nor have we rendered any assistance in their modernization.

I must say that our stance in supplying these types of weapons is a very well-weighed stance. And in general, since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq conflict mainly defensive weapons alone have been supplied by us to Iraq.

Now, as you know, in connection with the aggression against Kuwait all deliveries of our weapons to this country have been suspended.

[IZVESTIYA] But Iraqi servicemen are undergoing training at our military educational establishments. Which ones, specifically?

[Nikityuk] A small group of Iraqi specialists in the operation and maintenance of types of weapons and military hardware previously adopted by the Iraqi Army is now completing instruction in the USSR. They will not be studying anywhere here any more. Iraq trains its military specialists on its own, by the way, as well as in other highly developed countries.

Iraqis have studied in our country in past years. In military academies of communications, rear services, transport, and medicine, and at the Odessa Higher Military Combined Engineering Command School and the Krasnodar Combined Military Aviation Technical School. This training ceased with the start of the Iran-Iraq war.

[IZVESTIYA] One more question concerning weapons. You said that our supplies of weapons to Iraq have ceased. But where is the guarantee that it will not obtain them via third countries? And how in general do you regard the practice of arms sales?

[Nikityuk] Recipient countries are bound under intergovernmental agreements on the supply of arms not to transfer them to third countries without the assent of the Soviet side. We have granted such a right to no one. Moreover, we constantly monitor this process. And it must be said that instances of its violation are extremely rare. Although they do occur.

During the Iraq-Iran conflict, for example, one country transferred to Iran surface-to-surface missile complexes supplied by the USSR. Our government did not let this incident go unnoticed. After our statement such supplies were immediately stopped.

As far as the problem of the arms trade is concerned, there is no room for two opinions here. It must, of course, be stopped: Not unilaterally, however, but in light of the existing international situation and the situation prevailing in a particular region.

It is no secret to you or anyone else that Western countries have not stopped and are not stopping military aid to their foreign partners and, according to available evidence, are not intending to reduce their influence where any interests of theirs are affected. We are bound to take this into account.

But perestroyka is essential in this delicate sphere. It is necessary to approach with special deliberation a question such as the provision of military aid. To proceed from the principles of reasonable defense sufficiency, to take account of the long-term rather than the immediate economic interests of the country, and to rely on special laws on this question. And, of course, to do everything with openness and glasnost rather than in secret. We must conceal nothing from the people.

[IZVESTIYA] Last question. How many of our military specialists have remained in Kuwait? What is their fate? Are any Soviet-U.S. joint military actions against the aggressor contemplated?

[Nikityuk] There were around 50 Soviet military specialists plus members of their families in Kuwait. They are all alive and healthy and have already been evacuated.

I know nothing regarding joint actions. This question falls within the competence of the supreme state organs of the USSR, above all the Soviet president and the USSR Supreme Soviet. I can only add that no one has set the defense ministry such a task.

UN Committee Urged

LD1508183490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] The USSR has again proposed that the Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council be brought in to consider the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Correspondents in New York were informed of this by Lozinskiy, the Soviet representative at the United Nations. In recent days such consultations have been taking place almost without interruption in connection with the explosive situation in the Persian Gulf region. As we have already reported, this situation arose after Iraq occupied Kuwait and following the emergence of the threat of Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia. As a warning, the United States has embarked on the biggest deployment of its troops abroad since the Vietnam War. An interrupted stream of crack U.S. troops and the most up-to-date weapons is arriving in Saudi Arabia.

Belonogov Sees Turkish Envoy

LD1508150690 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today received Volkan Vural, the ambassador of Turkey to the Soviet Union, at the latter's request.

There was an exchange of views to the situation that has taken shape in the Persian Gulf. Serious concern in view of the dangerous development of events in the region was expressed.

Some matters concerning bilateral Soviet-Turkish relations were also touched upon during the conversation.

Evacuation Plans for Soviets From Iraq Reported

Women, Children To Leave

AU1508135490 Paris AFP in English 1333 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, Aug 15 (AFP) — Moscow is organising the evacuation of Soviet women and children from Iraq, but men have not been given permission to leave, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said here Wednesday [15 August].

"From Iraq, under conditions set by Iraqi authorities, only women and children can be evacuated at this time," Yuri Gremytskikh told a news briefing. There are currently about 8,000 Soviet citizens in Iraq, one third of them women and children, the spokesman said.

"I wouldn't use the word hostage at this stage of development," the spokesman told reporters when asked whether Soviet men were being held in Iraq against their will. "We hope that Iraq does not consider our citizens as hostages," he added.

However, "you can compare our situation with that of citizens from Western countries who are not being allowed to leave Iraq," Mr. Gremytskikh added. "Iraqi authorities assured us there was no threat to the security of our people," he said.

Currently, a group of 230 Soviet men, women and children were being evacuated from Kuwait to Iraq, while 32 Soviet citizens managed individually to board a plane out of Baghdad Wednesday, the spokesman said. An ad-hoc committee set up by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was currently working on evacuating the women and children to Jordan, in very difficult conditions as Iraq would only authorize the Soviet Union to use non-Iraqi registered buses to travel overland out of the country, the spokesman said.

Group Organizes Evacuation

LD1508142190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 15 Aug 90

[From the "News and Views" program]

[Excerpts] The inter-ministerial group set up on orders from President Gorbachev to organize the evacuation of Soviet nationals from Iraq and Kuwait has begun its work. [passage omitted]

A reporter from the weekly MOSCOW NEWS has learned these details from the Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, who is in charge of the Middle East affairs. [passage omitted]

Asked if he could feel a threat looming over the Soviet specialists staying in Iraq because, well, in the first place, of a likely military action by the United States against Iraq, and secondly, in view of the possibility that Baghdad might take them hostage in response to Soviet sanctions, Aleksandr Belonogov said he objected to using the term hostage. The Iraqi leaders, he said, could not but take into account the history of Iraqi-Soviet relations. Mr. Belonogov expressed the hope that the Iraqi media would refrain from fanning public hostility towards Soviet specialists.

Asked whether he could say anything about the future of Soviet military advisers in Iraq, Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov said that was an issue to be decided by more than the Foreign Ministry alone. He admitted he had no information about any decision taken on the subject. [passage omitted]

Preparations Made for Evacuees

PM1508193990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by IAN correspondent Ye. Mikitenko for PRAVDA under the general heading "No Way Out In Sight": "Evacuation from Kuwait Beginning"]

[Text] Baghdad—The first group of Soviet evacuees from Kuwait is expected to arrive in Baghdad late tonight. Some 196 people, mainly oilworkers and their families, will be accommodated in a Soviet specialists' settlement near Baghdad. When the requisite documents have been processed they will continue their journey to the border with Jordan. From there the group will be taken by Jordanian buses to Amman airport and will fly to Moscow on Aeroflot aircraft.

First Group Arrives in Baghdad

LD1608102390 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The first group of Soviet evacuees from Kuwait numbering 230, mostly women and children, arrived in Baghdad, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials told TASS.

It is expected that Soviet citizens will be flown from Baghdad by charter flights.

A group led by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov on the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Kuwait and Iraq, which was set up on the instructions of the Soviet president, is working on the evacuation.

The Soviet side continues efforts to obtain more convenient ways of evacuation—by air and sea.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said that virtually all Soviet citizens sent to work in Kuwait will be evacuated from that country. As is the practice in crisis situations, mostly women and children will be evacuated from Iraq.

Iraqi representatives assured the Soviet side that there was no direct danger to Soviet citizens. The stay of Soviet specialists in Iraq will, therefore, depend on how things develop.

The spokesman also said that the Iraqi side assists in ensuring the safety of Soviet evacuees.

TASS Reports on U.S. Moves in Gulf Crisis

President Meets Jordanian King

LD1508173190 Moscow TASS in English 1722 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondnet Oleg Polyakovskiy]

[Text] Washington August 15 TASS—King Husayn of Jordan arrived here early on Wednesday for talks with President George Bush on the worsening Gulf crisis. According to the ASSOCIATED PRESS News Agency, Husayn carried a "private message" for Bush from President Saddam Husayn of Iraq.

Bush told a news conference on Tuesday that the King of Jordan had told him on the telephone on Monday that he would like to come over and talk about the whole situation in the Persian Gulf.

Bush and Husayn will confer Thursday at the President's oceanside home in Kennebunkport, Maine.

During the Tuesday news conference, Bush warned that the United States could seal the Jordanian port of Aqaba, through which Iraq continues to receive food and other cargoes in circumvention of United Nations sanctions.

When asked whether he thought it would be necessary at some point to stop ships going into Aqaba, Bush said: "I think at some point it might well be. If it's a hole through which commerce flows in an otherwise tight net, I would certainly think that Aqaba should be closed to Iraqi commerce."

Bush offered reassuring words and the prospect of financial aid, "provided Jordan joined these other countries in fulfilling these obligations under the sanctions," i.e. to compensate Jordan's losses as a result of the termination of its commercial operations with Iraq.

"We have always been a friend of Jordan. We've helped them in the past. We'd help them in the future if they fulfil their obligation here," Bush emphasised.

Bush Speaks at Pentagon

LD1508180690 Moscow TASS in English 1753 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy]

[Text] Washington August 15 TASS—"Our objectives remain clear: The immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. We will achieve these honorable goals," President George Bush told Pentagon employees today.

"Our action in the Gulf is about fighting aggression—and preserving the sovereignty of nations," he said.

"We are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources that are key—not just to the functioning of this country, but to the entire world.

"A half century ago our nations and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should—and could—have been stopped. We are not about to make the same mistake twice.

"Today, Saddam Husayn's Iraq has been cut off by the Arab and Islamic nations that surround it. The Arab League itself has condemned Iraq's aggression. We stand with them—and we are not alone.

"Sanctions are working. The Armies and Air Forces of Egypt, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are shoulder to shoulder with us in Saudi Arabia's defence.

"Ships of numerous countries are sailing with ours to see that U.N. sanctions—approved without dissent—are enforced. Together we must ensure that no goods get in—and that not one drop of oil gets out," Bush said.

Bush rejected President Saddam Husayn's assertions that the Gulf conflict is a conflict between the Arabs and the Americans, accusing Iraqi troops of committing atrocities in Kuwait.

The president addressed Pentagon employees after U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell briefed him on the Gulf situation and the course of the U.S. Armed Forces' operations there.

Marines Arrive in Saudi Arabia

LD1508181190 Moscow TASS in English 1747 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko]

[Text] Washington August 15 TASS—Forward units of the first expedition corps and the Seventh Brigade of the U.S. marines have arrived in Saudi Arabia as the crisis in the Gulf worsens.

U.S. Marines were flown in from Camp Pendleton, El Toro and Twenty-Nine Palms Bases in California and Norfolk in Virginia, according to a U.S. defence ministry [as received] press release.

Initially, only light infantry troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, according to a Pentagon spokesman.

The expedition forces are armed with 60 Harrier vertical-take-off aircraft, 48 F/A-18 jet fighters, 20 A-6 attack planes, 25 attack helicopters, 70 tanks and more than 90 155-millimeter howitzers.

The deployment will boost considerably the firepower of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

In the next few days, a total of 16,000 marines will be deployed in Saudi Arabia. Finally, a whole 45,000 strong expedition corps will be moved to the kingdom.

Arms stocks already deployed in the country will be enough for 30-days of combat operations, the spokesman said.

There are now about 26,000 U.S. servicemen in Saudi Arabia, according to the UPI news agency, which said that the total number of troops involved in the "Operation Desert Shield" will exceed 100,000.

The carrier John F. Kennedy and seven support ships are heading for the Red Sea to join The Eisenhower nuclear aircraft carrier, the Pentagon announced today.

NATO Members Take 'Active Part' Against Iraq

PM1508125790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" by Colonel I. Vladimirov: "NATO in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] Against the background of the political impasse which is arising in the Persian Gulf region and which is leaving less and less chance of a peaceful settlement of the extremely dangerous crisis with consequences that are hard to predict, the various sides' war preparations are in full swing. Iraq is building up its group of forces in annexed Kuwait. The forces opposed to it are sending military formations into the region to force Husayn to back down. The escalation of mutual threats has reached its limit.

The NATO countries are taking an active part in the attempts to curb Baghdad. The special session of the bloc's council held in Brussels 10 August unanimously condemned Iraq's actions and supported the political and economic sanctions taken against it by the United Nations. The firm line taken by the leader of the alliance—the United States, which is creating a powerful military strike force in the region—was also approved. True, not all agreed to take the risk of a direct military clash with Iraq. Britain, France, and Canada have already sent additional detachments of warships, including the aircraft carriers Invincible and Clemenceau, aircraft, and contingents of servicemen to the Persian Gulf. But the majority of West European NATO countries have preferred to confine themselves to tasks of ensuring the U.S. military effort. The governments of the FRG, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece have given permission for the U.S. bases in those countries to be used to transfer the U.S. rapid deployment forces to Saudi Arabia. In addition, Bonn has announced that it will send a detachment of warships to the East Mediterranean to take over from the ships of the U.S. Navy's 6th Fleet which have headed for the Persian Gulf.

This is not the first time the NATO countries have resorted to such tactics when crisis situations have arisen outside the bloc's zone of responsibility. This tactic is known in NATO circles as the "division of labor." Although the NATO leadership does maintain that such actions are not coalition actions, as they are conducted outside the bloc's zone of responsibility, the individual actions of each country and their consequences for the entire alliance are liable to be discussed and agreed on within the military-political structures of the alliance.

If diplomatic efforts fail to settle the crisis that has arisen, the conflict will inevitably assume an international nature. And even those countries in the alliance which are now aloof, as it were, from events in the Persian Gulf will find themselves in the flames of a new Near East war. It would not be out of place to recall that the well-known U.S. General B. Rogers saw the Persian Gulf as the region where World War III might begin. True, that forecast was made under conditions very different from the situation in the nineties. Now that the "cold war" has receded into the past, the world community has considerably greater opportunities to prevent a dangerous development of events in the Persian Gulf. Otherwise, the conflict with Iraq could boomerang on the whole of Europe and slow down the process of the continent's demilitarization or even reverse it.

Effects of Possible Oil Price Hike Examined

PM1508210790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Will There Be A New Oil Crisis?"]

[Excerpts] Paris—As confrontation in the Persian Gulf becomes increasingly protracted, another, third oil crisis is beginning to loom on the horizon and the consequences of it could have the most adverse consequences for the world economy. Remember that the two previous crises, 1973 and 1979, associated with a series of oil prices increases, led to a major slump in the industrially developed states and made the Third World poorer and the problems facing it even worse. [passage omitted]

If the Persian Gulf conflict drags on, the price of a barrel of oil will reach at least $30, according to observers' forecasts. Then, they believe, the interests of the United States, and also Japan, which is totally dependent on oil imports, will be most affected. West European countries' losses will be less significant. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of Western experts, what will be the consequences of an increase in the price of oil for the Soviet Union, which is the world's biggest producer of this type of fuel? At first glance, it would improve matters considerably, bringing in vital hard currency revenue. At the current price of $25 per barrel we would make an extra $750 million. However, in view of the close interdependence between various countries' economies, the Soviet Union would also be indirectly affected by the consequences of the oil crisis. We would have to pay much more for equipment from the West. The industrially developed countries would be preoccupied above all with their own problems, and least of all with giving us assistance. So ultimately, according to Western observers, our "gain" could be nugatory and more like a Pyrrhic victory.

But the main sufferers as a result of an oil price rise would be the East European countries, which are totally dependent on imports and are currently tackling the difficult tasks of switching to a market economy. For many years the Soviet Union has been their chief and often sole supplier of this type of fuel.

The Baghdad regime owes all these countries hundreds of millions of dollars for supplies of weapons, and they were expecting that Iraq would pay off at least part of the debt with oil. But in view of the embargo, in which the East European states are involved, these hopes are not likely to materialize at present. The economic sanctions against Iraq will cost Poland alone at least $300 million.

Is the embargo an effective means of pressuring Iraq? Will it make Saddam Husayn withdraw his forces from Kuwait? Many Western politicians are very skeptical about this. But at the moment the entire international community is demonstrating a willingness to observe the economic sanctions.

Clearly there is no longer any need to persuade anyone that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a barbaric act, violating all the principles of international law. It created yet another dangerous center of conflict, fraught with unpredictable results. But the consequences of Saddam Husayn's act do not stop there. They will affect the lives and well-being of people in all countries of East and West, North and South. The occupation of a small sovereign state in this interdependent world has dealt a serious blow both to our national interests and to general human interests.

Palestinian, Arab Criticism of Invasion Viewed

PM1508125190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" by Palestinian journalist Rami al-Sha'ir: "Recurrence of Fist Law"]

[Text] I have not had occasion to visit Kuwait, although I have intended to do so on many occasions. I regret this today. Above all because, if I had visited this country and plunged myself into Kuwaiti life, I could probably be more emotional today about showing my feelings for the people who have fallen victim to Iraq's blatant, treacherous aggression. I would sincerely like to voice my sympathy for the Kuwaitis who have done their duty of defending their homeland during a difficult time for their country.

My friends who have visited Kuwait have told me a great deal about this Persian Gulf state. They have said that Kuwait leaped from the Middle Ages straight into the 21st century. Others described it as a "supermarket in the desert." And others contended that Kuwait is an "enlightened monarchy in which there is no room for poverty."

Kuwait's development was indeed rapid in all areas of sociocultural policy and the economy. The Kuwaitis' standard of living—and in most cases the standard of living of foreigners living in Kuwait—was incomparable to the standard of living of virtually all the Arab countries in the region. Sensible, rational use of oil income ensured the country stable rates of growth. The new generation of specialists who received their education in Kuwait itself, Egypt, France, the United States, and the USSR has made a considerable contribution to the country's renewal. The report that Iraq had attacked Kuwait, renouncing the peaceful resolution of certain contentious problems, was all the harder for me. The thought automatically occurred to me that this country would be halted in its development and that it would take years to heal the wounds inflicted on the people and the country.

In order to justify its aggression Iraq is alluding to various pretexts today—these include disputed sectors of the oil-bearing zone and the "support of progressive forces" who allegedly opposed the amir's regime. But the more speeches are made about this, the less convincing they seem and the more disgusting the visage of aggression appears, and its its aims, and scale.

Kuwait's leaders may not have succeeded in everything, there have been episodes in this country's history that may cause some regret. But if we acknowledge any neighbor's right to forcibly overthrow the government of a sovereign country, if we trust in the fist to resolve a dispute that could quite easily be resolved without it, where, in what savage jungles will we end up? Both our region and others would certainly become battlegrounds where fascist interpretation of the laws of war and peace would be taken for the truth.

If we look at the new armed conflict from this angle, it seems far more serious than at first glance. First, it seems to be provocation against the worldwide tendency to move on from confrontation to cooperation, since its organizers indisputably expected the reemergence of two opposing camps in the world. Second, it seems to be a blow to those forces that are striving to assert the new thinking in international affairs and that are doing a great deal to put a stop to confrontational processes on a global scale.

To all intents and purposes, Iraq's aggression is not merely a throwback to the era predating perestroyka, but rather to medieval fist law. Iraqi leaders have satisfied the bellicose ambitions of some of their subjects by targeting their aggression against prosperous Kuwait, like the feudal lords who gave up prosperous trading cities for plunder. But what was the result of this Iraqi Army aggression if not shame? Not only are the Iraqis involved in a fratricidal war—you cannot call it anything else—but in addition an Arab state's soldiers are occupying an Arab country! And the fact that small Kuwait's resistance was smashed so rapidly does not make it any less shameful.

A great deal in this action arouses indignation, protest, and pain for the victims of the Iraqi aggression and, perhaps, for the Iraqis themselves. But the unbounded cynicism inherent in this action is what is particularly striking. The entire invasion saga has been cynical: the fact that the invasion was perpetrated against a small country which was clearly unable to defend itself against the battering blows by the tanks of a million-strong army; the fact that it was preceded by diplomatic games which, it is clear today, were only a cover for the aggression that was being prepared—the decision to annex Kuwait confirms this; even the fact that the commanders of the armies used for the invasion received high rewards as if they were doing something heroic, noble, or important for the Iraq's future.

Perhaps the most cynical element was the fact that Iraqi tanks plowed up a country that gave Iraq considerable material backing in its war against its neighbor, Iran, and did a great deal to ensure that Iraq, which began the war in the Persian Gulf zone, emerged from this war with the least possible losses in the prevailing conditions.

This is not, of course, the only point. The moral aspect of the problem is the main thing. If the Arab countries of the Near East and we Palestinians accept fist law from an Arab country, what moral right do we then have to condemn Israel for its treacherous attacks in 1956 and 1967? Where then are the criteria for assessment, the criteria for truth? Where is the guarantee that a suitable pretext will not be found tomorrow to violate the sovereignty and integrity of another Arab country and overthrow its government by force?

This begs the conclusion that Iraq has, by its action, effectively stabbed the Palestinians and all Arabs in the back, seriously undermining the efforts to settle the Near East conflict. Judge for yourselves: Is this not a gift for Israel, which is now fully entitled to say the following: What serious steps can be taken toward peace in the region until you Arabs put your own house in order and put an end to violence among yourselves? Because even if an all-embracing settlement is secured, there are no guarantees that any regime that advocates fist law won't want another partition in the region for various reasons or a change in the status quo. Thus, it is premature to talk about an all-embracing settlement.

Certain circles in the United States and Western Europe have stepped up their activity today, advancing the idea that Israel alone can be a stabilizing factor in the Near East since it alone can resist the most aggressive despotic regimes in the Arab world. Consequently, Israel's military ambitions must not be restricted.

But the fresh armed conflict also has an international projection. The Gulf was and still is a sore point in the world economy—because vast oil reserves are concentrated here and because highly important maritime and air lines of communication intersect here. It is not for nothing that the conflict caused panic on the Western stock exchanges, it is not for nothing that the most important oil cartels have sounded the alarm. Political specialists know that any armed conflict tends to expand. Mindful of the fact that the Iraqi troops have moved up to the Saudi border, one can speak of a serious threat to universal peace: After all, fever in an important economic area and the danger of the broadening of armed confrontation may produce the kind of earth tremor that will be felt in all capitals.

Sober politicians realize this today. Naturally, Iraq has effectively ended up politically isolated, if you do not count a few states whose regimes are considerably dependent on it. This fact above all indicates that, irrespective of the aims and tasks of its aggression, Iraq has not succeeded in imposing its way of acting on the region and the world, it has not succeed in changing the international political situation, and has not succeeded in establishing itself as a regional superpower, however its generals may have rattled their missile and chemical sabers. On the contrary, today Iraq's prestige has fallen lower than it ever has—to zero—in company with highly unpopular regimes who sacrifice the lives of their fellow citizens and the lives of people in other countries for the sake of ambitions that are not destined to be realized.

Now let me say a word about another matter. Quite recently, two months ago. Iraq initiated a pan-Arab summit meeting which adopted decisions directed by and large toward a peaceful offensive in the Near East and diplomatic steps, rather than to fist law methodology. Who will now believe the lofty speeches given by the organizers of the Baghdad meeting and those who voted on the highly important points of the general international program and why should they? So, we Arabs have once again compromised ourselves in the face of the whole world.

There is only perhaps one conclusion to be drawn from everything I have said: We will not be taken seriously by the international community until we are able by resolute, vigorous, and consistent actions to make Iraq to go home, until we can prove that even in this exceptionally complex situation we are able to display supreme responsibility, morality, and devotion to the cause of honor.

Commentary Says Iraq Pushing 'Clash With U.S.'

LD1508123790 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] The policy of military threats has its own logic. At a certain point it might be easy to take a step beyond the line of the reasonable. Hence the considerable public anxiety at the escalation of hostility between Washington and Baghdad. It would be impossible to let Iraq get away with its aggression. The question is how to bring those countrys' leaders back to their senses. Washington seems to be increasingly relying on the use of force. [passage omitted]

Some Arab countries, too, have been moving their troops to Saudi Arabia to form something of an international forces in that country. But Washington has a free hand to act, and is being encouraged to do so by some of its NATO allies.

Events in the Gulf region have been developing rapidly and have taken a dangerous course. United States troops are getting ready to deal a series of preemptive blows to Iraq should the United States receive information about Iraqi preparations for an incursion into Saudi Arabia. [passage omitted]

Strictly speaking, Iraq has been provoking an armed clash with the United States. Calls have been heard from Baghdad and the Arabs for unleashing what is described as a sacred war against foreign invaders. In some Arab countries there has been a positive response to those calls. Iraq is threatening to use chemical weapons and deploying its troops in Kuwait in the vicinity of the Saudi border.

Clearly the situation has grown exceedingly dangerous. Any use of force against the aggressor must, in these conditions, be attempted only by decision of the United Nations Security Council. Besides, there still seems to be a chance to settle the conflict politically through negotiations.

Iraq Recognizes Border With Iran, Plans Pullout

LD1508170590 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Timoshkin: "A Step in the Right Direction"]

[Excerpts] Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn today officially announced his endorsement of the Algiers agreement which stipulates that the Iraqi border with Iran goes through the Shatt al-Arab. Saddam Husayn also said that Iraq will withdraw its forces from that part of Iranian territory which was seized during the eight years of war, and that he is prepared to commence the withdrawal of troops on Friday, the day after tomorrow. Finally, Saddam Husayn announced that he is prepared to start exchanging POWs; and thus the main obstacles to a final solution of the Iraq-Iran dispute, which lasted 10 years, have been removed. It also ends the state of no war, no peace between Iraq and Iran. [passage omitted]

Tehran replied immediately to Baghdad's initiative on the resolving of the Iraq-Iran dispute. The official Iranian radio interrupted its normal programs to tell listeners about this exciting news. Later an official spokesman of the Supreme Security Council in Iran said that the country's leadership will examine with optimism the Iraqi president's latest proposals. The spokesman added that an official Iraqi delegation must come to Tehran this evening to bring the text of President Saddam Husayn's proposals, and that the proposals will be examined carefully so that a reply may be formulated.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that Iraq has moved in the right direction. I could say that the step must have been taken after a careful assessment of the current situation in the Gulf which has developed as a result of the Iraqi occupation and annexation of Kuwait, and as a result of the very negative reaction of most countries to a military action which has not previously been taken by an Arab country against another. It is clear that despite its military might, Iraq is incapable of opening many fronts at the same time. I would like to express my hope that Baghdad will not move the troops deployed on the Iranian border to its border with neighboring Arab countries. I would also like to express my hope that Baghdad will take positive steps toward resolving the extremely dangerous current crisis with Kuwait. This would be logical and very useful, first of all to Iraq itself, which was exhausted by its war with Iran.

Minister Confirms Aid Accord With Afghanistan

LD1508164190 Moscow TASS in English 1605 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Economic Relations Ministry official has confirmed that the USSR and Afghanistan signed several agreements last week to provide $300 million in financial aid to Afghanistan.

"These agreements, however, are not of an emergency nature as FRANCE PRESSE reported on August 14," said Viktor Koptevskiy, head of the Soviet Foreign Economic Relations Ministry Department on Cooperation with Asian countries.

Koptevskiy said that the decision to provide $300 million in financial aid to Afghanistan was made back in 1987, But "the funds have not been used since then".

"In view of the Afghan side's request, we gave our consent in principle to their use, but only after the size of Afghanistan's debt to the Soviet Union was determined. We told this to the Afghan side during the ninth session of the mixed Soviet-Afghan economic commission," Koptevsiy said.

This year, the USSR pledged to supply 230,000 tonnes of grain to Afghanistan and an extra 10,000 tonnes along the United Nations line. The Afghan side's request to increase grain shipments by another 100,000 tonnes is under consideration, Koptevski said.

"In addition, this year's commitments envisage the supply of 110,000 tonnes of aviation fuel to Afghanistan and the possibility to deliver another 50,000 tonnes is under study." [words indistinct] the Soviet side was guided by in signing these agreements, Koptevskiy said that they were envisaged by the documents signed at the inter-governmental level and were based on the USSR's policy in Afghanistan.

In Koptevskiy's view, the agreements signed last week do not require to be approved by respective Soviet parliamentary committees and commissions.

Afghan Rebel Leader To Negotiate POW's Release

LD1608054090 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Report by Tatyana Chemodanova, "Panorama" anchorman]

[Text] I will begin with a really sensational report. It consists of the fact that the mujahidin are planning on meeting Yelstin. It has been reported from Islamabad that Aleksey Olenin and Valentin (Dubina), POW's, after long years of waiting, will soon embrace their mothers. Representatives of the interim opposition government have promised that the will allow a meeting, as is done in the prisons of the civilized world. Therefore, the parents consider the first meeting with their children to be the first sign. It must open the way for others.

According to the statement by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a major opposition leader, he is doing this as a goodwill gesture to Boris Yeltsin. Both he and the leaders of the interim government have expressed the wish to send a composite delegation from the mujahidin leadership to negotiations in Moscow with the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Under discussion will be the possible release of all Soviet POW's. Thus, in Yeltsin's hands is a unique historic opportunity to save from imprisonment all our compatriots who have survived the Afghan war.

Fate of Pakistan's Bhutto Compared to Father's

PM1508092890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

["International Commentary" by N. Paklin: "Pakistan: Democracy Not to the Generals' Taste"]

[Text] Delhi—Does the tragic fate of Benazir Bhutto's father—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hanged in a prison torture chamber—await her too? This is by no means a rhetorical question. Parallels suggest themselves.

...Elections were held in Pakistan in 1977. They were won for the second time in succession by the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] headed by Z.A. Bhutto, its leader, who took the post of prime minister for a second time. The Islamic opposition refused to recognize the results. On 5 July 1977 General Ziaul Haq, chief of staff of the Pakistani Army ground forces, carried out a military coup. The prime minister was thrown into jail. He was executed at dawn on 4 April 1979.

The usurper ruled in Pakistan for 11 long years. Fate settled accounts with him cruelly. In August 1988 he died in an air crash. It is still not clear whether it was an accident or sabotage. In November of the same year the first free elections for many years were held in Pakistan. They were won by the PPP again. This time it was headed by Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the murdered premier, who herself spent five years in the dictator's jails, including 11 months in solitary confinement.

The same Islamic opposition gave a hostile reception to her accession to power. During the night of 5-6 August retired Gen. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, president of Pakistan, used his authority to dismiss Benazir Bhutto's government. He appointed as prime minister of a provisional government Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, leader of the Islamic opposition. B. Bhutto has been accused of corruption. Her father was also accused of the same sin. Experience shows that it is extremely difficult to prove one's innocence of such a charge and under those conditions. The new head of the provisional government is threatening to try Benazir Bhutto and her closest associates in a "special tribunal." Her father too was tried by a dictator....

At whose instigation did the 76-year-old president venture to dismiss the legitimate civilian government, which has a majority of votes in the National Assembly? There is one answer: the military. The president himself has no real power. It is in the generals' hands. Under their command infantry brigades, armored units, squadrons of combat helicopters, and squadrons of ships are in a state of combat readiness. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947 the army has always played a decisive role in the country's life. From time to time it has conceded power to civilians but has at once taken it back by mounting a new military coup.

The 11 years of Gen. Ziaul Haq's dictatorial rule brought Pakistan to the brink of crisis. The general regarded the country as a huge barracks which was instructed to live according to army regulations. But the country with a population of 100 million not only did not want to live like that but was also unable to do so. It perceived the general's death as a deliverance.

As a result, the army officers, orphaned without the dictator general, did not risk mounting a new coup. They consented to elections being held, reckoning that they would be won by the parties of the Islamic fundamentalists, with whom they speak the same language. This misfired. Of course, even after the elections the army might have taken power. But the generals decided to appear before their own people and the rest of the world in the guise of respectable gentlemen. They magnanimously allowed the formation of a civilian government headed by the winner—Benazir Bhutto.

They made their consent conditional on two things: The government would not interfere in the affairs of the military, leaving it with a completely free hand, and would pursue the former foreign policy course. And, so that it did not take it into its head to exert influence, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a close associate of the dead dictator, was set up over it as the country's president, while retired Gen. Yaqub Khan, who was equally close to the late Ziaul Haq, was included in the government as foreign minister. Benazir Bhutto and her ministers found themselves hostages to the military. Pakistan acquired a civilian facade, but its interior was military. The attempt which Benazir Bhutto once made to weaken the military's iron grip by rearranging it ended in failure: The military simply ignored her order.

Deprived of actual power, the civilian government could not resolve the complex problems facing Pakistan. Ethnic riots flared up with new force in the southern province of Sind. They are now being blamed on Benazir Bhutto, but not even Ziaul Haq with his dictatorial methods of ruling could pacify Sind.

Pakistan's military special services sabotaged all B. Bhutto's efforts to try to resolve together with India the complex problem of Kashmir. They armed Kashmiri separatists, set up their own agents in the most northerly Indian state, and supplemented them with fundamentalist mullahs who were infiltrated there.

Many Pakistanis pinned on Benazir Bhutto's name their hopes for the democratization of political life in the country: the functioning of political parties, the regular holding of parliamentary elections, and basic civil rights and freedoms guaranteed not in words but in deeds. But the omnipotence of the military undermines democracy. The Pakistani generals not only looked askance and inimically at Bhutto's reforming activity but also sharply criticized it. The generals are trying to impose on the country life under the medieval dogmas of Islam, according to which the shari'a holds sway over the law. They trembled at the very thought that a Muslim country would be ruled, albeit even formally, by a woman—moreover, one with higher education. The chief demand of the Islamic opposition was Benazir Bhutto's resignation. But it was not possible to overthrow Benazir Bhutto's government by democratic means, that is, as the result of a vote in parliament. Then they took advantage of presidential prerogatives.

Literally the second hour after the announcement of the president's decision the military began disowning it. "We had nothing to do with it," Gen. Beg, ground forces chief of staff and still a key figure in the Pakistani military hierarchy, publicly declared. But, by that time army units had already seized many strategic—from the generals' viewpoint—civilian targets. And a little later officers came to rummage in the desks of the former prime minister's secretariat.

People in khaki uniform put their immediate proteges in power. It is impossible to speak of a democratic or constitutional change of regime.

Not that the military is concerned about such niceties. It has already been announced that new parliamentary elections will be held in the country 24 October. It is planned to hold them in such a way as to rule out all elements of chance this time and to ensure victory for the Islamic fundamentalists. An extremely primitive way to do this has been selected: prevent Benazir Bhutto, who is popular in the country and abroad, from participating in the elections. The premier of the provisional government has announced this. It is for this purpose that the trial of the head of the civilian government is being set in motion in the "special tribunal." But, as a preliminary, they intend to arrest her. An order forbidding her departure for abroad has already come into force....

The military's gross interference in the process of democratization of Pakistani society has caused concern abroad. This has been stated frankly in Delhi, and it has been declared in Washington. But nothing has been said about this in Moscow. Maybe our government and public are still defining their attitude toward the recent events in Pakistan? Of course, a changeover of power is strictly an internal matter for every country. But this certainly does not mean that other states must necessarily keep mum. People abroad and, incidentally, in Pakistan itself have repeatedly expressed views on our internal affairs. And we too will express ours.

New Ambassador Appointed to Egypt 12 Aug

LD1208045190 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 12 TASS—The Soviet president has appointed Vladimir Polyakov ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Polyakov, an ethnic Russian, was born in 1931. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in 1953. He is Master of sciences (economy). Polyakov has the diplomatic rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

Gennadiy Zhuravlyov has been relieved of the duties of the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union in the Arab Repulic of Egypt because of his retirement.

Deputy Prime Minister, Yemeni Minister Meet

LD1308185690 Moscow TASS in English 1740 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Lev Ryabev today received Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth of the Yemen Republic Salih Abu Bakr Husaynun at the latter's request.

They discussed economic and industrial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yemen.

The talk was atended by Yemen's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ahmad Abdallah 'Abd al-Ilah.

Israeli Education Minister in Leningrad 9 Aug

TA0908200690 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Text] Education and Culture Minister Zvulun Hammer left today on a two-day visit to Leningrad at the invitation of the local Jewish community and the U.S. rabbinical union. Minister Hammer will represent the Israeli Government in a ceremony marking the completion of the writing of new Torah scrolls for Jewish communities in the USSR.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Cameroon Students Picket Embassy in Moscow

LD1508195490 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Students from Cameroon now studying in the Soviet Union visited their country's embassy in Moscow on August 8 to receive an addition to their grant, TASS was told at the Moscow militia chief department.

When the money was not paid to them, they occupied the embassy in protest until 20:00 Moscow time. The Moscow militia reported the incident to the USSR Foreign Ministry State Protocol Department.

On August 10, the charge d'affaire of Cameroon in the USSR approached the USSR Foreign Ministry requesting the tightening of the embassy guard.

On August 12, following repeated meetings with the embassy counsellor for cultural issues, a group of 48 Cameroonian students, who were not allowed into the embassy, tried to force their way into the embassy grounds. Militiamen guarding diplomatic missions drove the students back from the main entrance to the embassy. Students responded by picketing it. The action lasted until 18:00 Moscow time.

On Tuesday, the deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry State Protocol Department spoke to the charge d'affaire of Cameroon and recommended that he himself make decisions on issues related to his country's citizens.

As the charge d'affaires refused to solve these issues, the USSR Foreign Ministry asked the Soviet ambassador to Cameroon to inform the Cameroonian Foreign Ministry about the incident.

The embassy did not work on Tuesday and the charge d'affaires and his staff were outside the embassy building. Students continued picketing the embassy during the day. Some of them refused to disperse and remained on the street for most of the night. The embassy was guarded by a reinforced militia detail.

Cameroonian students lifted the seige only this morning.

Soviet Fishing Trawler Held in Mauritania

PM1508141890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by S. Mostovshchikov incorporating interview with Yevgeniy Shiryayev, deputy minister of the fish industry, followed by G. Charodeyev report on conversation with unnamed USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Soviet Fishermen Captured Again"]

[Text] The capture of Soviet trawlers is apparently becoming a tradition. For the second time in the past few days, a telegram arrived in Moscow addressed to the USSR president, to IZVESTIYA, and to Central Television, from the crew of the trawler "Sugan," captured 6 August by a Mauritanian warship.

Here is the text of this telegram:

"Urgent. Repeat. A Mauritanian warship stopped the 'Sugan' Soviet trawler of the 'Kerchenskiy' fish industry association, under threat of opening fire, 6 August in the neutral waters of the east central Atlantic 18 miles north of the border of the Mauritanian economic zone, in foggy conditions. Officers from the Mauritanian Navy who came on board refused to check coordinates or to draw up a warrant for detention, and cut off means of communication. Two crew members were taken onto the warship as hostages and the ship's documents confirming the ship's true position were removed. The captain of the trawler 'Sugan' was forced under threat of opening fire to follow the warship into the port of Nouadhibou. In practical terms, a terrorist capture of a ship and hostages has been perpetrated. When the ship was anchored in the port of Nouadhibou, embassy personnel and representatives of the ministry of the fish industry failed to pay due attention to the captain's demands to call in the USSR consul. This was proved by the fact that the USSR consul only came to Nouadhibou 9 August—at the beginning of the fourth day of arrest. The captain was arrested 8 August and barred from running the ship, the crew was isolated within the ship, the anchor chain was cut off with an autogenous welder, and the ship was forcibly towed off and moored. The instructions from the USSR consul to the captain say that Mauritanian forces are unloading the fish, 38 crew members are being kept hostage in the local hotel, and the supply of fresh water on the ship is running out. Up until now, no documentary evidence of the 'Sugan' having violated the borders of Mauritania's economic zone has been presented. All norms of international maritime and humanitarian law are being flouted. We appeal for state protection against piratical actions on our ship and against terrorist actions with respect to Soviet sailors who have been taken hostage. On the crew's instructions—Captain Director Kirpichev and ship trade union committee chairman Sarapin."

In the morning of Monday 13 August, we called the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry to establish the situation today. Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Shiryayev knew what was going on. According to him, a "respite has been successfully achieved." After the general director of "Kerchrybprom" arrived at the place where the ship was forcibly moored, and the Soviet representative and the consul made the necessary statements, the unloading of fish from the "Sugan" was suspended, and talks are being held.

As Ye. Shiryayev affirms, the local authorities have already agreed to discuss the prospects for freeing the crew and the ship. There are grounds for hoping that everything will be sorted out in two or three days and that they will let the people go. However, as Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich says, we are probably not going to manage to prove that we were fishing without committing any violations, and consequently, the USSR will bear losses. The deputy minister bases his fears on the fact that during his service he has become familiar with the Mauritanian legal system and in his opinion the question comes down to having to pay the judge a bribe. Therefore it will be rather difficult to prove anything.

Answering the question of why the fishermen prefer to appeal for assistance to the USSR President and the mass media, rather than to the Ministry of the Fish Industry, Ye. Shiryayev answered:

"I believe that this is due to lack of discipline on the captain's part. We give strict reprimands for such things. But now you cannot shut them up, because there is free access to radio stations, and so they are sending cables. We will find out where they were fishing when they come home." [Mostovshchikov report ends]

IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Charodeyev got in touch with a USSR Foreign Ministry representative, who said the following:

"It is not yet clear to us here in Moscow why the Soviet consul did not arrive in Nouadhibou until 9 August. We are clarifying this matter, although we are not ruling out the possibility of the reasons being purely technical. (It is hundreds of kilometers from the capital of Mauritania to Nouadhibou). In addition, there are permanent USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry representatives in Nouadhibou. Another thing is known: Our consul met with the Mauritanian minister of fisheries and maritime economy in Nouakchott as early as 7 August. A relevant note from the Soviet embassy was sent to the Mauritanian Foreign Ministry on the same day.

The USSR charge d'affaires took the necessary steps with regard to the Mauritanian foreign minister and the general secretary of the Mauritanian Ministry of Fisheries 8 August. A similar representation was made to the Mauritanian ambassador in Moscow by the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry. A session of the commission investigating the given case is to be held in the next few days in Mauritania with the participation of Soviet representatives. The USSR Foreign Ministry is closely following this question and intends to defend the legal rights and interests of the Soviet fishermen....

It must be said that this is not the first incident of its kind that has taken place recently off Mauritanian shores. As a rule such incidents were previously concluded with the payment of a fine and the release of our trawlers. I would like to hope that a way out of the present situation that will suit everybody will also be found in the case of the trawler "Sugan." At the same time, our fishermen would be well advised to draw the necessary conclusions and display due circumspection in their work in the future....

Sao Tome and Principe Anniversary Celebrated

Shevardnadze Greets Counterpart

PM1508110690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, the two countries' foreign ministers have exchanged greetings telegrams.

E.A. Shevardnadze and C. da Graca expressed satisfaction with the level of relations of friendship and cooperation existing between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe and supported their further strengthening and development.

Gorbachev Greets President

LD1508191190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent President Pinto da Costa of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe greetings on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic's independence. He wished the people of Sao Tome and Principe success on the path of socio-economic development.

In a message of reply, President Pinto da Costa, on behalf of the people of his country, expressed gratitude to the USSR president for the greetings.

Nigerian Envoy Delivers Message to Gorbachev

LD1508151890 Moscow TASS in English 1441 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today received Zubiru Mahmud Kazaure, the ambassador of Nigeria to the Soviet Union.

The ambassador delivered a message to Mikhail Gorbachev from Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida.

Foreign Minister Receives Guinea Ambassador

PM1608083190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Untitled item from column of TASS-attributed "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.M. Belonogov received Guinea Ambassador C. Diallo 10 August. The ambassador was handed a message from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev in reply to Guinea Republic President L. Conte and a letter from USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze in reply to Guinea Foreign Minister J. Traore.

East Europe

Bulgarian Leader Depends on Pact for Security

PM1508202390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Aug 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent Andrey Smirnov: "Bulgaria: Zh. Zhelev Statement"]

[Text] I see the future of Bulgarian-Soviet relations in terms of the greater democratization of our countries and of relations between them, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev said in an interview with TASS correspondent Andrey Smirnov.

The legacy of Stalin and Brezhnev is passing away and, it seems to me, relations of total frankness and sincerity are already being established between our countries, which I regard as a prerequisite of genuine friendship, genuine equality, and mutual benefit, he stressed.

Of course, much depends on how the situation develops in the Soviet Union, the president continued. I have ventured to suggest in the past that Gorbachev's task—I am referring to the perestroyka he started—is twice as difficult as the task of any other leader in Eastern Europe.

As for economic cooperation between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, we could soon find ourselves, in a sense, in a difficult situation. Indeed, the more production is modernized in the USSR, the greater the demands will be on the quality of our goods. And we will really have to fight for the Soviet market, Zhelev stressed.

Talking about cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere, the president noted that hitherto the main guarantee of Bulgaria's national security and territorial integrity has been the Warsaw Pact and the republic does not intend to quit it.

Bulgarians Differ on Ruin of Communist Symbols

PM1508111390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by correspondent L. Zhmyrev under the rubric "East European Countries": "Who Needs This?"]

[Text] Sofia, 10 Aug—Three years ago a ruby-red star was installed on the spire of the party building in Sofia. Pickets of the "In the Name of Truth" movement are now on duty day and night at the foot of the building. They are demanding the removal of the star from the spire and, at the same time, the removal of the red flags, the hammer and sickle, and other emblems from the buildings of the Council of Ministers, the State Council, and the former Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee.

Similar actions are also to be observed in other cities in the country. Yesterday, for example, the residents of Plovdiv, Bulgaria's second largest city, applauded three rock climbers who were dismantling representations of the hammer and sickle from the tallest building in the city—the former party building of the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

Residents of Plovdiv's tent camp—the "City of Truth"—applied to the authorities for official permission to "wrap up" the monument to Lenin which stands in a prominent position, facing the fair. They did not receive permission, but they did it anyway. With the help of cardboard boxes and sticky tape they "immured" it, surrounding it with posters reading "We don't want monuments to dictators," "Made in the USSR," etc.

In front of G. Dimitrov's former mausoleum, from where his remains were recently removed to a cemetery, a shabby car has been standing for many weeks on deflated tires, representing a poignant backdrop for "departing communism." Broken and scattered all around lie the works of the "founders," their portraits, slogans, hammers and sickles, banners, tables, competition schedules, pennants.... On the hood there stands now a bust of Lenin, now one of Marx, now one of Dimitrov. There is always a crowd around, with some people swearing, others silent, and yet others approving.

What is the attitude to all this of the 5,000 Soviet people who live and work in Bulgaria? There is an invisible line beyond which de-Stalinization and rejection of "totalitarianism and dictatorship" become insults against the honor and dignity of Soviet citizens. For there are many civilized, compromise methods of resolving the problem of monuments and party emblems. For example, a referendum or mutual agreement. For us Soviet people Lenin is not only the "party leader and teacher" but also the symbol of our homeland and of civic dignity. Those who are "immuring" him cannot disregard this....

GDR Party Defies Efforts To Isolate It

PM1608090990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov: "There Will Be No Isolation"]

[Text] Berlin, 13 Aug—The efforts of the ruling coalition parties in the GDR revolve around the question of how to exclude the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] from political life.

The political manipulations over the treaty on elections which is being concluded between the two German states are geared to the attainment of this goal. The document's authors reckoned that they would be able to leave the PDS without allies.

The PDS' response is to endeavor to nullify the efforts to isolate it. This particular point was discussed at an enlarged plenum of the PDS Board in Berlin.

The PDS is prepared to be part of a broad alliance with other political forces, party chairman Gregor Gysi said at the plenum.

The plenum participants, who included the chairmen of regional and district PDS organizations, members of the Council of Elders, People's Chamber deputies, representatives of grassroots groups, and guests from the FRG, discussed the question of preparations for all-German elections. It was noted that the PDS has allies both in the GDR and in the FRG. The experience of left-wing forces in both German states will make it possible to conduct an effective policy in a united Germany.

Czechoslovak Envoy Interviewed on Relations

PM1508153490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 p 3

[Interview with Rudolf Slansky, Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, by Yevgeniy Nefedov; date and place of interview not given: "The Forties, Sixties... What Next?"—first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] Time marches on, changing the life of whole peoples and states. This conversation is concerned with how the new Czechoslovak ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR, Rudolf Slansky, sees the way to renew relations between our countries.

His life has not been an easy one: Born in Czechoslovakia in 1935, he lived with his parents in the Soviet Union during the war; subsequently his family returned home, where at the beginning of the fifties the life of his father, Rudolf Slansky, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee and prominent figure in the Czechoslovak communist movement, was brought to an abrupt end when trumped-up "charges" were leveled against him. The son became a worker, at the same time graduated from high school and a higher educational establishment, was employed in various economic posts, and in 1965 became a member of the CPCZ, from which, four years later, he was expelled as a participant in the Prague Spring of 1968.... He then engaged in economics and current affairs writing, was among the organizers of Charter 77, and studied problems of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. Today Rudolf Slansky answers KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's questions for the first time.

[Nefedov] First, please let me thank you for agreeing to this conversation.

But, if possible, do please allow me to address you as "pan": It is more or less neutral and unambiguous in both our languages, whereas, I must admit, having lived several years recently in Czechoslovakia, I have been unable as yet to get a handle on the metamorphosis of the concepts "comrade" and "mister." My apologies....

[Slansky] Oh, that's all right. In Czech such a term of address is usual, natural, and civil, if you will. While, for example, "comrade" implies, as it were, affiliation to a certain ideology, just as "mister" seems to express the superiority of one person over another.... Czechs indeed have a saying: "I am pan—you are pan," which expresses peoples's equality in relation to one another....

[Nefedov] Thank you, Pan Ambassador. So you have now come to our country and have looked around you with "fresh eyes," so to speak. What, then, have you seen, and how would you describe all that is happening?

[Slansky] It is fairly difficult for me, I must admit, to do that, since I have not come here as a politician, political scientist, or journalist: I am a diplomat, so I am to some extent constrained in my answers and assessments. But what I do consider the main, important thing is of course the process of changes occurring in everything or many things. Everything is changing, the old political system in essence exists no more, but there is not, however, a new one yet. Indeed, the outlines of the actual new system in politics are not as yet altogether clear. Likewise the old economic system no longer exists, but the one which should succeed it is not visible either. In the same way, the former relations among the nations do not obtain, but again new ones have not yet developed.... So my first impression, already fixed to some extent, is that everything here is now at the stage of changes, but it is difficult meanwhile to discern or predict the new outlines or the time frame for a more or less clear stabilization of relations in your country.

[Nefedov] In keeping with the current tradition of our press I should, esteemed Pan Slansky, ask you whether you have any "prescriptions" for improving our society's "health." But, first, I am aware that this does not form part of your functions and, second, I do know how difficult the problems facing Czechoslovakia are today. But if one talks about similar crisis situations, then, in my view, one of the most "panhuman" problems in Europe now, and not just in Europe, is the formation and development of true democracy. So much has been said and resaid about this, but what does it mean, in your opinion?

[Slansky] You know, one may, of course, approach the actual concept "democracy" from different aspects. Democracy denotes a political system, democracy denotes in general the course of political life, the process of revealing the will of the majority so that the country may be governed in a more or less stable way. This system should be accepted by the overwhelming majority of the people. On the other hand, democracy also denotes a means of communication in society. For example, Masaryk said that democracy is discussion, the art of talking to one another. Then democracy is the art of compromise. Since you need a socially acceptable means of finding a compromise among the divergent interests of different strata of the population... And this could be extended by other examples. But it is clear that democracy also means a kind of system and life which cannot be created by any resolutions whatsoever, but is something which everyone must work hard at creating and where everyone must accept common principles and values—and act and collaborate with one another in accord with them and out of their own deep inner conviction.

[Nefedov] Let us then dwell a little on principles and values. Today one has to acknowledge that the reflection of precisely those values which were proclaimed—as an ideal—by the theoreticians of socialism is seen in much of the positive things achieved by countries with a high standard of living—capitalist or otherwise. In that case have its postulates grown outmoded, is it necessary to abandon them completely forthwith, which quite a few arguments revolve around today? Excuse me, Pan Slansky, but your political orientation, after all, is socialist, is it not? So your opinions on this score are all the more interesting.

[Slansky] I think that socialist values are on the whole some of the basic values of mankind. They indeed belong to that whole repository of the finest things which people have created over many centuries. The chief virtue of these ideas lies in its orientation toward people, and moreover an orientation that is real rather than merely verbal. That is social justice, the defense of all the weak, those whose lives are encroached upon in some way, by someone, or something. Futhermore, it may be considered that the effectiveness of the economy and production and the wealth of society are ensured by the market as such. The market gives impetus to the development of the strong. But socialist ideals lead to society becoming not a place merely for the "strong" but a place in which everyone can live in the enjoyment of equal rights. And therefore the market and socialist values are not at variance with each other. The market leads to efficient, effective operation of the economy, while socialist ideals seek a fitting place for people within this system.

[Nefedov] I sense, esteemed Pan Ambassador, that while becoming a politician and diplomat you have also successfully worked in your economic specialism. And since you are still engaged with the problems of economic relations between our two countries, what do their prospects look like to you against the background of all the events occurring?

[Slansky] I think that at the present time these relations and their discernible prospects are not very good. Not very good. Our country is at a turning point and we are already switching from an administrative edict system to a market system—all this is bound up with very major problems of a systemic order. Your country also finds itself undergoing this process, but here, it seems to me, everything is far more complex than in my own country and proceeds more slowly. And while we have cooperated—well or badly—for many years now, unfortunately, a noticeable withdrawal from large-scale economic relations is noticeable. Under the pressure of enormous problems there is a marked tendency to move away from previously reached accords. This also applies to the method of switching to settlement in freely convertible currency at world prices and adherence to previously stipulated volumes of supplies of, for example, petroleum and other raw materials. Also it is not altogether clear whom we will be trading with—the center, the republics, or directly with the enterprises....

[Nefedov] That is to say, difficulties immediately give rise to others?

[Slansky] Yes, and everything is shaping up in such a way that unless some fundamental political and economic decisions are taken here, the volume of our trade will fall next year. In such periods of crisis we can either cooperate closely in order to overcome together the real difficulties of the transition period which are characteristic of both you and us or we can each endeavor to scramble out of all this somehow by ourselves or even at the other's expense. And it seems to me that this second approach, whatever form it assumes, is very dangerous in the sense that it can lead, if put into practice, to complete destabilization of our economic relations. And all that we have have created over the decades could come to naught. And yet it is clear that political relations too depend in many respects upon economic interests and economic cooperation. So a reduction in the scale of our partnership in economics will be bound to influence our relations in politics, and Czechoslovakia wants neither the one nor the other.

[Nefedov] It is clear that serious study of these problems lies ahead. I would like, however, to look at a topic which has already been discussed from a different angle. My family and I lived in your country for several years recently—and we met with kindness and cordiality everywhere. But then at the end of last year, however, things were different, at the time of the revolution itself, which—both your colleagues and mine will forgive me—I do not describe as either "gentle" or "velvet," because I saw it from close up, so to speak.... Why since that time has there been so much enmity toward the whole Soviet Union? It is clear that the pain felt over that ill-fated year of 1968 burst out. But how could 1945 and all the useful things of which you have spoken, Pan Ambassador, be "suddenly forgotten" so vigorously? Why, for example, was it necessary to change the name of the Moscow Subway Station in Prague, which was actually constructed, as were all the Prague subway stations, with our assistance? Not to mention a host of other very rapid changes of name, some of which KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has already written about. No, it is true that it is difficult for us to understand: What is going on and why?

[Slansky] It is not easy, of course, to answer all the questions. Because the answer cannot be as glib as was customary in the recent past. It has to be acknowledged that the attitude of our people toward the Soviet Union has in actual fact drastically changed since 21 August 1968. And that is understandable: After all, if foreign troops arrive in a country against the people's will to reverse the political events there, that is bound to be reflected in everyone's attitude to the country which sent them.... Even those who in 1945 greeted with flowers the Soviet soldiers who had liberated us from Nazism. After all, at that time those people were welcoming their liberators. But they could not, after all, regard in the same way those whom Brezhnev sent to carry out his will in their country. Unfortunately, it is very easy to breach relations between countries, while it takes years to mend them. And you can see that our government, despite all the emotions connected with the past, is pursuing a rational, good-neighborly, and well-intentioned policy toward the Soviet Union. Here we have to build the new European home together. But it is also necessary to understand people's feelings. And as for the subway station, I live in Moscow not far from a street which yesterday was called Gorkiy, but is now Tverskaya. People want to restore the original names to places.... It is now called Angel Station, like the historic area in Prague where it is situated. It is scarcely worthwhile looking for anything more behind this....

[Nefedov] There could, of course, have been quite a few more questions, but let us hope that new meetings lie in store for us. But in conclusion, Pan Ambassador, a couple of words about today's young people—being the kind of newspaper we are it is perfectly reasonable for us to ask about this. The youth movement we have in our country today is very diverse and multiform, what is it like in your country? Let your answer, of course, be as long as your knowledge of the topic allows.

[Slansky] I was just about to say that I am scarcely an expert here. I am 55, I live in Moscow.... How to answer, then? The mood of our young people is very changeable now, because there are many changes going on around them. I think that they are searching for their own place in this process, just like all generations do. And young people vary. Vladimir Dlouhy, our economics minister, was in Moscow the other day, and he's 37! May more young people take part in today's changes—after all, they bear less of the burden of past years and events, harbor fewer thoughts about what was, their main reflections being about what should be and how to achieve it. I do not want to say this is solely their task, it is everyone's task, but it is, I repeat, easier, in a certain sense, for them. It is important to remember the past, but it is even more important to think about the future.

[Nefedov] My heartfelt thanks, Pan Slansky.

West Europe

Italy Detains Economics Official for 'Espionage'

90UF0441A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 32, 11-17 Aug 90 p 7

[Interview with I. Mordvinov, head of the Press and Information Department of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko; date and place of interview not given: "Where Do the Tracks Lead?"]

[Text] **On 10 July 1990, without producing an arrest warrant, the Italian police detained Viktor Diodorovich Dmitriyev, born in 1944, a USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations [MVES] official. Dmitriyev came to Italy on 8 July of this year with a group of experts from the ministry who were invited by the Olivetti firm for training at the computer center. Dmitriyev was accused of economic espionage.**

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko met with I. Mordvinov, head of the Press and Information Department of the USSR MVES.

[Lukyanchenko] On 17 July the MVES issued a protest at the unreasonable detention of your ministry's official. But according to an article in the Italian newspaper LA REPUBBLICA, a representative of the Olivetti department of trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, M.A. Valente, participated in the "spy drama." During the preliminary investigation she admitted that Dmitriyev was an agent of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]. She also testified that he was the person she had to contact to hand over the secret materials she had obtained; allegedly she had been promised $250,000 for the job.

[Mordvinov] It is true, Valente could have stated that Dmitriyev was an agent of the military intelligence. But let us look at what Dmitriyev is. He is a teacher with a knowledge of foreign languages, and has no technical background. He got into trade because of his job with us. He has no military rank, and even if he has one it cannot be higher than reserve lieutenant—the rank of anyone who has graduated from an institute with a military department. Dmitriyev works in the MVES Main Technical Administration, which deals with the construction of defense projects in other countries in accordance with intergovernmental agreements. I want to emphasize that it deals with the construction of those projects and not with their technical equipment.

As far as I know, this case did not involve any purchases of military technology. They were interested in buying computers for the needs of the Main Technical Administration; the package should have included the system that helps prevent leaks of commercial information. This system is nothing out of the ordinary, and Valente's testimony about Dmitriyev being a GRU agent seems rather naive. How in the world could she have known this unless somebody intentionally supplied her with the idea?

[Lukyanchenko] But according to the Italian newspapers, the "Tempest" system that caused all the uproar has nothing to do with the Olivetti firm. It is produced by the American firm "Digital Equipment."

[Mordvinov] However, I do not think it presents any special secret. We addressed Olivetti about this system on the basis of the competitors' list. It was an ordinary trade deal.

[Lukyanchenko] If one can rely on LA REPUBBLICA's article, the Italian police confiscated a 54-page secret document from Valente, which had a description of the very system of electronic protection. But a representative of the American "Digital" firm denied that its Italian office had that kind of paperwork, writes LA STAMPA newspaper; more than that, he claimed that the many-volume document could not be condensed to such a small size.

[Mordvinov] I explored this issue, and experts told me the same thing: There should be no fewer than 400 or 500 pages of technical description. My question is: Why do the Italian special services hold the interests of an American firm so dear? Especially that this firm competes with the Italian Olivetti....

[Lukyanchenko] It must be that the office of any foreign firm registered on the territory of Italy can expect the same legal protection as local firms.

[Mordvinov] Let us rephrase the question. The Olivetti firm expressed their consent to sell us the "Tempest," didn't they? This says it all.

All these spy hunts do not bother me at all. I am concerned about the fate of our employee Dmitriyev.

[Lukyanchenko] Both Valente and Mariotti, another participant of this operation, are official representatives of Olivetti and were acting on behalf of the firm. LA REPUBBLICA, however, speculates that Mariotti could deceive his Soviet partners as he decided to make some money for himself (or maybe for himself and Valente) on that deal by concluding it outside the existing regulations.

[Mordvinov] I would not exclude such a possibility. Somebody might have wanted to line his pockets on this. But I have to tell you that a $250,000 deal is just chicken feed and not real money. If tens of millions of dollars were involved, then it would have been a different story.

[Lukyanchenko] You deny that Dmitriyev is a GRU agent. But it is no secret that the MVES employs some people who used to work for our special services. According to the Italian press L. Pavlov, for instance, one of the heads of an MVES branch, is a former GRU general, and A. Zolotarev is a former KGB colonel.

[Mordvinov] Any state institution deals with certain official and often state secrets and its duty is to protect those secrets. Even any commercial operation, especially if it involves big money, is a secret. Therefore, the MVES cannot be considered an exception in this respect.

As for Dmitriyev, I want to ask you the following: Why should our officials take risks, run into danger, and jeopardize the prestige of our ministry and our country if the above-mentioned system can be simply bought?

[Lukyanchenko] The Italian press writes that some representatives of the Italian special services have been in Moscow for over two weeks now. They are trying to find out what could have happened to Mariotti, who suddenly disappeared in Sheremetyevo airport. An assumption was made that our special services captured him to exchange him for Dmitriyev.

[Mordvinov] I do not have any information on that account, as the Italian special services did not contact me. To me this story sounds very much like an invention.

[Lukyanchenko] The Italian newspapers expressed the opinion that the whole Dmitriyev story was instigated by the Americans and not the Italians. The Americans are fighting for the richest computer market in the USSR and with this story they punched Olivetti, their chief competitor, below the belt.

[Mordvinov] I am simply convinced of it. Especially in that the whole story is not worth mentioning, but a lot of noise was raised about it. Why was this done? Not only to remove the competitor, but also to cast a shadow over the Italian president's visit in September of this year. That is, some people are not happy about the speedy development of Soviet-Italian relations in all fields.

FRG's Genscher Interviewed Prior to Visit

PM1508164590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

[Interview with FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Grigoryev in Bonn; date of interview not given: "A New Quality Of Relations"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and FRG diplomatic departments is about to take place in Moscow. PRAVDA's Bonn correspondent Ye. Grigoryev interviewed H.-D. Genscher.

[Grigoryev] Mr. Minister, you are off to Moscow again. What is the purpose of your visit this time?

[Genscher] German-Soviet relations have acquired a quality they never had before. We are linked by trust and an appreciation of mutual interests. We are aware of our common responsibility for future development in Europe. The exchange of messages on the 20th anniversary of the Moscow Treaty confirmed once again the long-term joint aims. It is in this spirit that we are shaping relations between our countries.

In the course of the "two-plus-four" process, the Soviet foreign minister and I have met repeatedly for conversations during which the interests of our two countries in the context of the solution of the external aspects of German unity were discussed exceedingly openly and intensively. I would remind you of our meetings in Geneva, Brest, Muenster, and other places as well. It was at these meetings that the decisions subsequently adopted in Zheleznovodsk were prepared; the opportunities created by close German-Soviet cooperation in building a united Europe were discussed. I would like to continue and deepen these contacts.

[Grigoryev] In your view, how is work proceeding on the document in the "two-plus-four" group? When do you expect it to be completed? What part do the accords reached in the Caucasus play in this?

[Genscher] Following the meeting in the Caucasus, the fundamental questions of the external aspects of building German unity were answered. Therefore, E. Shevardnadze can reasonably expect that agreement on a final international-law settlement can be reached at the fourth meeting of ministers under the "two-plus-four" formula, which takes place in Moscow 12 September. I agree with his assessment, as do, in fact, the other foreign ministers involved. The preparatory group has made good progress in its work on the document. But a number of bilateral questions have still to be resolved: We are talking about the terms on which Soviet Armed Forces will be present for a certain transitional period on the territory of the present GDR until their withdrawal, but above all about the prospects of German-Soviet relations after German unification. Because of the abundance of outstanding questions, we arranged back in July to meet before 12 September.

[Grigoryev] How do you view the current situation in the Near East?

[Genscher] The UN Security Council has given a clear and precise assessment of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. I am convinced that such unanimous collaboration by the entire international community was possible as a result of fundamental changes in East-West relations. The solution of regional conflicts is no longer paralyzed by confrontation. The new political thinking makes it possible to elaborate a joint stance and joint actions, as envisaged by the UN Charter. The postwar period in Europe has ended and the United Nations is starting to show its mettle vis-a-vis the challenges of the modern world. This is an inspiration and, at the same time, it is a clear and urgent warning to any potential aggressor, if one should try, anywhere in the world, to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of any state.

[Grigoryev] Are you carrying with you to Moscow any new proposals on all-European security structures?

[Genscher] It is now a matter of creating a new, united Europe. Both sides—the Soviet Union and a reunited Germany—want Europe to unite as well—politically, economically, ecologically, technologically, and in the cultural sphere. The members of the two alliances are busy seeking new relations. On the threshold of the Paris CSCE summit meeting, specific ideas already exist of how Europeans' common security could be developed in the future. I will be discussing all these possibilities with my Soviet colleague. Particularly questions about how to make security more cooperative, how to widen trust, and how to create peace-safeguarding institutions within the framework of the CSCE process, for instance, a Conflict Prevention Center.

I would like to particularly mention another apsect. I am referring to the conversion of military resources and new tasks for people employed at them. We are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union in switching from an armament to a disarmament economy in order to combine Soviet research and projects with German expertise in production and marketing. What I mean by this is that the German economy ought to take advantage of the opportunity and take up General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal on participation in the Soviet conversion process.

Albanians Discontented With French Asylum

PM1508131190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "'I Cannot Live in This Hole Anymore...'; Albanian Refugees Dissatisfied With Living Conditions in France"]

[Text] Paris—Several days ago, under the burning midday sun, 75 Albanian refugees—men, women, and children—left their camp at Mourmelon, where they had been temporarily placed by the French authorities, and set off on foot, taking their modest possessions with them.

In response to all the questions put to them by representatives of the Red Cross and charity organizations which have been responsible for finding them somewhere to stay in France since they arrived in Marseilles by ship from Albania, the refugees have said indignantly: "We have had enough! Our patience has run out! We are leaving for Chalons (the neighboring city to Mourmelon - Yu.K.) to take a train to Paris. They will listen to us at the American Embassy."

The Albanians had walked about 10 kilometers along the dusty road, under the hot sun, before Daniel Roue [name as published], director of the Marne Department cabinet, and the lieutenant colonel accompanying him managed to persuade them, after three hours of talks, to go back to Mourmelon, where they have been living since 15 July.

A high-ranking representative of the French Foreign Ministry arrived to see the refugees next day, as promised. Yes, he repeated once again, France would do everything possible to help them. No, France did not have any objections to them emigrating to the United States. But the Albanians, who were disappointed that the minister himself had not come to see them, persisted: "We want to be given the times of flights to New York and set off immediately." Arbe, the only Albanian speaking English, who spent nine years in jail in his own country for "political agitation," stubbornly repeated: "We respect France but we want to leave for the United States. That is not at all difficult to do—despite what you say."

"We are trying to explain to the Albanians," Roue said, "that a French visa is not a passport to the United States and that they must wait two years to obtain the necessary documents. But they are refusing to wait, not realising that every country has its own laws—particularly concerning emigration."

Soon after this, 50 Albanian refugees left another camp, in Montier, for the same reason. They made their way to Paris by train, without tickets, where they searched out the U.S. Embassy in Concorde Square.... But their representatives, who were accompanied by a Frenchman, were told as soon as they stepped into the reception room: "We cannot promise you any rendezvous or any meetings with officials." At that moment, the newspaper LE MONDE, which is covering the misadventures of the Albanians on French soil, said, "A serious blow was dealt to their great American dream."

But even this blow has not shaken their faith in America. Of the 543 Albanians who arrived in France about a month ago and are housed at several reception centers, more than half are demanding that they be sent immediately to the United States. "The main bulk of Albanians who have come here are ordinary workers," Besnik Demazh [name as published], an agrarian engineer, explained the impatience of his compatriots. "As far as they are concerned, America is a beautiful, picture-book land, a paradise. If the United States had an embassy in Tirana, everyone would be rushing there."

Their America is the country seen in the television series Dallas and Dynasty, which they watched enthusiastically while in Tirana, being able to tune into Italian television. According to Dominique Tissier, the head of the refugee center at Saint-Astier [name as published], "the Albanians wanted to be given freedom, money, and women instantly." According to other personnel at the center, they have totally phantasmagorical notions of what capitalism is. And they do not wish to be admonished on this point.

At the center in Montier, for example, the refugees are calling a young interpreter of Albanian origin a "liar," simply because she wanted to tell them that there are also poor people in the United States and that you have to work hard there in order to live well. As far as the Albanians are concerned, these words are nothing more than "propaganda." Long years of living in dictatorship conditions have taught them to distrust everyone and everything. The refugees will only talk to American journalists.

The press points out that, for all the patience being shown by people working at these centers, among whom are many volunteers, conflicts often arise between them and the Albanians. Some of the emigrees refuse to do their own washing up, saying that this "is not men's work." They also cannot understand at all why representatives of the fairer sex in France are allowed to drive cars. At the center in Montier, where all the inhabitants are bachelors, the Albanians have a scornful attitude toward the soldiers helping them and believe that they should do all the heavy work for them. Because of the total lack of mutual understanding, in every sense of the word, the authorities have had to replace the group of servicemen looking after the Albanians in Montier.

The majority of them have no intention of learning French, evidently believing that they have no need of this language. According to LE MONDE, young people have decided to limit their knowledge to the words "Do you want to go to bed with me?" and make much use of this phrase.

The French feel that the explanation for much of this lies in the low level of the Albanians' general culture. It is particularly hard to instill in them why they should treat the environment with care. "They must get out of the habit of throwing everything they don't need out of the windows," the French point out. "And they must urgently be taught to use the toilet."

With every day spent in France, the refugees' demands—like their dissatisfaction—increase. At first, LE MONDE recalls, fights even broke out when clothing was being distributed among them by Red Cross representatives, and young mothers tried to stockpile disposable diapers for their babies. And now, when cigarettes are given out in the center at Montier, the Albanians refuse to accept French Gauloise and demand American Marlboro. When they are not given what they want, they immediately display their dissatisfaction in noisy fashion.

The French complain of the lack of any understanding whatsoever on the part of the refugees. They, in their turn, express displeasure at the fact that they have to live in the centers alongside Algerians, Moroccans, and blacks. "But in French society there are Algerians, Moroccans, and blacks," it is explained to them. "We are an open country." To which comes the reply: "But we want to live among Albanians!"

"I cannot live in this hole any longer," a young Albanian at the camp in Mourmelon protests. "I am used to living in a city. And, finally, why are we not being paid a weekly allowance of 105 francs like everyone else?"

The local organizations responsible for receiving the refugees believe that they have made a mistake in grouping the majority of Albanians in two camps: in Mourmelon, where 250 people are living, and in Montier, where 131 people are living. They must urgently be split up, the leaders of the centers emphasize, because otherwise there will be an explosion.

What does the future hold for the Albanians in France? According to LE MONDE, they had all been counting on being given a house, car, television set, and job here. That has not happened—and their disappointment knows no bounds.

Nevertheless, all those who have decided to get to America at all costs and become truck drivers, waiters, and so forth are still hopeful. They have absolutely no wish to remain in France and are firmly counting on getting a ticket across the ocean that will guarantee them "a wonderful life." Blessed are the believers....

Communist Party Member Meets Swiss Lawmakers

LD1508222890 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee Gennadiy Yanayev met Peter Bodenmann, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, and Elmar Ledergerber, a deputy of parliament, in the CPSU Central Committee on Wednesday.

Bodenmann and Ledergerber are currently in the Soviet Union among a Swiss parliamentary delegation.

The guests were told about the state of affairs in the country and the results of the 28th congress of the CPSU. Some matters of the international situation, specifically, disarmament, socio-economic tendencies and ecology issues were discussed.

The two sides expressed mutual interest in further development of contacts between the CPSU and the Swiss Social Democratic Party.

Latin America and Caribbean

Cuban Ambassador Speaks at Friendship Society

PY1108203890 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Text] Members of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society held a meeting with Cuban Ambassador Jose Ramon Balaguer in Moscow. Our correspondent Viktor Kuzmin reports:

[Begin Kuzmin recording] The meeting with the Cuban ambassador was very interesting. Ambassador Jose Ramon Balaguer gave a complete and objective report on the current situation in Cuba. He did not hide his concern over the fact that different evaluations are made in the Soviet Union about the essence of Soviet-Cuban relations. Balaguer said that this is a new and unique situation because great changes are taking place in the Soviet Union. With glasnost anyone is able to express his opinion.

Balaguer added that according to news agencies a small group of people living in Leningrad plan to carry out a protest demonstration in front of the Cuban Consulate in that city. He said that about a dozen people held a demonstration in Kharkov demanding that Cuba pay its foreign debt to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the fact that there are similar opinions means that there are similar points of view on this issue. Balaguer said that he hopes the opinions published in the Soviet press, and the statements made about his country, have a real basis and reflect the real situation in Cuba.

Balaguer went on to explain what is happening in Cuba, and how the Cuban people are involved in the active process being carried out by the Communist Party of Cuba in rectifying mistakes. He also gave details on the problems related to the embassies crisis in Havana. Regarding the Cuban position on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict, Balaguer said that Havana has a clear position: the sovereignty and independence of any country should be protected, they cannot be changed by an aggressor. He recalled that the Cuban representative in the UN Security Council voted against the aggression and for the immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from the occupied territories. Ambassador Balaguer answered many other questions from the members of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society, and this is a summarized report I wanted to convey about the meeting. [end recording]

Brazilian Navy Training Ship Ends Visit 15 Aug

PM1608091790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel A. Bilichenko: "Visit of Brazilian Ship"]

[Excerpts] Under an existing accord the training ship "Brasil" of the Brazilian Navy under the command of Captain First Rank L.S. Silveira Costa has paid an official visit to the city on the Neva. In Leningrad the ship's commander paid visits to the Leningrad City Soviet Executive Committee, the Leningrad Naval Base headquarters, and the M.V. Frunze Higher Naval School. Return visits were made on board the "Brasil." [passage omitted]

On 14 August the training ship "Brasil" left Leningrad and set course for Rotterdam.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Interrupts Vacation for Economic Talks

LD1608104490 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev has decided to interrupt his vacation and return to Moscow to take part in drafting the program for the country's transition to a market economy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told journalists today.

Yeltsin also cut short his trip around Russia on Wednesday for similar reasons.

Gorbachev is expected to return to Moscow within the next few days.

CPSU Secretariat Views Monument Issues

LD1508171290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] There has been a routine sitting of the Secretriat of the CPSU Central Committee.

One of the first questions was that of the preservation of the cultural property created by the labor of several generations of outstanding Soviet craftsmen in monumental propaganda.

Obviously, you know that instances of the dismantling of monuments to Lenin in a number of places in Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine have become more frequent. There are instances of an abusive attitude toward revolutionary symbols in some countries of East Europe. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Kerbel, people's artist of the USSR; Gubenko, USSR minister of culture; and Professor Loginov, doctor of historical sciences, spoke on the question at the sitting. It was acknowledged as necessary, on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and party committees, to put forward as legislative initiatives the question of the renewal of the legislation on the preservation and use of historical and cultural monuments.

As far as the defilement of revolutionary and communist symbols in some countries of East Europe is concerned, the Secretariat came out in favor of tabling a resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture of the USSR on holding talks with the state services of these countries in order to obtain guarantees that the monuments, memorial plaques, and museums connected with Soviet history will be preserved.

Questions regarding the preparation of another plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were also discussed at the sitting of the Secretariat.

GLASNOST Reports Politburo Members Retire

LD1608055390 Moscow TASS in English 0546 GMT 16 Aug 90

["Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Ligachev, Slyunkov Now on Pension"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Lev Zaykov, Yegor Ligachev and Nikolay Slyunkov, who served on the Soviet Communist Party Politburo before the 28th Party Congress, retired after the forum, the weekly GLASNOST reported today.

"Some of them may want to work in the future," the weekly remarked, "but they will have to decide this issue for themselves."

Abalkin Chairs Market Economy Meeting

LD1508160790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] There has been a meeting today of representatives of the Union republics belonging to the working group that is preparing the government program for the transfer to a market economy. Questions of economic interrelations in a union of sovereign states were discussed. (Galakhov), a member of the working group, told our correspondent that an accord has already been reached on many basic questions although, of course, there remain a number of disagreements which must be resolved in further work. The meeting was chaired by Abalkin, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Supreme Soviet Session To Examine Draft Laws

PM1508154290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report: "How Many Laws Will the USSR Supreme Soviet Fall Session Adopt?"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is faced with more than 100 draft laws which have been submitted for discussion and adoption at the next session of the Soviet parliament, which will begin 10 September. However, an INTERFAX correspondent was told that the session will realistically be able to examine and adopt no more than 20-25 legislative acts. They include laws on economic reform in the country and also a number of draft laws that have had a first reading—on entry to and exit from the USSR, on public organizations, on the Soviet militia, and so forth. Members of the Supreme Soviet also have to discuss the draft new Union treaty.

Democratic Groups To Meet in September

LD1608111190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0936 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] A forum of democratic forces, movements, and organizations is planned to be held in Moscow at the end of September. This was reported by USSR People's

Deputy Yuriy Afanasyev. He said the forum would be attended by representatives of the interregional deputies' group of the Soviet parliament, the Democratic Russia bloc of deputies, and people's fronts of a number of republics. The workers' movement would also be represented, including the miners' strike committees. The forum's initiators intend that it should lead to the coordination of joint actions to deepen perestroyka.

MVD on Lack of Arms Decree Enforcement

90UN2561A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Aug 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent A. Orlov: "When Will the Arms Fall Silent?"]

[Text] The following events were unfolding in our country at the moment I stepped over the threshold of the room of the operations group of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops on a completely ordinary Thursday, 2 August: In the vicinity of Stepanakert the search was on for a YaK-40 aircraft. In Georgia rallies were being held: either democratic elections in October or the "elimination of the present power" in a number of rayons. In the settlement of Gyuynut in the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], bursts of automatic weapons fire were ringing out....

These are definitely not all the events in the country. Not all of them ended up in the log book that sat in front of Lieutenant Colonel G. Shulga who took over the watch on the morning of 2 August. Multicolored phones on his desk began to ring insistently, either one at a time or several at once. At particularly difficult times yet another officer, Colonel V. Tsvetkov, lent a hand.

Shulga responded to someone's voice: "Yes, I am writing it down. Board No. 69. Check out its area of work...."

Tsvetkov pressed his interlocutor: "You had to report which train the detachment of soldiers was taking to Baku; the deadline has passed...."

There were about 10 operations maps of the most varied areas of the country, communications equipment making it possible to raise all of them, and the monitor of a computer capable of pulling up the necessary information immediately. This was, in essence, all that the room was outfitted with. We made arrangements beforehand for a report from here, the main nerve center in which hundreds of events in our country "focus." In the ukase of the president dated 26 July, the Internal Troops are mentioned among the forces that the USSR minister of internal affairs has the right to use in the process of disbanding informal military units and confiscating weapons.

...From the summary report as of 0600, 2 August:

The Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]: The operational situation in the city of Osh and the oblast has not deteriorated. The number of dead and wounded has not changed—222 and 1,373. Eighty-seven missing persons are being sought....

The Azerbaijan SSR: No crimes on interethnic grounds have been registered.

The NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and adjacent areas: The situation remains complex. The YaK-40 aircraft accident has provided a pretext for fabrications which are affecting the aggravation of interethnic hostility.

The Armenian SSR: Attacks on MVD personnel for the purpose of getting weapons have been registered. Car theft, mainly by means of bandit attacks, has become more common....

During a lull in telephone conversations, we talked to the superior of the group. Grigoriy Stepanovich Shulga is by no means new to operations work. He has been to virtually all hot spots on "the big horseshoe"—from Central Asia to the Baltic area. He took part in maintaining public order in Armenia at the time of the earthquake. He has decorations: the Order of the Red Banner and the medal For Maintaining Public Order. He has two years in Afghanistan under his belt. He never expected that he would have to wear a bulletproof vest in his own country as well.

He asked me back: "Operations of the troops in execution of the ukase? I must say that so far no special target-oriented operations for confiscating weapons have been conducted. My personal opinion is: Perhaps, for now this is reasonable. I can see you are surprised. First of all, we have never been proponents of extreme measures. The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet suspended the effect of this ukase in its republic. We may understand from the statements the soviet made that the republic is indicating its willingness to resolve this issue on its own. The problem is whether they will do so."

This position was confirmed by Major General V. Starikov, chief of the Operations Administration of the USSR MVD Internal Troops:

"Of course, being servicemen, we are prepared to carry out the order. However, so far we are not talking about active measures...."

In a word, by then it was just regular work. However, alarm still hung in the air. For example, how does the following message compare with the ukase: On the previous night of 1-2 August the depot of one of the military units of the Yerevan Garrison was attacked. Up to 80 commandos armed with automatic weapons exchanged fire with a small guard detail. This was an unprecedented action: The terrorists captured more than 150 flame throwers and 102 canisters for them.

Lt. Col. Shulga dropped the pencil: "If these flame throwers are used, little will remain of a big city."

Telephones rang again. It was exactly about the flame thrower emergency situation. After they were seized, the Army, together with the Internal Troops units, initiated a set of measures for finding and recovering the dangerous weapons. The code name of the operation which had been underway for several hours by then was "Ring." Motor vehicles were being inspected, and exits from the city were closed off. There had been no results so far, not counting the seizure of three automatic rifles.

Incidentally, another daring trick by commandos took place the day before, on 1 August. A gasoline tanker was seized and disappeared which belonged... to the republic MVD. Three militiamen escorting the car were disarmed—the commandos got exactly three automatic rifles.

It looks as though Armenia attracted all the attention on this day. A new message came as one more confirmation of the fact that weapons are plentiful over there: Artashatskiy Rayon, the settlement of Vaktan, where a firefight between two commando groups had been underway since 1230. What about the response of the operations group?

Lt. Col. Shulga did not finish the sentence: "If we are going to stand between these armed bands on top of this..." Somewhat later, he finished with pain: "Our duty is to defend peaceful people, and the soldiers need to be kept safe, too."

I judge the attitude here toward the safety of the soldiers by an outwardly insignificant episode. Shulga did manage to obtain a report from Baku on the specific train and time at which a detachment en route to rest was leaving. He even wrote down the numbers of the cars.

It goes without saying that the life of the Internal Troops at present is tense. Sometimes units are not replaced for several months at a time in the regions in which the situation is extremely heated. Hence fatigue, alarm in the families, the concern of wives and mothers...

I wrote down one more message along with Tsvetkov: Major General M. Surkov, USSR people's deputy, spoke at a session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia. He called on the deputies to grasp the scope of the emergency that had occurred in the republic as a result of the attack on the artillery weapons depot. He discussed the need for urgent contacts and negotiations with the leaders of the commandos; the flame throwers must be surrendered voluntarily.

I looked at a summary report on the surrender and confiscation of weapons, broken down by republic. As of 1 August the most weapons were turned in and confiscated in... the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]: about 60 pieces. These were mainly hunting rifles. Next came Latvia and Kirghizia. In the Kazakh SSR, two carbines and one handgun were confiscated. Armenia? With the exception of the three automatic rifles today, one handgun was turned in. I know from my trips to Armenia that "the bearded ones" are armed to the teeth.

The situation with board No.69 was clarified. This is the board number of an Army helicopter that was inspecting the Azerbaijan-Armenia border. A message came to the USSR MVD from Armenia: The crew of this helicopter had disarmed Paramilitary Guards riflemen at the Spandaryanskaya Hydropower Station. It was reported that three carbines had been taken from the Paramilitary Guards riflemen. It turned out that the helicopter had not been to the hydropower station. The air detail had been at work at the Kyukyul post, where one hunting rifle and one carbine had been confiscated. So, could it be that this was an attempt to "pin" three more weapons on the military?

Another report. The firefighting in the settlement of Gyuyinul had stopped. A military detachment had driven a group of commandos away from the village.

A message came soon: The Yak-40, which had crashed, was found 23 kilometers to the southwest of Stepanakert.

Yet another call: Shooting in Artashatskiy Rayon had stopped....

I am afraid that the readers are already fatigued by the information which continuously reached the duty officer. When I left the duty group it was getting dark outside. We spent only six hours together there. The officers had 10 more hours of duty to go. The night was still to come....

I called the operations group yesterday morning. Lt. Col. Shulga was preparing to complete his period of duty. What was new? I wrote down just several lines. They were still from Transcaucasia. Operation "Ring" was still underway. The flame throwers had not yet been found. Four more firearms had been confiscated in the course of the operation. One more emergency situation. The Araratskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs was attacked that night. The chief of criminal investigations was killed in the firefight. There was one fatality among the attackers.

When will the arms fall silent?

Secretary Kuptsov Interviewed on Tasks

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[Interview with V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by TASS correspondent N. Kupriy for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; place and date of interview not given: "The Unknown Lady—the Multiparty System"]

[Text] [Kupriy] Valentin Aleksandrovich, you began working at the 28th CPSU Congress in the post of head of the Central Committee department for work with sociopolitical organizations and you ended up in a position that is new for you—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A question about this: What has changed in your activity?

[Kuptsov] The department for work with sociopolitical organizations in the CPSU Central Committee is a new one. Its creation was brought about by perestroyka processes and life itself. The idea of organizing a special area that could develop the tactics for the actions of the CPSU under the present conditions, analyze the political situation, and give recommendations to party committees for working with the political parties and movements that are being generated has been ripening in the Central Committee for a long time now. The theme of these proposals is cooperation: The time when "principles were given" is receding into the past. Only the direct participation of the parties and movements themselves in the overall cause of perestroyka will serve to carry out its tasks.

I am now being asked many questions about the department's activity, and people sometimes imply that we "were late with its creation." If it had been possible to predict such a stormy political life I would agree with such an idea to a certain degree. But events really have gotten ahead of us. I think that the creation of this department is an example in which the party Central Committee reacted promptly to the changing political situation.

The process of forming parties and movements in the country is rapid and there have been very many citizens' initiatives of various kinds. A three-volume work has already been published which just lists with annotations the various kinds of movements, associations, clubs, and funds. Operating in the country today at the Union level are more than 20 parties which have their own principles, programs, and charter documents. I am not talking about the numerical composition of the parties themselves; as a rule they are still rather small. But this process will continue. And it is clear that our party should clearly predict the alignment of political forces and determine the tendencies for their development in time.

If we talk about the changes in my functions, my responsibility, and my personal participation in the work of the CPSU Central Committee, of course, are increasing considerably. The Central Committee secretary is responsible for more than just his narrow area of work. He participates in the development of policy as a whole and also in the implementation of the decisions of the party Central Committee and the Politburo, and he is involved in all the problems related to the main area of his work.

[Kupriy] How do you view your work, what are its main areas in light of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Kuptsov] In keeping with our strategic line, and it is presented in the congress program statement, I wish to emphasize: We are obligated, we are actually obligated, and must cooperate directly with all parties and associations that choose the socialist option. We must continue to work as partners with movements that have a truly democratic direction. This is the great merit of the congress and it is the fundamental issue of the congress. It has not been given much attention yet but, as they say, large things must be seen from a distance. And one day historians will rate highly this step of the Communists in the matter of consolidating the perestroyka forces in society.

We must undoubtedly repulse and protect our party from various unjustified attacks and defamation. This is my opinion as a Communist and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

We are faced with a multifaceted task—analysis, prediction of the alignment of forces, dialogue, and cooperation. It seems to me that all the movements are interested in stability of the situation and improvement of our life. Apparently we will have to enter into both blocs and coalitions and to conduct joint actions with certain movements. We must prepare for this work not so much in the CPSU Central Committee as in the local areas—in the kray, oblast, and republic party committees where these processes are especially acute. Therefore one of the main areas is the development of a mechanism for communication with social organizations, parties, and movements. In order to design it we will study the experience accumulated in the local areas and then generalize and disseminate it in the party committees.

We are alarmed by the lack of psychological preparedness of many party and other cadres for perceiving the new political situation. This has been felt in the 28th CPSU Congress as well. At a meeting of the section entitled "The Party, Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations, and Movements," of which I was the cochairman, a simple conclusion was reached: In order to accelerate the processes of perestroyka we must proceed toward direct cooperation. But how should we do this, how do we break the psychological barriers in some of our party workers?... The leaders of many of the new parties also have barriers and are preparing for confrontation instead of cooperation. In this connection we all need a kind of "code of multiparty behavior" whose basic requirements are respect for the Constitution and the laws of the country, concern for the good of the people, a readiness to work for the socialist option, a mastery of the art of polemics, and a rejection of the image of the enemy.

As for our party, I think that the personnel need to be retrained. And we will do this in the near future, perhaps through the Academy of Social Sciences or various courses. Throughout all the decades during which the problem of the multiparty system has been facing us we have not been aware of it or have seen it as something remote and unfamiliar. So under the conditions of the multiparty system the tactical issues of the party have remained essentially undeveloped. But there is a strategy. It was fairly clearly presented in the program statement and the resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress as well as the party rules.

[Kupriy] Valentin Aleksandrovich, I would like to know about the structure of the new department and how you intend to provide for the most important area of CPSU activity in the modern stage.

[Kuptsov] Our department is already something new, born of perestroyka. It has no inspectors or official organizers. We have nobody to instruct, inspect, or organize. Our functions are to investigate and analyze. The department's specialists include historians, philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, jurists, and, of course, party workers who know social processes well.

The future structure of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, including the departments, will be established by the next plenum. My viewpoint is this: We should create a commission of members of the CPSU Central Committee for ties with soviets and sociopolitical organizations and movements. Precisely for these ties and not for work. It should include 30-40 people who for five years will do a special study of various problems and develop recommendations. This would be a joint organ. Moreover, the apparatus should probably retain highly qualified specialists whose range of responsibilities will include scholarly research to help the commission.

It seems to us that the department will have to strengthen contacts with youth, worker, peasant, and veteran movements. We will introduce this proposal at the Central Committee plenum and hope that they will support us.

[Kupriy] How do you evaluate the decisions of the 28th congress from the standpoint of the development of joint activity between the CPSU and the new parties and social organizations?

[Kuptsov] I think the greatest achievement of the congress is that, in spite of all the predictions about the demise of the CPSU, its splitting, and its collapse, nothing of the kind happened. It is this factor that will be decisive in the consolidation of all patriotic forces of society and in the cooperation between the CPSU and various sociopolitical organizations. Unfortunately, there are people who do not notice or do not wish to notice this. And certain ones refuse to understand because they have based and are still basing their strategy and their hopes on the idea of a split. Apparently a certain period will have to pass, after which they will be able to interpret everything correctly.

In my view colossal efforts were made at the congress on the part of the party leaders and the delegates themselves, which led not to a split but, on the contrary, to consolidation. The dynamics of these meetings proceeded in an progressive manner—I am convinced of this since I was constantly observing those around me. In the ranks of the delegations one could feel enthusiasm and a great deal of responsibility for the country, so to come to some kind of split was tantamount to the end of perestroyka. The majority understood this.

[Kupriy] Why were you the one to begin to handle the new area of party work; were you trying to get into this kind of activity previously?

[Kuptsov] Certainly not. I myself have wondered for a long time why I ended up with this part of the work. I can see several aspects here. I do not think there are any trained personnel who are fully aware of all the aspects of this problem. And maybe it is better to begin, as they say, "from scratch" so as not to drag into a new job the baggage of old ideas and habits. Working "from scratch" will make it possible to find a certain new approach. Moreover, today there are many first secretaries of oblast party committees who have significant experience in working with the masses.

As for me personally, the choice probably fell to me because I have had a long enough work life which has been formed by the labor collective. After serving in the Army I came to the Cherepovets metallurgical combine, which also educated me. At that time mainly newcomers worked there—from Magnitogorsk and Novokuznetsk—metallurgists who had undergone the hardest tempering both in labor and at the fronts. For nine years I was a hot rolling mill operator, I worked on the night shift, and I know what it is to work without holidays or days off, to live in the dormitory, and to study in the evenings and at night.

I think that one other fact was in my favor in the selection of candidates for work in this completely new area—I have been through all the lower stages of party work.

This is not very modest of me, but I think that this is not simply a line in my biography; these are the most difficult and interesting years. I know the plant collective for what it is. This will help me to defend the interests of the workers and, of course, the peasants and intelligentsia as well.

Pugo on Changes in Party Control Work

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[Report on press conference given by B. Pugo, chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, at CPSU Central Committee Press Center; date not given; by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent B. Ukolov: "Boris Pugo: Not a Punishing Sword..."]

[Text] *One can understand the journalists' interest in meeting with B. Pugo, chairman of the new party control organ—the CPSU Central Auditing Commission: What changes can be expected during the course of the perestroyka process? But Boris Karlovich began by saying that he had already expressed his opinions about the significance of the 28th Party Congress.*

The congress, he said, confirmed that the CPSU is still the party of the socialist option. The initial principles that are most important for it are the October Revolution and the Leninist legacy. The task will consist largely of rectifying the mistakes that were made during the construction of our society.

The most important thing, in his opinion, is that the 28th congress became a landmark that will separate the party in its previous condition from the one it is now to become. The renewal will be so significant that one can speak about the creation of a new party.

Then, addressing the subject of the press conference—the position of the Central Auditing Commission and its tasks—B. Pugo said that the CPSU is returning to the Leninist vision of party control. Although if one is to touch upon the organizational form, the party control organ has never been so representative before. It will include 165 Communists chosen mainly from the labor collectives.

Conceived as early as the 19th party conference, the Central Auditing Commission was envisioned at that time as a counterbalance to the return of the authoritarian regime and a guarantee against encroachment on minority rights. The changes in society have been so rapid and fundamental! Now, under the conditions of a real multiparty system, these functions have receded from the foreground. But when the CPSU claims the role of the vanguard in the society there is an essential need for an organ which, on behalf of the party masses and party organizations, would have the capability of monitoring the activity of the Central Committee and the entire ramified party apparatus. This was the purpose for which the Central Auditing Commission was formed.

Boris Karlovich discussed the forthcoming activity of the Central Auditing Commission, responding also to questions from journalists. In particular, he emphasized that the Central Auditing Commission has the right to consider questions pertaining to any Communist, regardless of the post he holds, for the sake of improving the party. Suffice it to say that last year more than 60,000 letters came to the Central Auditing Commission, of which eight to 10 percent were complaints about unworthy behavior on the part of Communists, including leaders.

Understandably, the center is simply not capable of handling this volume. There are only 70 officials working in the Central Auditing Commission. The "health " of the party is thus in the hands of the lower organizations.

He gave an example. The Central Auditing Commission received a statement from the Moscow Higher Party School regarding the firing of the rector, V. Shostakovskiy. (Recall that he was the one who spoke at the 28th CPSU Congress about the division of the party and the withdrawal of the Democratic Platform from it.) In the statement it is asserted that V. Shostakovskiy is a high-grade specialist and that he is being persecuted for his convictions. What will the Central Auditing Commission do?

B. Pugo said that he personally agrees with the arguments of the gorkom [city committee]. But that is not essential. It was not a matter of appealing to the central organ through the head of the commission for party control of the Moscow party organization. After all, this is now a completely independent organ elected at the city conference which has a right to look into all issues pertaining to any Moscow Communist.

He was asked if the Central Auditing Commission has the right to deal with the personal affairs of the leaders of the notorious ANT [Automation, Science, and Technology]. Boris Karlovich responded that he would not accept a reproach against him regarding this. "I raised both my hands in favor of entrepreneurship and was prepared to support all enterprising people, but I absolutely cannot understand those Soviet 'entrepreneurs' who are trying to sell goods abroad that are quite suitable, offering them as scrap metal, and engaging in price manipulation," he said.

B. Pugo returned a couple of times to the fact that sometimes the wrong opinion is formed about party control organs as some kind of "punishing sword" or a kind of "inquisitor" or procurator. "I am not in favor of turning into, say, a legal organization like the bar, but I will say outright that I am much more interested in protective functions," he assured us.

As an example Boris Karlovich credited the former Central Auditing Commission with restoring to the party the eminent historian Roy Medvedev, who was elected to the Central Committee at the 28th CPSU Congress.

Prokofyev on 28th Congress, Party's Future

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[Interview with Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom, by VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondents R. Zaretskiy and Yu. Kazarin; place and date of interview not given: "The Voice of Reason Has Been Heard"]

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, you have participated in the work of several party congresses. Have you witnessed anything as dramatic and as emotional as the current party congress?

[Prokofyev] I was present as a guest at the 25th and 26th party congresses and I was a delegate at the 27th congress and at the 19th party conference. Speaking in general, I did not feel any emotional tension at the three previous congresses. But the situation was already different at the 19th conference. It became quite tense when they discussed combining the positions of the general secretary and the Supreme Soviet chairman, or those of the first secretary and the Soviet chairman, or when the discussion of resolution drafts would tend to get biased. But there were no other unusual confrontations.

The agendas of all the congresses were quite traditional: reports, debates—mostly sounding like reporting on one's personal achievements, and the adoption of a brief resolution on the report. The selection of the new Central Committee used to proceed quite smoothly too, with no spontaneous nominations.

But the 28th congress kept the delegates and everybody who was following it in constant suspension. A real political battle was being waged. Some moments were quite dramatic....

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Some journalists and delegates think that the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev with the secretaries of the gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees] became the turning point of the congress. It was after that meeting, it seems, that the delegates finally switched over to constructive work, instead of criticizing the party leadership sharply, instead of trying to return the CPSU's former image to it, instead of indulging in a fruitless search for somebody to blame for all the mistakes and failures of perestroyka and for perestroyka itself, almost for starting it at all.

[Prokofyev] I would not want to overestimate the importance of this single meeting. But it did play its part, together with some other meetings that the general secretary had—with the secretaries of the primary party organizations and with the workers' delegates. These meetings helped in many ways to dampen the confrontational spirit at the congress. M.S. Gorbachev was very articulate in explaining his position to the people. And the people came to understand the situation.

Quite a few delegates were rather unprepared politically when they arrived at the congress. They felt that they had to find the culprit, to locate the enemy, and "destroy" him. But the congress sessions and those meetings gave them some important political education.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] What were your feelings on the podium as the audience tried "to applaud you out," trying not to let you speak? One of us spoke to the delegates about your speech during the intervals and the general opinion was that your presentation was very interesting. They did start to listen to you finally, but at first...

[Prokofyev] As I was still preparing my speech I asked for my comrades' advice whether to omit the part about the attitude toward the Russian Congress: Many members of the Moscow party organization were very critical of it. It was easy to foresee how a considerable number of the delegates would react to these words. But it would have been incorrect not to give an evaluation of the Constituent Congress, to say nothing about it. As I took the floor I knew that the delegates would not approve of the beginning of my speech; still I did not expect such insistent clapping, such interference. But I had been educated by the pre-election campaigning when I was nominated as a candidate for deputy. I have experience in dealing with a public that does not wish to listen to you. So my self-control helped me and I was not taken aback.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] How would you explain a certain suspicious, or sometimes outright hostile, attitude displayed towards the Moscow delegates and to Muscovites in general? It was evident at the First Congresses of the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies and the Russian Party Congress. It was noticeable at the 28th Congress also, though to a lesser degree.

[Prokofyev] The delegates from different republics and oblasts identify Moscow with the decisionmaking center. The situation in those areas depends in many ways on those decisions. It is the center that used to be generous or threatening, it would allow or disallow, extend or withdraw help—in other words, it was the core of the hateful command-and-administration system. Very often you would travel half the world to see an official and everything depended on what side of the bed that official had got up on that morning. The accumulation of years is bursting out now in human relations.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] There must be another side to it too. Moscow, Leningrad, and some other areas are well ahead of others in their political development. Here we have to resolve problems that are not going to face others for quite some time yet. Can it be just a lack of understanding?

[Prokofyev] This is true too. We do not always see the situation in other places clearly either. Some Moscow delegates had seriously criticized the party leadership for the slow pace of the reforms; but after they participated in the Russian and the 28th congresses they had to change their minds—politically, our country is developing very unevenly. And if we thoughtlessly accelerate this process the results can be far from favorable.

We have to treat the situation with understanding. Every region has its most complex problems and we have to find some sophisticated ways to resolve them. We cannot fix them with one stroke. And speaking of the attitude towards Moscow, many people think that the city exists on somebody else's money. But Moscow gives R16 billion of its revenue to the state budget and spends only R8 or R9 billion on itself.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Are you going to insist that the ideas and proposals suggested by the Moscow party organization be adopted by the second stage of the Russian congress which, we assume, is supposed to take place in September? And can you win there, anyway?

[Prokofyev] I must say that we have won the second part of the Russian congress in many ways already as the RSFSR Communist Party was formed within the CPSU and all the documents that we have to adopt there will be prepared on the basis of the materials of the 28th congress. And those materials have incorporated a lot from the position of the Moscow party organization. Our future task will be to democratize even further the program statements of the Russian Communist Party as well as its rules.

There is one thing I want to mention here: In the initial representation norms the Moscow party organization was allotted only two positions in the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee even though we make up one ninth of the total number of members. But in the final stages we agreed that the Moscow party organization would get 11 positions—the same quota as in the CPSU Central Committee.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Could you describe the Moscow delegation at the congress, not person by person but as a group?

[Prokofyev] If we talk about the position of the group then most of the delegation stands a little left of center. The Democratic and Marxist Platforms were also represented.

The composition of the delegation was quite diverse. About a third were party officials, a third were from the technical and artistic intelligentsia...

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] And only 14 workers...

[Prokofyev] That, of course, is insufficient. How do I explain this? The fight for delegate nominations was just as real and serious as the previous competition for deputy vacancies. Unfortunately, it was a rare worker that could successfully compete, offer his own program, and attract the people.

Some people see no reason to be concerned about this. I even had an argument with one woman delegate, from Magnitogorsk as I recall. She teaches at an institute; she insisted that she had been elected by the workers and could represent their interests perfectly well. You cannot understand the worker's interests 100 percent from outside, without being "in his shoes" as they say.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] But there are many workers that refuse to become delegates or deputies....

[Prokofyev] Yes, that is a different problem. We have to admit that many people have lost their trust in the party. They received very little from perestroyka. Take the market economy—it will hurt the working class first of all as they are the people who will become unemployed. Factories will have to be closed or transformed through no fault of the workers, but they will be the ones to bear the brunt of it.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] But then the party has also failed so far to incorporate the workers in political life, to get them involved in real political activity, rather than making them showcase characters. What ways do you see to enhance the workers' trust in the party?

[Prokofyev] There is only one way: They have to see that the party is expressing their interests.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] The party congress is over. Without going into detail, do you think it will influence the life of the party and of the entire country; will any radical changes ensue from it?

[Prokofyev] Of course, it will. Before the congress, a split in the party and a loss of its prestige and importance in our society loomed ahead quite realistically. And it is of utmost importance that the congress adopted documents that will help consolidate the people around them. The decisions of the congress, I think, will serve to achieve a certain normalization and to stabilize the situation in society. However, there are certain forces that dislike all this, as we could see from the rally in the Manezhnaya Square last Sunday. There are people who do not want the situation to stabilize, they do not want gradual reforms; they act as some congress delegates did at the very beginning. They are out to find "the enemy," to point him out to everyone, and "to teach him a lesson."

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] The course to a market economy has been set irrevocably. A third of the delegates, however, spoke against the transition to the market and thus demonstrated clearly their nonacceptance of market relations in the economy. Is the proportion about the same in general—in Moscow and in the country—a third against the market?

[Prokofyev] I think that the people at the congress were better prepared, but the situation in the country is more complex. It is obvious that considerably more people are suspicious of the market and do not want to accept it. The negative attitude towards it may increase, especially at the beginning, once we start transferring to the market.

Here is one example. Some of the science and research institutes are financed by the state budget. We stop the government financing but nobody contracts those institutes, either due to lack of money at the enterprises or because of the low level of the research done by the institutes. Entire organizations would face bankruptcy. Recently I spoke with a certain minister—four institutes are ready to fold in his field. They also talk about changing the type of production at many enterprises. It is easier to do so at small and average size places as they are more flexible. But what about giants like ZIL, for instance, that depend on thousands of suppliers? What will happen if one of them stops producing just one part which they think unprofitable? In other words, there is a whole world of problems tied up with the transfer to the market.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] What is the role of the party organizations in all of this?

[Prokofyev] It will be quite different than in previous times when the party carried a lot of clout. In my view, it is very important now to explain to the people what the market is, why we need it, what it can provide, what initial losses there may be, what price we will have to pay for its introduction. We have to remove the people's prejudices against the market.

The second thing that we have to do is resolve the problem of social protection of white and blue collar workers. I have already been approached by some of my comrades about the Moscow aluminum alloys plant. The plant is being switched over to a different type of production and we have to help the people transfer to other industries or be retrained. Some people say that this is a job for the trade unions. I am sure that it is also a job for the party organizations. We can, for instance, make up a group of fine specialists who will establish contact with the employment agencies, etc.

If there are no concrete actions and decisions then the party organizations have no future. They can, for instance, support some society groups in their fight to resolve ecological problems, or to improve working conditions at enterprises, or to introduce progressive forms of management. And here I want to reiterate that the issues of social protection for the most diverse groups of people are extremely important. That is what the party organizations should be concerned with instead of worrying about how to fulfill planned quotas at any cost as it used to be.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] What specific problems facing Moscow Communists after the 28th Congress would you single out?

[Prokofyev] I would like to name four tasks. First is further democratization. I say further because the city party organization already has some beginnings of the democratization. Using the congress materials as a base we now have to move on.

Second is our work in the soviets, with the deputies and through them.

Third, we have to design our own socioeconomic program which would be interesting for the people of Moscow and can be realistically carried out.

And fourth, we have to consider our policy in the intellectual sphere; among other things, how to employ the mass media (TV programs, radio broadcasts, and publications) to gain the support of public opinion.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] How will the mass media related to the gorkom work now, do you think?

[Prokofyev] In my opinion, the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA should remain the organ of the gorkom, its official publication. The Moscow TV and radio should broadcast official programs of the city party organization. I think that the gorkom could benefit from becoming a shareholder in a number of other newspapers including VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. You, for instance, can write anything you want in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. But we should be able to publish some of our materials there also.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] The congress managed to prevent the split in the party which was forecast by many political scientists. What will happen next? Can the internal party feuding intensify? Would people start leaving the party in numbers? All the same, the new CPSU Rules remain somewhat severe with respect to party discipline. But the champions of various platforms and movements are not going to disappear. Will they have to be expelled from the party now, as happened in some organizations after April's famous open letter of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Prokofyev] This is the approach of the past, of the old dogmas. Why do we have to expel or to suppress in any way the people guided, just like us, by a socialist choice but who are looking for different roads to the goal? Why should we condemn supporters of, say, the Marxist or Democratic Platforms who do not want to leave the CPSU? We should look for some sensible ideas in our discussions with them, we should work together. We cannot allow a situation when one side considers itself the keeper of the truth or insists on the extremes—all or nothing. We should look for compromises.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Was there an increase in the number of those leaving the party just after the congress? Or is this too hard to access yet?

[Prokofyev] We have tried to analyze the situation. There is no particular rise; the picture is approximately the same as in the previous months. In the first six months of this year over 20,000 people left the city party organization.

I want to emphasize again that the materials and documents of the congress are a basis for some serious work on reviving the party and rebuilding its prestige. Our main job is still ahead of us.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, you were elected member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee which is now new in its composition and in its goals. The Politburo will probably structure its work differently now. How do you envision it?

[Prokofyev] It seems that the internal party tasks will be given priority now. What can I say? The new practice will be established gradually. To begin with we plan to meet once a month which is understandable. The Politburo includes the leaders of Union republic communist parties and they have to spend most of their time in their areas. I think it is very positive that they have been introduced into the party's political leadership. This will help to strengthen the CPSU and to accelerate the development of all the party processes.

Estonian Daily Analyzes Kalugin Affair

90UF0415A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by A. Birov, Moscow: "From KGB General to USSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] In the estimation of experts, the demoted KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin has become one of the most graphic examples of the Europeanization of our politics, along with Yeltsin: A presidential ukase and a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers stripping him of his military rank and all decorations have been perceived as publicity, and ensured the present and perhaps the future for the former chekist.

Oleg Kalugin paid for popularity and fame among the people with a 50 percent rent reduction, the right to an extra 20 square meters of living space, a R350 retirement benefit, plus prestige and the rank of general. Oleg Kalugin said the following regarding the illegality of the actions taken against him: "It is absolutely invalid from the legal point of view. If I divulged state secrets they should take me to court and then make a decision. Everything I have said and will still say are secrets of the party-police mafia rather than the state...." In Kalugin's opinion, the fact that the president signed this patently unpopular document related to him is further proof that Kalugin is right: In the USSR the KGB can pressure leaders of the highest rank.

Kalugin himself has no reason to resent the president. The ukase affected public opinion with the precision of up to 180 degrees—the demoted general became literally a hero to the people, and he did so with such speed that he did not immediately understand it properly himself.

As Oleg Kalugin admits, "I would not have stood up under Chernenko; it would have been suicide, pure and simple."

The loss of the retirement benefit did not strike a substantial blow to the consultant for international relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Association for the Development of Information Technologies—drawing a R600 salary—where the "victim" works to this day... APN and Progress have offered him book contracts.

The former general says that despite power technically being transferred from the party to the soviets, the chiefs of the Leningrad KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], for example, report to the first secretary of the oblast and city party committee, Boris Gidaspov, rather than Leningrad Soviet Chairman A. Sobchak....

To run for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and USSR people's deputy is the only proposal Kalugin has accepted. He explained: "The immunity of a deputy will help me tell the entire truth without reservation." So far Kalugin has turned down all other proposals, saying that he will leave the CPSU after the congress and will not join other parties, including the Democratic Platform which is "working" on him and diligently trying to persuade him.

Thus, Oleg Kalugin was nominated as a candidate in the RSFSR people's deputy election from Lyublinskiy Rayon of the city of Moscow. He was also nominated in the 15th National-Territorial District of Krasnodar Kray. There, a conference of representatives of the labor collective of the VNIIPI [All-Union Research, Scientific, and Design Institute] Neftegazpererabotka nominated Kalugin by 93 votes in favor with three against for the vacated seat of a USSR people's deputy. Previously Ivan Polozkov, who gave up the mandate after he was elected RSFSR people's deputy, was elected USSR people's deputy in this district.

Oleg Kalugin spoke to the labor collectives of the institute about his program and answered the questions of workers. Party Committee Secretary Mikhail Veligodskiy, who is active in the Krasnodar club "Communists for Democratizing the CPSU," was one of the organizers of his nomination as USSR people's deputy. According to data as of 13 July, 14 candidates have been nominated in this okrug, and First Secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Ivan Polozkov, who has not yet stated his consent to run in this district, has been nominated again. Meanwhile Kalugin continues to receive new proposals to be nominated people's deputy of various levels.

USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov disagrees fundamentally with the opinion of those attending rallies and demonstrations and the labor collectives which nominated Kalugin USSR and RSFSR people's deputy. Thus, speaking at the 28th CPSU Congress, he devoted a substantial segment of his report to denouncing the former general and striving to show the true Kalugin. As his speech at the congress suggests, Oleg Kalugin has violated the primordial commandments of a chekist, and this is why he is not worthy of the generals's insignia and government decorations. In the report, the KGB chairman showed that the former general did not do all that well in his military service with the organs. V. Kryuchkov added "so to speak, several words to the political portrait of Kalugin." V. Kryuchkov stated: "These people jump off the party ship moving at full speed, just in case, and shout louder than anyone else about how great they were and are as democrats. Kalugin is also rushing to join the ranks of such people. They ask us: Have we not dealt with Kalugin too sternly by stripping him of the rank of general and all decorations? No, not too sternly," answers V. Kryuchkov and even explains: "As far as our response to the actions of Kalugin is concerned, in other countries it would have been considerably harsher." In our country as well, in the words of Kalugin himself, "in the time of Chernenko, I would not have stood up." This is to say nothing about the well-known times of "the iron fist" and "stagnation." Could it be that the time of democracy and glasnost has indeed come when a demoted general who has fallen out of favor with the KGB itself (!) is nominated USSR people's deputy?

(Some data of the Postfactum Agency and the weekly KOMMERSANT were used in this article).

Customs Chief on Role in Market Economy

LD1508174890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1606 GMT on 15 August, in an unscheduled broadcast in the "In the USSR Government" series, carries a 13-minute recorded talk by V.K. Boyarov, chief of the main directorate of State Customs Control at the USSR Council of Ministers. He discusses the role of the customs service as the country prepares for the transition to a market economy.

The Soviet customs services, he says, have benefited from the experience of those in other countries, and he goes on to outline the basic way these countries' systems work. Fears have been expressed that the Soviet state, or a part of its territory, will be split into independent customs territories; Boyarov believes that this would lead to "grave economic and general political consequences for each region." He goes on: "A republic or a region that embarks on such a path would have to set up its own customs system protecting not only the line of the current USSR state border, but also the border between republics. This is a double-edged measure. Any republic that takes such a measure must bear in mind that other republics, on the other side of the border, would be compelled to take similar measures." This would mean two sets of customs legislation for each territory. Furthermore, setting up customs services in each republic would entail huge expense. In Lithuania, for example, this would cost at least R250 million and in Estonia a fraction less.

Boyarov believes that centralization of the customs services does not mean encroachment on the sovereignty of the republics, but their strengthening, because the USSR is the guarantee of all the country's foreign economic links on the foreign market. If each republic has its own service, this would lead to one having claims on the other. What is required is a state structure for a new type of customs service from which all republics would benefit. The government's program for the reconstruction of the Soviet state border provides the following figures: The Ukraine, which obtains approximately R20-22 million in customs revenue annually, is incapable of equipping its western border to meet world standards. To do so would reqire at least R300-400 million.

Boyarov goes on: "We have tabled proposals—and the government has approved them—which provide us with the opportunity to turn all the resources that the customs services earn over to the development of the customs services themselves. In other words, we now have at our disposal all the finances we need. This will enable us to equip and carry out construction work on the state border of the Soviet Union and prepare all the customs crossing points for the increasing commercial exchange which will naturally accompany our transition to a market economy." The legislative provision for the customs programs is contained in two draft bills which have been tabled to the USSR Supreme Soviet, where they are being examined in committee.

Letter to Editor Criticizes Praise of Yakovlev

90UN2549A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 2

[Letter to the editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "Who Gave You the Right?"]

[Text] On 4 July your newspaper printed the article "Will There Be a Split?"

This article reveals your views and your political platform. Your voice sounds similar to the voices of such publications as OGONEK, IZVESTIYA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, etc.

You discovered the phenomenon of A.N. Yakovlev, did you not? But why don't you listen to rank-and-file Communists? Yakovlev has nothing communist or socialist in him. When he speaks he is afraid to use the words "communism" and "socialism" as heresy; long ago he transformed himself into a socialist-democrat of the time of the Second International.

Dear editor, you present Comrade Yakovlev, together with Comrade Gorbachev, as the savior of our party and our country.

But why do you not write about who is responsible for the collapse of the ideological work in our country, who is to blame for the disintegration of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact? Whose fault is it that our armies are being chased away from the countries of East Europe without any compensation or social protection being offered our officers and warrant officers and their families?

Dear Comrade Yurkov, I want to remind you that the United States and South Korea agreed to withdraw 40,000-45,000 U.S. troops before 1996, and South Korea will pay compensation in full. And our Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Gorbachev did not think about it when they were signing agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We must be richer than the United States, it seems.

And what role did Yakovlev play with respect to the ethnic problems? His trips to the Baltics and to Moldavia served to encourage the local nationalists. And the whole country can see where that took us.

Who should be held responsible for the five years of warped economy and finances? Who brought the country to such a condition? Can you be shameless enough to blame all the problems on Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev even now? Is it that Gorbachev and Yakovlev should be above criticism? Gorbachev is at the head of the government and the party, and he should be the first to bear responsibility for the failures.

We understand why you sing praises to Yakovlev. You want him to take the leading position in the party, and the revisionists have ordered the same. But that would bring nothing but grief to the party and to the country. Our life will confirm the truth of what has been said.

And the time will come for you to answer for your praises to the opportunists.

Please publish my letter in one of the issues of your newspaper.

Sincerely,
[Signed] Grigoriy Ivanovich Bomeshko, Kishinev

Market Forces To Double Newspaper, Book Prices

PM1608092390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 Second Edition pp 1, 6

[Ye. Dvornikov report: "Publish? Please..."]

[Excerpts] Registration certificate No. 1 was issued to the newspaper IZVESTIYA at the USSR State Committee for the Press in Moscow yesterday. One of the provisions of the Law on the Press which has come into force, according to which it is necessary to register all existing periodicals or ones newly opening up in the country, has thus begun to be fulfilled. [passage omitted]

A question was asked at a news conference about the newspaper PRAVDA: Has the editorial board applied for registration? A. Gorkovlyuk, deputy chairman of the committee, confirmed this fact but specified that the request for registration of the country's main party newspaper has been submitted by the PRAVDA Publishing House in a "package" together with other newspapers and journals published under the aegis of this publishing house. The application will be considered in September.

Journalists asked many questions about the paper famine and the upcoming rise in subscription prices. Everything will be twice as expensive on average. The psychological complexity of the present situation consists in the fact that the press will be the first to greet the market face to face, for the subscription campaign essentially anticipates market relations. According to the most modest estimates, a book that now costs two rubles will cost the reader five in the new year. The "Children's Literature" Publishing House and those specializing in textbook production will have a hard time.

...And so, the market breath of 1991 is being felt increasingly distinctly in the field of journals and newspapers.

PRAVDA Announces Price Rise

LD1608103890 Moscow TASS in English 1021 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The PRAVDA Publishing House, under the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, will increase the retail prices of its newspapers and magazines by two or two and a half times next year, the GLASNOST weekly said.

Chief of the party publications department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Business Administration Department V. Kostrav told the GLASNOST weekly that the transition to a market economy will increase three to four-fold the cost of paper. The cost of distribution will also be 2.4 times higher.

All 1991 losses from the publication of the newspaper PRAVDA will be compensated for out of the party budget.

The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Young Communist League have made subscriptions to their newspapers TRUD and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA three rubles cheaper than party newspapers of the same size.

The Soviet Communist Party cannot match their prices because of falling membership dues and revenues from publications.

Decree Aids Families With Children

904F0233A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the USSR Council of Ministers, State Support for Families with Children"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has passed a resolution on additional measures to provide social safeguards for families with children in connection with the transition to a regulated market economy.

Instead of the previous one-time benefits paid for the birth of a child, differentiated as a function of the number of children in a family, and the monthly benefit payment for large families for the fourth and subsequent children aged under five years, it has been decided to establish a one-time benefit payment at the birth of a child set a three times the minimum wage. A combined monthly benefit payment will be made for children aged 18 months to six years, set at 50 percent of the minimum wage for each child who is a family dependent, if the average combined income for each member of the family does not exceed double the minimum wage.

It has also been decided to increase monthly state benefit payments for single mothers, paid for each child until he or she attains the age of 16 years (of 18 years for students not receiving a grant), for divorced men and women who are not receiving alimony for children falling within these same age limits or who are receiving alimony that is R20 per month or less, and for children who have not reached maturity and whose parents are, on instructions of the courts, being sought by the organs of internal afairs for failure to make alimony payments, with payments set at 50 percent of minimum wage.

For persons living in regions and areas where regional wage coefficients have been set, the amount of benefit payments will be determined on this basis. If in this region different wage coefficients are in force, then the coefficients set for wages for workers and employees in the nonproduction sectors of the national economy will apply.

These benefits will be paid beginning 1 December 1990.

The resolution makes provision for retaining the norm for the republic level of monthly benefit payments of R12 for children aged up to 12 years in families in which the average combined income per family member does not exceed R50, while in regions of the far east, Siberia, and the northern areas of the country, the amount of R75 will be paid monthly in accordance with the the list compiled by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Expenditures connected with implementation of the planned measures to provide social safeguards for families with children will be funded for the current year in varying amounts from assets in the all-Union budget and the budgets of the Union republics. Starting from 1991 these proportions will be taken into account when forming the corresponding budgets.

KGB Finds Burial Site in Moscow Oblast

LD1508171890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] The USSR Committee for State Security continues its search for the burial places of victims of the repressions of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's on the territory of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

In the course of this work additional information has been obtained on the existence of such burials in the area of Kommunarka State Farm in Moscow Oblast. According to the testimony of some former NKVD [KGB precursor] officials, repressed Chekists are buried there along with other citizens. Moscow Soviet has been informed about the information obtained.

Comparison of Presidential Decree on Repression

PM1408105090

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 14 August 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 1 a presidential decree on the victims of repression. The PRAVDA item, entitled "On the Restoration of the Rights of All Victims of the Political Repressions of the 1920-50's," has been compared with the translation of the Moscow domestic Russian version published in the 14 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the headline "Gorbachev Decree Rehabilitates Stalin Victims," page 26, revealing the following variations:

Column one, paragraph one, sentence one in PRAVDA begins: [Text] On the Restoration of the Rights of All Victims of Political Repressions of the 1920's-50's:

The mass repressions, arbitrary... (picking up paragraph one, sentence two, supplying new introduction)

Column two, third complete paragraph, last sentence in PRAVDA reads: ...USSR Presidential Council.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR
[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 13 August 1990
(PRAVDA ends, supplying signature and date)

Comparison of KGB Report on Suspects' Arrests

PM1608081790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 15 August 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 6 an unattributed report on KGB arrests of espionage suspects. The PRAVDA item, entitled "At the USSR KGB," has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published in the 15 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the headline "KGB Announces Trial of Espionage Suspects," page 26, revealing the following variations:

Column one, paragraph two, only sentence in PRAVDA reads: [Text] State Security Committee.... (deleting introductory paragraph)

Same sentence in Pravda reads: ...Soviet nationals to pass state and military.... (supplying indistinct word)

Same one, last paragraph, only sentence in PRAVDA reads: ...released after the court examinations.... (substituting "court examinations" for "trials")

Economic

'Mutual Understanding' Shown at Economic Talks

LD1608104190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Journalists were today informed about the preliminary results of the work of the working group preparing the concept of a Union program for the transfer to a market economy, as the basis of a Union treaty.

Present at the meeting were: Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet [RSFSR]; Shatalin, member of the USSR Presidential Council; Abalkin, deputy chairman of the country's Council of Ministers; Petrakov, aide to the USSR president; and well-known economists.

It was noted that a stream of proposals is coming in from scientists, enterprises, collectives, and individual citizens.

Representatives of the working group also held a meeting with representatives of workers' movements. There is mutual understanding on most clauses of the program.

Ryzhkov Talks With Precious Metal Managers

LD1508191390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A meeting took place today in the Kremlin between Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and a group of directors of associations and enterprises of the Chief Directorate of Precious Metals and Diamonds under the USSR Council of Ministers.

There was discussion of the work, amid the transition to market conditions, of enterprises engaged in the extraction of gold and diamonds and in the production of cut diamonds and jewelery goods. The participants in the meeting noted that the sector has consistently fulfilled state orders and has many opportunities for the further expansion of production. At the same time the transition to market conditions requires the solving of many problems concerning the provision of material and technical back-up for enterprises; organizational and financial relations with local authorities; foreign currency deductions; wages; and a number of other questions of a social nature, while also taking into account the fact that a considerable proportion of the sector's workers work in the conditions of the Far North.

With the introduction of the new tax system there is a considerable change in the economic relations between the enterprises and the local and republican authorities. This will open up new opportunities, increase incentives for labor collectives and soviets to resolve their common problems, and make it possible to preserve those things of value that have been achieved in the development of the sector.

Comrade Ryzhkov gave specific instructions to the appropriate management bodies on a number of problems touched upon by managers of the sector.

Spain To Aid Production of Disposable Syringes

PM1508113690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Aug 90

[Report by V. Gorkayev and V. Ledkov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Is it possible to resolve the problem of the production of disposable syringes in our country? Available experience indicates that it is possible. Here is a report from Spain:

[Reporter] This kind of disposable syringe, whose handle can easily be broken off to avoid accidental re-use, is something Soviet doctors and patients can only dream of. We have been presented with some. Sometimes prominent Soviet figures buy a few thousand of them for a fee earned abroad. Noble as such charitable acts are, they merely serve to emphasize the problem. What are tens of thousands of such syringes compared with the annual requirement of ten billion of them? This problem must be resolved radically, seriously, and most important swiftly.

Our experience of cooperation with the Spanish Fabersanitas S.A. company opens up promising prospects in this respect.

[L. Serrano, the company's technical director, speaking in Spanish with superimposed Russian] We have developed our own technology for the production of disposable syringes and are now selling them to more than 50 countries virtually worldwide. We have managed to combine mass production and high quality with low production costs which has made our syringes very competitive on the world market.

[Reporter] What is the scale of your cooperation with the Soviet Union?

[Serrano] A year ago we signed two contracts. The first is for the production of 400 million needles in Tyumen, the second is for the production of 600 million at Vormsi near Gorki.

[Reporter] And so 1 billion needles per year. That is already something. Furthermore, this cooperation is likely to grow. While we were filming this report at the Spanish company, we met some Soviet specialists from Ufa who were interested in the Spanish technology, and we interviewed an official from Uzbekistan where production of disposable syringes will begin in the near future.

[S.S. Akhrarov, director general of the Uzbekmedtekhnika Association] Our factory will start up production at the beginning of 1991 and it is planning to produce 100 million syringes and 100 million needles per year. This is insufficient for the republic, of course. But we have just had talks with the management of the Spanish company and we will seek to increase our output.

[Reporter] Some 300 million syringes will be produced in Tashkent in the future, and what is more from our own plastics which is also quite important. You will agree that this initiative is worthy of emulation.

Novolipetsk Plant Bids To Produce Refrigerators

PM1508112090 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Aug 90

[Report by Oleg Bobin from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Trade outlets' demands for refrigerators will be less than 70 percent met this year. This means that 3 million Soviet people who would like to buy a refrigerator will be unable to do so. In general there are few refrigerators in our country—92 refrigerators per 100 households. The corresponding indicator in West Europe is 175 refrigerators per 100 households.

Our correspondent Oleg Bobin reports an initiative which may help to resolve this problem:

[Bobin] Here are the refrigerators which you are planning to produce.

[A.N. Frudkin, production chief] These are primarily multicompartment refrigerators. This for instance is a three-compartment refrigerator with four temperature zones comprising a freezer, a refrigerator, and a compartment for storing vegetables.

[Bobin] How do these refrigerators and freezers differ from those currently in production in the Soviet Union?

[Frudkin] First of all, about half these models will be equipped with a special forced ventilation system—the so called Nuvofrost—which means that the freezer or refrigerator does not have to be defrosted.

[Bobin] It is unusual for us that metal workers are planning to produce these latest models of refrigerators. But for major metallurgical concerns in the world this is quite normal. They even produce cars. The Novolipetsk metal combine supplies metal not only for the automobile industry but also the Minsk refrigerator plant and allied enterprises which supply the motors. While maintaining their former contacts, the Novolipetsk metal workers believe that it is possible to start up production also at their own enterprise. The logic is quite straightforward. As a result of sales abroad of above-plan output—not just metal but also ammonia for which there is no demand in our country—they have been able to conclude a contract with an Italian firm for the supply of manufacturing equipment. A Yugoslav company is building the production premises and in two years' time it is planned to start up the production of the latest models of refrigerators here, producing 1 million of them per year.

[I.V. Frantsenyuk, director general of the combine] But we have problems, unsolved problems. This is a sizable, solid contract. Construction is proceeding very rapidly. The bulk of the equipment is to be delivered in the coming year, 1991. And we need some temporary support. We cannot earn enough money to finance all this in a year or two. We have taken on credits and squared our accounts with the government. The combine is operating under conditions of self-financing, full economic accountability, and cost recovery. But it cannot earn this amount of money—$170 million—in a year.

[Announcer] Economists have worked out that in order to satisfy demand in our country it is necessary to produce 10 million refrigerators annually. The Lipetsk plant is proposing to start producing one-tenth of this in a year's time on condition that we help them out now.

Joint Soviet-Japanese Timber Enterprise Begins

PM1508133490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Report by L. Stroykov and O. Ivanov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Another new Soviet-Japanese enterprise—Lidoga—has started operations in Khabarovsk Kray. Our correspondent provides the details.

[Reporter] It has taken just over a year—very fast by our standards—to build this sawmill under the Dallesprom Association together with the Japanese firms C. Itoh and Progress Trading. Its main output is blanks for furniture and housing construction as well as technical tenons.

Quality is ensured by state-of-the-art equipment—the boards are marked out by laser—and a highly skilled workforce, many of whom have traveled specially to Japan for training. The production system is waste-free. For the first time the timber industry in the Far East has been able to place its finished output on the Pacific market. This output is several times more expensive than the raw material—round timber. Moreover, the Japanese partners in Lidoga will sell the goods in their own country on a commission basis which will bring in extra profit for the joint enterprise. Dozens of potential Japanese customers even came to the Lidoga opening ceremony so as to see for themselves that everything was fine. But all these are the delights of production.

These days it is important to know whether this joint activity suits people—the people of the Far East. There is news in this area too. Perhaps for the first time the final decision to build a Soviet-Japanese enterprise rested not with a central department but with the rural soviet in the Nanay national region on whose territory Lidoga is situated. The new enterprise has built housing for its workers and specialists. New medical, cultural, and other social institutions are being opened. [passage omitted]

Agricultural

Weather, Crop, Harvest Conditions Detailed

904B0272A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by agrometeorologist N. Ignatova: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Cool weather with heavy rains was observed on a large part of the European territory of the USSR at the end of July. The average 10-day temperature was two to five degrees lower than the long-term average.

The boundary of ripening summer grain crops moved to the line Tallinn-Smolensk-Ryazan-Yoshkar Ola. In a majority of the rayons the grain formed to full weight. In the southern and eastern Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the southern Volga area—where precipitation was noted for one to three days and was insignificant—the conditions for harvesting grain were favorable. On the rest of the territory of the Ukraine; in Belorussia; in the Central Chernozem; in the Northwest, Central, Baltic, and Ural Rayons; and in the central Volga area, intense rains over-moistened the top layer of the soil.

A lower temperature regime delayed the growth and development of corn. For a greater part of the zone cultivated for grain, the blossoming of tufts and ears was observed, but to the south of the territory a milky ripeness of grain was noted in early-ripening types of plants and hybrids.

In a large part of the beet-growing zone, root growth was delayed somewhat as a consequence of weather conditions. In the south of the Central Chernozem and the central rayons, in the beet-growing oblasts of the Volga area, conditions for the accumulation of sugars were poor because of the prevalence of cloudy weather. In

Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays and in the central oblasts of the Ukraine, conditions were good but on individual days, because of a shortage of soil moisture, a loss of turgor was noted in plants and a premature yellowing of lower leaves was observed.

In the southern Ukraine, in Moldavia, and in a large part of the North Caucasus the blossoming of sunflowers is coming to an end, but ripening was noted in places in Odessa and Kherson Oblasts and Krasnodar Kray which is five to 10 days later than the average long-term periods and last year. In the remaining rayons where sunflowers are cultivated for grain, they continued to blossom.

In the agricultural rayons of Siberia and southern Kazakhstan, the air temperature was close to the average long-term temperature or exceeded it by one to three degrees, and in the remaining part of the territory of Kazakhstan it was just as many degrees lower than the long-term temperature. The rains that were observed in a majority of the rayons were favorable for grain forming of early summer grain crops. Grain forming ended for plants that were planted early and a milky ripening was noted. Full grain ripening of summer grain crops was reached in Ural Oblast and western Aktyubinsk Oblast.

In the steppe rayons of Omsk and Novosibirsk Oblasts; in the Altay Kray; in the central rayons of Irkutsk Oblast; and also in Pavlodar, Karaganda, and Semipalatinsk Oblasts, where the establishment of ears (tufts) of spring wheat and spring barley and oats occurred under conditions of dry weather, the ears formed were small and not of full weight, and in places laxial ears were noted. In a large part of the agricultural zone of Siberia and in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan the rains that occurred improved the moisture supply for potatoes somewhat, but the growth of tubers occurred under an increased soil temperature to the depth of their bedding. Nonetheless, in individual rayons of Krasnodar Kray as well as Omsk and Irkutsk Oblasts, the reserves of productive moisture in the soil remain low and conditions for the growth of tubers were unfavorable.

Agricultural Developments Reported for 12-15 Aug

LD1608015890

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural development in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 12-15 August, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parenthesis at the end of each item.

12 Aug

Kazakhstan: More than four million hectares of grain have been cleared so far. All the barley and wheat has already been mown and threshed. The republic has had problems however: 180,000 tonnes of petrol were not delivered in August, and the farms need an extra 14,000 combine harvesters for best results. Selective harvesting is now starting in the Kazakhstan valley—the republic's bread basket. (0600)

Lieutenant-General (Goronkevich), chief of ground forces headquarters, has talked about military help in gathering in the harvest for Russia's farmers. Here is his information: At present 50 motor transport battalions out of 70 formed by the country's Ministry of Defense are transporing grain and other agricultural produce in 15 oblasts, three krays, and one autonomous republic in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. Over the first 10 days more than 1 million tonnes of loads, including more than 700,000 tonnes of grain, have been transported from Russia's fields. In accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers' decision it is proposed to send an additional 3,000 trucks with drivers to the Russian Federation. (0800)

13 Aug

The farmers of Luganks Oblast could receive an extra 2 million rubles [R] from the sale of cereals at the new procurement prices. The farmers have increased the acerage of sunflowers, grain, corn, and oats, the prices for which have risen several times over. Now the grain is suitable priced for it is very difficult to grow it on the stony land. Thanks to the rise in the procurement prices, the workers in Lugansk Oblast fields will receive an additional R85 million. Alas, we do not yet know how this will affect retail prices. (0300)

14 Aug

According to the Lithuanian Statistical Department, by 12 August grain crops were cut on an area of 590,000 hectares, or 60 percent of the total area. The average yields amount to 34.9 quintals per hectare. (Vilnius Domestic Servce in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 14 Aug 90)

Happy news has been received today from the Russian Federation: collective and state farms have sold the state 18.5 million tonnes of grain. (1500)

15 Aug

Orenburg Oblast: The first million tonnes of grain have been sold to the state. (0130)

Belorussia: Harvesting has now started on the second half of the land. It is expected that the gross grain yield will top 8 million tonnes. Brest Olbast has already completed its cereal harvesting. (0130)

Semen Astakhov notes that because of the bad weather and other problems, the harvest of cereals in Russia is two weeks behind last year's, although much more grain has been gathered in. In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic an average of 29 quintals per hectare is being harvested. Astakhov then goes on to play part of an interview with a farm director on how the harvest is proceeding on his farm. (1500)

Voronezh Vegetable Glut Causes Harvest Problems

PM1508114090 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Report by L. Maksimov and V. Shishkin from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We go over to Voronezh now where a session of the oblast soviet yesterday discussed problems and measures to save the harvest.

[Reporter] This is the Voronezh market today, 8 August. The vegetable season is in full swing, there is a lot of produce around. But prices are a different matter.... Tomatoes cost up to four rubles per kilogram. At the 60-letiye Oktyabrya Sovkhoz [state farm] near Voronezh there are thousands of hectares of vegetables. Here are the same tomatoes but their price is low; it is the state price. Industrial workers have arrived to help with the harvest. But hundreds of hectares of vegetables have already been plowed over in the oblast because there was no one to tend the crops.

[V.G. Atlasov, chairman of Voronezh City Soviet] I view all these emergency measures with caution. I believe in systematic, painstaking labor and industrial enterprise sponsorship of the countryside.

This year is a big exception of course. Even the weather conditions in the oblast are such that certain measures are simply indispensable this year. It is difficult to cope with such a glut. We at the city soviet are now trying to elaborate new approaches, a new strategy. Leaseholding is definitely one of the solutions. It is also within our capabilities to mechanize the vegetable growing and harvesting process.

[Reporter] So there are plans. But it would have been better if they had been drawn up yesterday rather than today.

Overburdened Shigany Dairy Needs Reconstruction

PM1508114690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Report by L. Krechetova and V. Pavlov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Another matter which should have been attended to yesterday rather than today is the construction and reconstruction of processing industry enterprises. In our country most of these are small, low-capacity units which are simply choking on the produce which is arriving to be processed at the moment. This applies to livestock as well as crop produce. Nonetheless, they continue to be regarded as projects of secondary importance.

[Reporter] The Shigony Dairy near Syzran is nearly 200 years old. It is working flat out supplying dairy produce to some 50 children's and medical establishments in the city as well as to leisure bases and stores. In addition it produces 600 tonnes of excellent cheese. There are few dairies in the Volga region and Russia as a whole where milk suitable for this sought-after dairy product is available. The dairy could produce twice as much cheese, but reconstruction is necessary.

Some 18 months ago, following the publication of a resolution by the oblast party committee and soviet of people's deputies, the Syzran Construction Trust sent a multiskill construction team, the foundation pit was dug, and a new production unit was to have been built in the course of the summer. But then the team was switched to a more profitable project. Production equipment is due to arrive here at any moment. The Shigony Dairy workers have left no stone unturned. They have appealed to the oblast party committee, the oblast soviet executive committee, and USSR and republic people's deputies, but to no avail.

[P.M. Yelin, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet] It is true that in the oblast as a whole the situation as regards processing enterprises and organizations is quite desperate.

Therefore today, when the oblast soviet is preparing for an extraordinary session on oblast food supplies, economists and lawyers are trying to work out a common denominator for the interests of industrial enterprises, state and collective farms, construction organizations, and Kuybyshev agro-industrial association processing enterprises.

[Reporter] The question is whether the oblast soviet will get a grip on the situation prevailing on its territory.

Shortages Cause Holdups in Cherkassy Harvesting

PM1508155090 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Report by N. Gluzova, V. Reyskiy, and V. Matsak from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Reporter] Cutting work was done in Valki a week or so ago. Now it is the harvesting combines' turn. The amazingly rich grain crop cannot wait. In some places it has already become overripe and is being scattered. What is more, the recent rain and squalls have lodged and mixed up the grain. For instance, such fields account for more 80 percent of all fields in Cherkassy Oblast. And very great care needs to be taken in order to get all this grain to the threshing floor. Now, without a second thought, it is not just machine operators working on the combines, in the threshing floors, and in grain transportation, but teachers, doctors, technicians—any country people who have even a little free time. An influx of students is also expected along with military subunits. But this brings us to a general problem. Supplies of harvesting equipment are not reaching the countryside, and there are shortages of weighing equipment at reception centers and of fuel. In this regard the Ukrainian Government recently adopted active measures, obtaining gasoline from Romania in return for lubricants, but this is far from being enough. Yet the harvest is heading for the threshing floors. According to specialist estimates, the Ukraine is expecting to produce 40-45 million tonnes of grain this year. It is as if nature herself were giving us a chance at this hour of economic crisis. Around 28 million tonnes of choice grain has already built up at grain threshing floors.

Kuybyshev Elevators Unable To Cope With Harvest

PM1508151190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent A. Solarev under the "Harvest-90" rubric: "Urgent Signal—Extra Grain?"]

[Text] Kuybyshev had never seen such a thing before. Almost 30 dump trucks with their headlights switched on, disturbing the city with their horns, drove into Glory Square in the evening and lined up in front of the House of the Soviets.

The reason for this was something that has become customary in our day. Grain brought by four drivers to the Kuybyshev elevator was refused. It had started germinating because of the excessive humidity. The damp weather and storage in the open air caused havoc. The indignant drivers, who were not to be blamed in any way and who were not paid a single kopek for their wasted journeys or for waiting in line at the elevators, first blocked the way to the elevator and then moved down town. Other vehicles tired of waiting to unload joined them.

And this happened on the first day that the state of emergency was declared in the oblast and the city—it will last the whole period of the grain and vegetable harvest until 30 September. But will this extreme measure help? The driers at the elevators are not working and there are few threshing barns on the farms.... After all, all this was well known long before the beginning of the harvest, but neither the oblast soviet of peoples deputies, nor soviets at other levels which were busy with their own organizational questions, got involved in the preparation for the harvest.

When the food commission proposed at the first session of the Kuybyshev City Soviet in May that the question of preparing for the gathering in of the harvest be examined, this proposal was rejected by a majority of votes. They said that it was too early to talk about it. Now, alas, it is too late. An unprecedented amount of grain—124,000 tonnes—has accumulated on the oblast's threshing floors.

At one of the oblast staff sessions on the gathering of the harvest, V. Trubakov, chairman of Sergiyevskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Soviet Executive Committee], stated: "If we do not receive assistance we will pour the grain into trenches for cattle feed." A decision that is clearly reckless, but one dictated by despair.

Progress of Mari Republic Harvest Reported

PM1508132490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Report by A. Aleksandrova and V. Ivanov from the "Vremya" nescast]

[Text] [Announcer] You have probably noticed that our reports are increasingly covering the help given by city people to the countryside and the conflicts that arise. A report from the Mari ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]:

[Reporter] Usually at vegetable harvest time this central square in Yoshkar-Ola is the starting point for dozens of buses leaving for the nearby sovkhoz [state farm] named for the 60th anniversary of the USSR. Currently you can just see odd buses, and even they are half-empty. And this on people's days off. The sovkhoz supplies the whole republic with vegetables and really needs help at the moment. What has happened? Have the townspeople really stopped understanding the country people and their difficulties? Does the fate of the rich harvest not concern them? Or are the stores full of products rich in vitamins?

By no means. The partners have simply not yet learned to work under the new economic conditions on a mutually advantageous basis. Leading enterprises are wrapped up in their own problems, and the sovkhoz did not conclude labor contracts with them in good time. The trading system is waiting but it can't speed things up itself. Thankfully in this complex situation the local authorities stepped in quite quickly to mediate. The appeals from the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] to the inhabitants of Yoshkar-Ola, the local garrison, students, and schoolchildren, as well as the agreement with the sovkhoz on the introduction of payment in kind, have drastically altered the state of affairs in the vegetable fields. And the resolution by the country's government on additional measures to save the harvest has topped things off, as they say. So there is hope now that the vegetable fields of the Mari Non-Chernozem Zone will not be plowed up without being harvested.

Harvest Delays Jeopardize Good Feed Crop

PM1608084390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

["Our Commentary" by Ye. Grigoryev: under the general headline "Harvest Time"]

[Text] There is a good crop of grass this year. Provided the green abundance is harvested on time there will be no worries about winter feed for the livestock. But concern persists because haystacks are growing very slowly. Seven million fewer hectares of grass have been cut than by this time last year. Hay procurement is more than 11 million tonnes lower, and silage is 1.5 million tonnes down. Haylage is the only feed of which more has been laid in. Why are many farms still without good stocks of hay and other feeds even after this year's summer? A slow start, breakdowns of machinery, and bad weather are being blamed. It is true that the weather is an impediment; in some regions it has been raining for weeks. But even bigger losses are inflicted by our eternal sluggishness. Tens of thousands of tractor mowers, pickup balers, rakes, and feed harvesters are defective.

The USSR Council of Ministers discussed questions of the material and technical backup of harvest work six weeks ago. It was decided to make up the shortfall in the deliveries of tractors, agricultural machinery, and spare parts to agro-industrial complex enterprises. And what has happened?

It seems that many plant collectives are confusing independence with a neglectful attitude toward the plan and toward their obligations to the countryside. Their debt to the countryside remains the same as it was before. At the beginning of July, PRAVDA criticized a number of enterprises for failing to meet deliveries. And what has changed? The "Gomselmash" Production Association is still in debt to the countryside; it has held up deliveries of spare parts. The "Zavod imeni Ukhtomskogo" Lyubertsy Production Association, the agricultural machinery plant in Frunze City, and the Urgench feed harvesting machinery plant are in no hurry to repay their debts. They do not respond to appeals or criticism.

What are the entreaties, groans, prayers, and threats of agricultural workers to them? The plants have their own entirely understandable concerns. But is the concern for feeds and grain only the rural workers' affair or does it concern all of us? And is the silence of the leaders of industrial enterprises really the gold that is needed today? Although, of course, it does turn into gold in the end since the country is having to spend foreign currency in order to acquire grain, feed, meat, and butter abroad.

Military

Air Force Chief of Staff Views New Doctrine

LD1608022290 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Report on interview with Colonel General Pankin, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Air Force; place and date not given. Pankin speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] August 19th will be marked in this country as Aviation Day. It is a professional holiday for all those who have dedicated their lives to aviation. Radio Moscow's correspondent has asked the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Air Force, Colonel General Valentin Pankin, to answer several questions about the Soviet Air Force. What questions are most crucial to Air Force officers today? Col. Gen. Pankin:

[Begin Pankin recording] The Soviet Air Force is having no easy time. Its structure is being changed under the new defensive military doctrine. We strictly honor all arms reductions and limitation agreements. The unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces announced in December 1988 has already been carried out as far as aviation is concerned. Eight hundred and sixty warplanes have been withdrawn from the Air Force and five air divisions, two Air Force academies, and more than 20 Air Force regiments have been disbanded. Air Force units are being withdrawn from Mongolia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Preparation is under way for their withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic and Poland. [end recording]

Asked about plans for reductions under a future strategic offensive arms treaty being drafted in Geneva, General Pankin said the following:

[Begin Pankin recording] In my view it would have been much better if countries had no strategic nuclear arms at all. Hence the stockpiles of such weapons are enormous, we have to reduce them, in the first place those of the Soviet Union and the United States. The treaty about to be finalized is expected to contain a compromise solution concerning limits on the heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles. The United States will have no more than 150 planes and the Soviet Union 210. The reason for the difference is that there are different standards for the cruise missiles carried by each bomber, in the United States greater, in the Soviet Union smaller. [end recording]

It is also important that the sides have agreed to continue to reduce strategic aircraft on the basis of parity. Asked about the balance of the Air Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in Europe, General Pankin said this:

[Begin Pankin recording] World changes have had considerable influence on the condition of the military-political alliance and the balance of forces between them. The recent visit by NATO's secretary general to the Soviet Union is very encouraging. I'd like to believe that a solid groundwork of a future common European home is being laid. So one can suppose that the national armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries may be withdrawn from the united command, their air forces too. [end recording]

The national air forces would have the sole mission of defending their country. It must not be ruled out that some Warsaw Treaty countries may join NATO, which would lead to a certain redistribution of forces in Europe. However we believe that there will be no serious changes in the line up of forces or any serious imbalances. General Pankin hopes that the difficulties at the Vienna talks concerning cuts in air forces will be overcome.

The chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Air Force in conclusion noted the importance of expanding contacts with the air forces of the United States and other western countries. He recalled the meeting he had in the Soviet Union in 1988 with the United States' Secretary of the Air Force Aldridge and announced the intention to establish friendly contacts with the Canadian Air Force. I believe, the general said, that further contacts with our colleagues abroad will promote better understanding between us.

Baltic Republics

RSFSR Delegation in Lithuania To Sign Treaty

Arrives 15 Aug

LD1508172490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Excerpt] Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, arrived in Lithuania today. The aim of the trip is to sign a treaty on economic cooperation with Lithuania. (Gladyshev), a member of the RSFSR delegation, told a correspondent of the republican paper that a draft treaty prepared by Lithuanian experts has already been adopted. In (Gladyshev)'s opinion this was done speedily and professionally. [passage omitted]

Trade Agreement Signed

LD1508200990 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius August 15 TASS—Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and her Russian counterpart Ivan Silayev signed an agreement on trade and economic contacts for 1991 between Lithuania and the Russian Federation here today.

Prunskiene Satisfied With Treaty

LD1508215590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] At 2200 [Moscow time] an economic agreement was signed between Russia and Lithuania. The Russian Federation delegation led by Council of Ministers Chairman Ivan Stepanovich Silayev arrived in Vilnius during the afternoon. The welcoming party included Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, the leader of the Lithuanian delegation to the talks, and other officials. [video shows aircraft taxiing to a halt, Lithuanian and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic flags flying together; Silayev being greeted with a handshake by Prunskiene; Silayev shaking hands with other Lithuanian officials]

This was not in conformity with protocol—a picket as they left the airport for the town. The participants in the picket, representatives of the Communist Party of Lithuanian town committee, the Civil Committee, and the Socialist Movement for Perestroyka and Unity, spoke to Comrade Silayev about what concerns them about present-day Lithuania and its leaders' actions. [video shows motorcade halted and Silayev talking to picket members]

We were in the room where the negotiations were being held for the first two minutes. After that the negotiations went on behind closed doors. As we see, today's negotiations and the preparations for them took very little time compared with the preparations still underway for the negotiations with the Union leadership. Thus those people in the Lithuanian parliament and society who have been endeavoring to prove that it is more beneficial for Lithuania to start by reaching agreement with Russia and not with the Union can be satisfied today.

[Begin recording] [Paulyus] This is correspondent Paulyus of Central Television's news service. What is the main outcome of these negotiations?

[Silayev] The outcome is that we have signed an economic agreement on interaction—in the main for 1991—and it will be on a mutually beneficial basis.

[Paulyus] Did you look at the longer term?

[Silayev] Yes, we did and we agreed that we will organize a working group to which we will give the task of drawing up a long-term program by the middle of next year.

[Paulyus, addressing Prunskiene] Are you satisfied with the results?

[Prunskiene] Yes, we are. We did very good work today. We prepared an agreement to be signed and a communique that will be reported in our press. Our minister colleagues have been instructed to continue the work so that in two months' time the very specific quantitative parameters of our cooperation for 1991 will be ready. We shall then have a meeting and again sign concrete agreements on particular fields of cooperation. [end recording]

Accord Raises Legal Questions

LD1608084990 Moscow TASS in English 0822 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev and his Lithuanian counterpart Kazimiera Prunskiene held talks in Vilnius on Wednesday, reaching a bilateral agreement on trade and economic relations for 1991.

The meeting followed a letter sent to Lithuanian leaders by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Silayev in the middle of last month and suggesting "immediate work to draft and then sign a treaty" between the two republics.

Subsequent close contacts at government and parliamentary levels involved the discussion of principles for commercial and economic relations between Russia and Lithuania. The two republics agreed to complete drafting work on the treaty this September and also to draw up a declaration on their political relationship.

According to Lithuanian Vice-President Ceslovas-Vytautas Stankevicius, the sides have "no contradictory positions that would hinder their talks".

But there still are issues affecting negotiations, most notably the legal question of who owns natural resources on Russian territory.

Lithuania is interested in importing natural resources as it does not have enough of its own and has to import most raw materials for its industry. In addition, the Lithuanian economy suffered badly during the recent suspension of Soviet oil and gas supplies to the Baltic Republic.

As a result, Vilnius has been closely monitoring the dispute between Federal and Russian agencies over the ownership of natural resources. Even after signing a treaty on trade and economic relations with Russia, Lithuania may find itself in a very delicate situation, where natural resources will remain in the hands of federal agencies.

Preparations have also been continuing for talks with Moscow, during which the Lithuanian parliament is prepared to declare a moratorium on its independence act.

Members of the official Lithuanian commission for preparing for the negotiations, visiting Moscow last week, handed Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov a draft protocol on their opening date and terms.

In Lithuania, in the meantime, friction continues unabated between the parliament and the government. On July 31, a group of well-known intellectuals and mp's accused the parliament of dragging its feet in talks with the Soviet Union and hampering the activities of the government, whose head, Prunskiene, is known to be in favour of opening talks at the earliest date.

Public Concerned About Lithuania-USSR Talks

90UN2542C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by publicist V. Liauska: "Negotiations—the Road to the Future"]

[Text] **The biggest problem that worries the Lithuanian public today, of course, is the impending negotiation with Moscow. The editorial office receives many letters on this subject. They are very different. In some there are doubts whether "insidious Moscow" will not deceive Lithuania, and whether it is impossible on the whole to do without negotiations when, in any case, independence has already been declared. In others, to the contrary, there is also alarm over the fact, as it seems to the authors, that the leadership of Lithuania is trying in every way possible to postpone the start of negotiations by engaging in unjustifiably long organizational and procedural questions. But this, they say, is of no benefit to either side, but especially to Lithuania.**

Below, we publish the thoughts of publicist V. Liauska on these questions.

The persistent opposition between Vilnius and Moscow, which began after the Lithuanian parliament's adoption of the Act of Independence, has been replaced by a temporary calm. The large amount of preparatory work in the Supreme Council of the republic's government for future negotiations attest to a qualitatively new understanding of the political problem of the Lithuanian state: Without a treaty with the Kremlin, valuable relations with the West are impossible.

But time is really flying by, and if we do not begin negotiations in the very near future, we may run into a situation in which the internal Union problems will overpower even the pain of the "Lithuanian thorn." The declarations of sovereignty of the largest republics—the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the Ukraine—which started the depoliticization of the leadership of Russia, Moscow, and Leningrad, indicate the depth of the changes. But the main thing is that there is a new Union treaty on the agenda whose necessity is growing with each day. And in the foreign policy plan, autumn of this year promises no less a gripping subject: the meeting of the 35 states that signed the Helsinki agreement.

Against the background of these events—those that have already started and those that are impending—the position of the Lithuanian state is quite moot. It is clear that we should take part in them at a different rank, so that, on the one hand, we are not dragged into a continuous round of internal Union problems, and, on the other hand, so that we are not left on the doorstep (as already happened near Paris in the year 1918) of an impending all-European dialogue.

The "rightist radicals," personified by K. Uoka in our parliament, continuously assert the necessity for negotiations specifically with Russia. But what does one do with the Union government? E. Bickauskas proposes holding parallel negotiations. But, in my opinion, both in the first and in the second case, it will be very difficult to determine priorities and the ultimate aim of the negotiations.

It is not easy to name the priority questions in negotiations, even with the real party—the USSR. But what can be said about the priorities of possible negotiations with a party that, just like us, is only just beginning to plan to exercise control over its own territory, finances, and economy?

It is possible that Russia would also agree to grant Lithuania raw material resources under more favorable conditions. But after the proclamation of the Act of Independence we fall into the rank of East European countries with whom the USSR is now arranging new economic relations and is already shifting to world price calculations. For Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and some other countries of East Europe, this is turning into a very difficult ordeal (shortage of gasoline, newsprint, etc.). What should one do? How does one avoid a situation when in winter, because of an inability to pay, it would become necessary even to restrict fuel distribution? But it is precisely economic difficulties, in my opinion, that are today the main reason for many troubles, including in the area of national relations. If we do not normalize the economic situation of Lithuania, we will also be unable to resolve other problems.

It is possible that the Ukase of the USSR president "Concerning the Formation of a Union Delegation for Negotiations with the **Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]**" distressed many and raised new doubts. But we have to agree with the fact that the president cannot exceed his authority. A new legal situation must arise right at the negotiating table during the signing of the protocol about the initiation of negotiations. After it is countersigned with signatures of the members of both delegations, the Lithuanian delegation can no longer be treated as "a delegation of the Lithuanian SSR."

Of course, it is the right of the other party to propose a Union or other version of the treaty. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council will defend our sovereign rights. That is the reason for the negotiations, which are unprecedented not only for us, but also for the present generation of Moscow politicians. All that is left is to hope for their quick beginning and successful outcome.

Press Conference Held on USSR Talks, Prices

90UN2542A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 26 Jul 90 pp 1,2

[ELTA report: "Press Conference"]

[Text] Journalists were met at a press conference on 24 July in the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council; Gediminas Vagnorius, member of the Supreme Council Presidium; and Eimontas Grakauskas, chairman of the Agrarian Commission.

Bronislovas Kuzmickas furnished information on the work of the parliament and preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The Government of the Soviet Union is interested in a speedy start to the negotiations. Inasmuch as this is a very crucial matter for Lithuania, it would not be right for us to enter into negotiations without fundamental preparation. And this should not be viewed as delaying tactics or something else, he said. Active preparation is going on for negotiations both with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Probably, in the opinion of Bronislovas Kuzmickas, a treaty with the Russian Federation will be concluded earlier.

Eimontas Grakauskas talked about the preparation for agrarian reform, and about how its draft is being considered in rural centers.

Gediminas Vagnorius provided information on questions of the economy, the budget, and other urgent matters that are being examined in parliament.

In answer to a question about what was being done in the area of wage policy, Gediminas Vagnorius said that an attempt was being made to tie wages to work accomplished and to prices. The main concern now is the enormous gap between the face value of a monetary unit and its market value. Under conditions of a switch to market prices, there should also be no less an increase in wages. However, this way is not the most reliable: High inflation is possible. This can be avoided if we have our own money. But there is none yet, and time requires that economic reforms be started. It follows that nothing else can be done except to raise prices and to increase wages proportionately, and, later, when our own money is introduced, to continue the reform.

The press conference was conducted by Povilas Pauparas, chief of the Supreme Soviet department of information.

Lithuanian Deputies Scored on Privileges

90UN2555A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by V. Zarovskiy: "Castling in the Course of 'Movement'"]

[Text] Vilnius—*For several of Lithuania's parliamentarians the fight for independence has become a fight for personal power and privileges.*

At the height of the fuel shortage the Lithuanian journal POLITIKA printed a cartoon: At a service station a car stands alone and the driver holds the gas nozzle at his temple like a pistol.

The parliament talked about the steadfastness of the people, and the people did not argue with them. At times they came out onto the square affirming their readiness for trials, although at the same time they did not forget about daily life. Each got by as best he could. Some hitched rides at the Minsk road, some sent messengers to the Transcaucasus to the people's fronts for fuel, and the journalists cooperatives presented the government with their own reserves, God knows where they had gotten them. The USSR Ministry of Railways, for some reason harking to the presidential edict on economic sanctions (although there was not a word about them in it), had blockaded the rails.

At one point it seemed that we would really have to live in the dark and wash ourselves on the run. Those days I was filled with pride for our civil defense: In addition to gas masks, we found 50 generators which we could "crank up." The state commission for registering the economic situation went even further. It thought up an emergency plan "for guaranteeing the functioning of vitally important industrial enterprises, especially meat and dairy plants." The plan was so fantastic that it became clear parliament would quickly balk: It was proposed that coal be thrown in the furnaces of steam locomotives standing on side tracks and that the steam be conducted away through pipes and the current from the generators through wires to all in need...

Some strategic appeals to those who were out of work were heard from the tribune of the Supreme Council: Go into the woods and prepare firewood for the severe independent winter, mow lawns, clean streets, help the builders, and go off to the countryside and raise livestock to give us meat. The more meat, the more secure our independence, they were told. And those who did not want to be lumberjacks, builders, and peasants were told that we need our own European train tracks and a railway with Poland. In a word, work will be found for everyone. And they were called to thriftiness: Pedestrian crossings should be adorned with bright boxes where, according to the plan of the unnamed authors, conscientious citizens would throw their bottles and jars. They would be recycled and would free us of dependence on raw materials. And to raise people's spirits, in Vilnius a group of people went out to take turns carrying a large cross across all of Lithuania.

The few who succumbed to these familiar appeals took up a trowel, a scythe, or a saw. It is no wonder a June public opinion poll showed that the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is more popular than "Sajudis." Here is what A. Yuozaytis writes in LETUVOS RITAS: "Something significant has happened which it is difficult, perhaps terrible, to talk about. The unbelievable has happened: The outdated political organization, or actually its remnants—the Lithuanian Communist Party—has beaten 'Sajudis' for the first time in two years. Who could have predicted it? 'Sajudis,' the peerless 'Sajudis,' is the very incarnation of restoration, life, and hope. And now it has retreated. The Lithuanian Communist Party has beaten 'Sajudis' not only as an organization. It beat the very spirit of 'Sajudis.' It would not have done that had not the officials of 'Sajudis' paved the way for defeat. The people are repulsed by everything that is false."

In the opinion of the philosopher, this happened because "many people appeared in the political arena for motives of power, while pretending to be imbued with patriotic motives. But soon everything changed: The fight for independence turned into a fight for power."

But that is not all. I would add that it was also a fight for privileges. At the very height of the gasoline crisis chic Zils appeared on the streets of Vilnius. Even during the period of stagnation they were only trotted out for high-ranking guests from the center. About two years ago the public, including "Sajudis," ejected party and soviet bureaucrats from the Turnishkes settlement of dachas, and now they are trying to move the deputies there: They say, let them be put to some good. There are plans to build a two-story garage for the cars of the Supreme Council. Fifty Volgas will be at the ready and 10 will be in closed bays (at the present motor depot there are only four guarded bays). The number of drivers is being increased to 80. There are plans to put warehouses for spare parts at this same facility as well as electrical appliances, sanitary engineering goods, and furniture. And recently the Supreme Council presented a "gift" to the trade unions: It prepared a draft bill on the nationalization of its property without even informing them.

The sanctions by the center did 124.4 million rubles [R] of damage to Lithuania's budget. The government decided to correct the situation by reducing allocations to culture, education, science, art, and public health. The total sums are being reduced by anywhere from R51 to R1 million. According to the republic's minister of finance, if this is not done, then by the end of November or December there will not be anything to pay wages with. And at the same time in 1990 the administrative apparat cost Lithuania approximately an additional R21 million, and the higher legislative and executive powers—R9 million.

An expensive Law on State Defense Duty was also adopted. The "Sajudis" deputies were in favor of it. And attempts by journalists to find out where the money would be taken from to create the army were drowned in a chorus of "We need it!" Previously the Supreme Council adopted a decree charging the Council of Ministers with preparing draft laws on a state defense service, on alternative service, and on liability for dodging service defending the state. The department of security has already estimated that 8,000 people are needed to guard the borders alone. Why so many? That means four positions are needed for each kilometer... One's breath is simply taken away by the scenario developed by the deputy general director of the department for regional security under the government. The fight against contraband, drugs, reform of the military departments in the higher educational institutions... "We know that it costs the USSR R16-18 million annually to maintain one division," he said. "Apparently it will not be any cheaper here. All the more because we do not even have weapons. Expenditures on military needs may grow rapidly, especially in the first year."

Let it not happen! The wish to control one's territory as quickly as possible is praiseworthy as one of the basic signs of independence. But at what price? At the border there is a problem with hordes of dogs gobbling meat... And the appetites of the servicemen themselves have already become apparent. The department of regional defense has already moved into the building of the Lithuanian Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties Abroad. Lo and behold, personnel and barracks are already appearing. Fifty retired servicemen are already "under arms." "Can we really waste time on trifles where it concerns the defense of the region, even if it costs the Republic of Lithuania a lot?" said a surprised A. Butkevicius, general director of that military department. And they do not waste time on trifles: The local journalists obtained a letter with his signature to a society of hunters and fishermen requesting that the hunting circles of that department be registered and that the area for hunting be allotted. This is what we have for forces: A wild boar is not a tank.

But we will return to parliament. The deputies have adopted more than 100 legislative acts since March, but they have forgotten about such trifles as a law on recall. Something has kept them from examining a bloc of laws on restructuring of the economy. One hopes that they simply have not had enough time. But perhaps they have just lost interest. I myself have repeatedly seen how some officials are assigned to stroll up and down the floors of the Supreme Council and tell deputies playing chess to return to the meeting hall: "It is time to vote."

In the meantime only a parliamentary and state commission for conducting consultations with the RSFSR has been created. The chairman of the Supreme Council and the prime minister have been charged with choosing a delegation for negotiations with Moscow. But they have different opinions: V. Landsbergis is convinced that it is necessary to sit down at the table with Russia first, and K. Prunskiene thinks the opposite. But while groups of experts prepare documents for negotiations and rack their brains over cunning diplomatic approaches, M. Burokevicius, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party loyal to the CPSU, stated at a press conference that Moscow has included guarantees for the Communist Party (CPSU Platform) in its list of questions, that Lithuania will never receive Klaipeda and the Vilnius region, and that in general Ryzhkov and Lukyanov assured him that Soviet power will be restored in the republic...

The time for negotiations is approaching. But vacation for the deputies began on 1 August. Some will stay in Vilnius, and some, apparently, will be heading out to hunt. The new military department is not the only one with the necessary conditions for that: The minister of forest management, forgetting about his promise to disband all the government hunting circles, signed Order No. 49 in June, "On Areas for the Hunting of Representatives." Allotted were 64,776 hectares. That will be something for them to think about in their free time.

Lithuanians Rate Parliament Satisfactory

90UN2555B Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Aug p 2

[Article by G. Konchyus: "'Sajudis' Against 'Sajudis'"]

[Text] Vilnius—At midnight on 31 July the first session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, which had continued almost five months, came to an end.

The statistics were calculated: There were 108 meetings of the Supreme Council, at which 45 laws were adopted. Another 50 draft bills have been prepared for discussion at the second session. Truly much has been done.

What do the residents of the republic think of the work that has been done? The government recently commissioned the sociology laboratory of Vilnius University to carry out public opinion polls. The polls were conducted according to the international method of the Gallop Institute for Public Opinion in the United States of America. Residents of all Lithuania's regions, of all social levels, and of various nationalities were polled using interviews.

What were the results of the poll? The Act of 11 March is approved by nine out of 10 residents of Lithuania and by half of the Russians and Poles who were polled. Eighty percent of the residents approved the moratorium on this act. The majority consider the search for real ways of affirming independence and economic reform to be the most important state business at the present time. Public opinion of the activities of ministers and deputies is interesting. They rate the government's activities as follows: Good—42 percent, satisfactory—49 percent, and poor—eight percent. Parliament's activities: Good—23 percent, satisfactory—59 percent, and poor—18 percent. The rating of Lithuania's political figures shows a similar picture. In first place is Prime Minister K. Prunskiene (rating—55 percent), in second place is her deputy, A. Brazauskas (47 percent), and only in third is V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council (30 percent). The evaluations of political figures show that the voters support the centrist position in politics.

The dissatisfaction of significant levels of Lithuania's population with the activities of the deputies of the Supreme Council has been expressed recently by a large group of intellectuals, many of whom helped to form "Sajudis." In their appeal to the residents of Lithuania, they write in particular: "From the very beginning, the Supreme Council, as the legislative power, has gradually broadened its powers and intolerably and even ruinously limited and obstructed the activities of the executive power—the Council of Ministers. Distrust, suspicion, and petty, unconstructive, endless criticism of the government do not contribute and will not contribute to a resolution of crucial political problems."

This appeal clearly contributed to the fact that the majority of the deputies voted against broadened authority for the Supreme Council Presidium during the period between sessions. It was decided to convene a special session of the Supreme Council on 7 August. The main questions there will apparently be the preparations for negotiations with the USSR and the RSFSR, and the staffing of the delegation to the negotiations.

Commission on Eastern Lithuania Meets 25 Jul

90UN2542B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 2

[ELTA report: "Concerning Problems of Eastern Lithuania"]

[Text] A meeting of the state commission to examine problems of eastern Lithuania was held on 25 July. It was conducted by Romualdas Ozolas, chairman of this commission and vice premier of the Lithuanian Republic. Specific features of eastern Lithuania that are exclusive in a historic, geographic, and national aspect to a part of Lithuania were considered. It was noted that Lithuanian citizenship could serve as the basis for uniting all the people of the republic, but citizens of other states who live in Lithuania should also be guaranteed individual rights. A discussion was held on the possibility of establishing a special budget system zone in eastern Lithuania for additional financing of economic, social, and cultural development. A wish was expressed that the area self-governments of this region also display goodwill and readiness to participate in a dialogue.

The commission delegated its representatives to the session of the Vilnyusskiy Rayon Council, which will be held tomorrow.

Latvian Front Appeals for Baltic Bonfires 23 Aug

LD1508214990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 15 Aug 90

["Appeal" by the Latvian People's Front]

[Text] The fateful date for Latvia, 23 August, when 51 years ago the fate of the three Baltic states was decided by a secret agreement between the two most bloody authoritarian regimes in the history of the world, the Soviet Union and fascist Germany, is approaching.

The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for many years determined the future fate of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by trampling upon state independence and physically destroying, by deporting and compelling to emigrate a considerable part of the people and condemning those who remained to a life under the conditions of chronic genocide.

The Baltic Road action organized a year ago—a human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius—will never disappear from memory. It attracted also the eyes of the world to the lawful demand of the three peoples for the restoration of their independence. Today we continue to go along the Baltic road because it is the only possible one. And like a road in the Baltic region, it is gray, rugged, and full of everyday difficulties. However, that light which a year ago shined so extraordinarily on this road in our eyes and flags must also in future remain in our hearts.

The Board of the People's Front of Latvia dome appeals in regions, towns, and settlements for all People's Front members and adherents of other organizations and movements who are not indifferent to the future of Latvia to come together.

Let us invite our deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and the deputies of local councils in the evening of 23 August to be together with their electors. Let us light bonfires at places of meetings as a symbol of our anxiety, doubts, hopes and readiness to continue to fight against the darkness.

At 1930, with church bells tolling, such bonfires will light up all of Estonia, at 1945 hours in Latvia, and at 2000 hours in Lithuania.

With the string of bonfires reaching the border of Poland and the camp, the gathered Lithuanians there, with Latvians and Estonians joining, will express a demand to tear up at last the barbed-wire fence woven by Stalin and Hitler on the road to Europe.

If today we have a hope to conquer, to regain independence and life worthy of human beings, then it is only through unity with our own people and with the entire Baltic region.

Latvian Preparations for USSR Talks Viewed

90UN2509B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 2

[LETA report: "Latvia"]

[Text] On 10 July the Supreme Soviet of the republic confirmed a delegation which is authorized to begin consultations with RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] with a view to preparing negotiations and a draft treaty between the Republics of Latvia and Russia.

The Supreme Soviet also adopted a resolution on preparations for negotiations with the USSR. The resolution confirms that preparations for the negotiations may be started. At present, the Supreme Soviet of Latvia does not set special preconditions for beginning the negotiations. However, the Soviet Union must acknowledge the fact of the state independence of the Republic of Latvia proceeding from the state and legal status of Latvia before 16 June 1940, that is, before the loss of state sovereignty by the Republic of Latvia as a result of the criminal Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The negotiations may be held on the basis of international legal principles.

The deputies also authorized a delegation of six people to conduct preparations for the negotiations at the first stage: Deputies of the Supreme Soviet Andrejs Krastins, Aleksandr Kirshteyn, Juris Bojars, Valentina Zeile, as well as Minister of the Economy Janis Aboltins and Janis Peters, plenipotentiary representative of the Republic of Latvia in Moscow, whose candidacies were proposed by the government of the republic.

A sharp debate on the composition of this delegation developed at the session. Deputies of the "Equal Rights" faction objected to the fact that representatives of the opposition were not included in preparations for negotiations at the first stage. The head of the delegation A. Krastins responded that the negotiations will be conducted in the name of the Republic of Latvia regarding its complete de facto recognition, whereas the deputies of the minority faction are against the Declaration of Independence dated 4 May. In turn, A. Alekseyev and other deputies objected that they are not opposed to the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Latvia but to the way the People's Front of Latvia faction has chosen to achieve it, without a poll-referendum of all the people. The demand was made to include Sergejs Dimanis and Mikhail Gavrilov in the composition of the delegation. As a result of a vote, the proposal was rejected. In view of this, the "Equal Rights" faction lodged a protest stating that the opposition will create its own delegation for consultations and exchanging information with the USSR and RSFSR leadership.

Head of Latvian Delegation Reviews USSR Talks

90UN2542E Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 2

[Report of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet Press Center: "A. Krastins—about Possible Negotiations"]

[Text] "For negotiations with Moscow to start there must be no demand for a moratorium from the Latvian Republic," said Andrejs Krastins, deputy chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet, at a meeting with journalists on 12 July. On 10 July a session of the Supreme Soviet appointed him director of the delegation that will conduct consultations on behalf of the republic with representatives of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the USSR for the purpose of preparing mutual treaties with both partners.

A demand for a moratorium must not be extended to Latvia, for the Declaration of 4 May provides for a transition period during which the restoration of independence will occur "de facto." During the transition period, negotiations with the USSR will also be held on all questions concerning their interests in Latvia.

"We cannot approve a moratorium on the Declaration of Independence, because then the status of the Latvian Republic will disappear, and there will be no more possibility for state negotiations, but Moscow, as the center, will begin to speak with one of the republics," A. Krastins said. But M. Gorbachev has said that negotiations are possible only between states. "By starting negotiations with Lithuania in which two partners possessing equal rights are interested in regulating interstate relations, Moscow has already recognized the Lithuania Republic," A. Krastins explained.

The decree adopted on 10 July by the session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet "Concerning Interstate Negotiations Between the Latvian Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" states that negotiations will take place on the basis of principles of international law: sovereign equal fights of the parties, noninterference in internal affairs, rejection of the use of economic sanctions and military force, etc. Commenting on the decree, A. Krastins said that the negotiations must alternate between Moscow and Riga and that there must be no preliminary conditions for their initiation.

"Political relations, of course, will predominate in the negotiations with the USSR," A. Krastins noted. "In turn, economics will predominate in the negotiations with Russia. Naturally the negotiations with Russia must stipulate one political point, specifically that Russia recognizes the Latvian Republic as an independent state," A. Krastins emphasized. "The fact that the letter of B. Yeltsin and I. Silayev—an invitation to negotiations—is addressed to the leaders of the Latvian Republic attests to this recognition."

[Signed] Press Center of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic.

Latvian Supreme Soviet on Gorbachev Ukase

90UN2276A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 1 Jun 90 p 3

[Statement by the Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet]

[Text] In connection with the Ukase of USSR President M. Gorbachev, dated 14 May 1990 and entitled "On the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, Entitled 'On the Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence,'" the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic **states the following:**

1. As the sole, legitimate successor of the Latvian Republic's Sejm [Parliament], which adopted on 21 July 1940 a Declaration on Latvia's Annexation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Latvia's Supreme Soviet is legally empowered to abrogate those acts of the Latvian Republic's Sejm which contradicted the Constitution in effect in 1940, as well as to renew the validity of the articles of this republic's Constitution.

2. The citation of Article 70 of the USSR Constitution regarding the fact that the Soviet Union was formed as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association or unification of the Soviet Socialist Republics is groundless and unjustified with respect to the Latvian Republic, inasmuch as Latvia's annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 occurred as a result of an internationally illegal use of force. In connection with this, the citation of Articles 71, 73, and 75 of the USSR Constitution is also groundless from the viewpoint of international law.

3. The USSR Law, dated 3 April 1990 and entitled "On the Procedure for Solving Problems Connected with the Secession of Republics from the USSR," was not ratified by Latvia's Supreme Soviet. Therefore, in accordance with Paragraph 5, Article 97 of the Latvian SSR Constitution, the above-mentioned USSR Law is not valid or in force on the territory of this republic.

This law contradicts Article 69 of the Latvian SSR Constitutin and Article 72 of the USSR Constitution, which reserve for the Union republics the right of free secession from the USSR. According to the above-indicated USSR Law, implementation of the right to self-determination with regard to Latvia in the Soviet Union depends completely on the legislation of the power performing the annexation and the decrees of its highest organ of state authority, but this contradicts the very idea of self-determination.

4. The requirement that a referendum be conducted on the issue of restoring the Latvian Republic's independence is unjustified either politically or juridically, inasmuch as:

—in 1940 the USSR annexed the Latvian Republic without a referendum, despite the fact that this procedure was required by Article 77 of the Republic's Constitution which was in effect at that time;

—the Latvian Republic is not seceding from the USSR, inasmuch as it never voluntarily joined the USSR but is merely restoring its prewar status as an independent state;

—Articles 5 and 108 of the Latvian SSR Constitution do not require a mandatory referendum to resolve the most important problems in the life of the state, but they do recommend an alternative choice—either a nationwide discussion or a referendum;

—the issue of restoring the Latvian Republic's independence was, in fact, brought up for nationwide discussion in May 1989, and since that time it has been universally discussed in the republic-level as well as in the central press. During this period several sociological polls were conducted in the republic; they showed that an absolute majority of Latvia's population advocates the restoration of this republic's independence. The results of these polls have been published in the central press of the USSR, and their trustworthiness has not been disputed;

—on 21 April 1990 the All-Latvian Assembly of Deputies was held; taking part in it were 8,086 deputies from Latvia's Soviets at all levels. Of these, 8,003 deputies voted for the restoration of the Latvian Republic's independence;

—the Declaration of the Latvian SSR's Supreme Soviet entitled "On the Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence" was voted for by more than two-thirds of the newly elected people's deputies. The principle of the necessary majority for making an amendment to the Constitution was thereby observed. The principal thesis of these deputies' election platforms was an advocacy of the restoration of Latvia's independence. Thus, the election results precisely elucidated the positive attitude of the absolute majority of those inhabitants of the republic who have the right to vote towards Latvia's self-determination;

—as of 28 May 1990 the Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet had received letters and telegrams in which 646,726 of this republic's inhabitants expressed their support for the declaration which had been adopted on 4 May 1990. At the same time 8,943 persons expressed themselves against the declaration.

5. Neither Articles 74 and 127 of the USSR Constitution nor its amendments concerning the competency of the president give the president of the Soviet Union any right either to evaluate or to proclaim as invalid the acts of the the Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet.

Thus, the Ukase of the USSR president, dated 14 May 1990, from the viewpoint of state law is a violation of the USSR Constitution—an illegal co-opting of a higher competency than is specified in the presidential constitutional powers. From the viewpoint of international law, the Ukase dated 14 May is an illegal interference in the internal or domestic affairs of the Latvian Republic—in the process of its political self-determination.

6. Consequently, the Declaration of the Latvian Republic entitled "On the Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence" is legally valid.

7. The Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet proposes to adopt as the basis for relations between Latvia and the USSR, as well as between Latvia and the other Union republics, general or common human values, the priority of which M. Gorbachev defends so faithfully and consistently in all international forums. Otherwise, it would be the case that the USSR employs one progressive system of principles for external "demonstration" abroad and another, conservative one for internal use at home.

These common human values, as proclaimed in the UN Charter, allow peoples to live side by side as good neighbors. They are fixed in the commonly recognized principles of international law. These principles are of a universal nature; they have imperative norms which are to be used in the relations between all the world's states and peoples.

8. As a sovereign state, the Latvian Republic proposes to build further relations with the Soviet Union and the Union republics, based on the "Declaration on the Principles of International Law, Pertaining to Friendly Relations Between States in Accordance with the United Nations Charter," dating from 1970 and the other, fundamental principles of international law as follows:

—renunciation of the threat of force and the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state;

—resolution of disputes by peaceful means;

—renunciation of the use of force for the purpose of depriving peoples of the forms of their national existence;

—the inalienable right of each and every people to self-determination;

—the inalienable right of each and every state to choose its own political, economic, social, and cultural system without interference by another state.

In accordance with the above-mentioned Declaration of the Principles of International Law, "the creation of a sovereign and independent state, the free joining to an independent state or the merging with it, or the establishment of any other political status freely determined by the people is an embodiment of the people's right to self-determination. Each state must refrain from any force or violence which would deprive people of the right to concretize or implement this principle, the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence."

The declaration justly says to an equal degree that all peoples are sovereign and juridically equal and that each of them enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty.

There is not a single document by means of which Latvia would transmit to the USSR any of its own sovereign rights. The people of Latvia do not demand nor do they take anything which is not due to them. They are only completely restoring their own independence, of which they have been illegally deprived over the course of half a century.

[Signed] Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic
[Dated] Riga, 28 May 1990

Russia-Estonia Talks on Treaty Continuing

LD1508215490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Estonian news agency has thoughtfully reported to us today that talks are continuing in Moscow on the signing of a political treaty between Russia and Estonia. The draft document is perceived as being very radical. For instance, its first article speaks of Russia's recognition of the independence of Estonia.

Legal Aspects of Unilateral Estonian Statement

LD1508152490 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—The unilateral statement by the Estonian Supreme Soviet about the occupation of Estonia and the invalidity of Soviet laws on its territory are anti-constitutional and have no legal basis, a representative of the USSR Academy of Sciences' institute of state and law, told TASS.

P. Semenov, doctor of law, was commenting on the legal aspects of the Soviet president's statement on the resolution of the Estonian Supreme Soviet "On Relations between the Estonian Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Estonia is a constituent republic, which is part of the USSR, the lawyer said. Its entry into the USSR was a nationwide act. Estonians, like other Baltic peoples, faced a choice in 1940: either Hitler or the Soviet Union. The Estonian people favoured joining the USSR, regarding this step as leading to the liberation from Nazi oppression.

Estonia can leave the Soviet Union, Semenov continued, but relevant procedures must be followed. A law was drawn up governing a procedure by which a constituent republic could leave the USSR, if it wants to do so. There are specific secession procedures. Following them is a legitimate process.

If the Estonian people wish to secede from the USSR by nationwide referendum on equal terms, it is legitimate. In addition to Estonians, representatives of other nationalities live in the republic. Hence the serious question of how the secession from a state and the formation of another state should be determined by the expression of the will of all of the people.

The method chosen by the Estonian Supreme Soviet is illegitimate. It neither corresponds to the Soviet constitution nor to internationadl law, Semenov said

Estonia Proposes Army-Republic Cooperation

90UM0830A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 p 1

[Diplomatic note of the Estonian government to the USSR Government]

[Text] The government of the Estonian Republic ascertains the continuing complexity of the internal political situation. Envisioning normalization of the situation in the republic as one of its internal policy tasks, the government is striving to establish a system of direct reciprocal relations with the Army which will preclude the possibility of any conflict situation arising.

The new government of the Estonian Republic has expressed its good will and undertaken certain steps to bring about mutual understanding. But events of recent times, expressed in repeated noncoordinated movements of troop units, the use of commandos to "guard" a conference of a group of deputies of soviets of all levels on 26 May in Kohtla-Jarve, the placement of assault forces on 4 July in the town of Tori, and the further participation of the military in mass political events, show that the actions of the government of Estonia are not finding an appropriate response. And the lack of opportunities for direct informational and operational interaction increases the risk of emergence of confrontational situations both on the governmental level and with respect to citizens in general, examples of which we have had the opportunity to observe in Tbilisi and Baku. The government declares that such tendencies will result in nothing but harm for both the Army and the people.

Taking the aforementioned into account, the government of the Estonian Republic presents this diplomatic note.

1. With the aim of developing proposals on principles and procedures for making a legal determination of the status of USSR Armed Forces in the territory of the Estonian Republic, it is proposed that a working conference be conducted with the participation of authorized representatives of the USSR government, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the government of the Estonian

Republic. We propose that this conference be conducted during the period between 15 and 25 August this year in Tallinn or Moscow.

The Estonian Republic government considers it advisable that authorized representatives of Latvia and Lithuania also participate in this conference.

2. The government ascertains that the uncertainty of the situation regarding the Armed Forces in the territory of the republic and the complexities arising due to this in mutual relations between the Army and local organs of power and the civilian population are caused by a departure in practice from historically shaped treaty principles in structuring mutual relations between the USSR government and the Estonian Republic. In connection with this, the government proposes that negotiations be initiated immediately to find a settlement to this circle of issues.

3. Taking under consideration the ambiguity of the political situation in the Baltic region, the unswerving will of the Baltic peoples to attain independence, not excluding the possibility that emergency situations might arise in the future, and taking into account the interests of the Baltic republics, the government of Estonia proposes that an institute of authorized representatives of the governments of the Baltic republics be established with ministerial rank under the USSR Ministry of Defense and observer rank under the Military Council of the Baltic Military District, whose functions would include:

providing information to the USSR Ministry of Defense and Military Council of the Baltic Military District regarding the political situation in the republic and major political events being planned in it;

providing information to the government of the republic regarding major military training exercises and maneuvers being planned, dislocation of forces and equipment, and extraordinary events taking place in military units;

participation in the development of organizational measures in emergency situations (natural disasters, major accidents, etc.);

development of proposals in support of living conditions and way of life of military servicemen and their families in units located in the territory of the republic;

joint resolution of issues involving the conscription of youth in the republic for active duty military service in accordance with the laws adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet;

bringing to the attention of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Military Council the positions of the government on issues of troop activity in the territory of the republic.

In the name of the government of the Estonian Republic

[Signed] Prime Minister E. Savisaar

[Dated] 12 July 1990.

Permanent Baltic States' Conference Proposed

90UN2276B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Conference of the Initiative Group"]

[Text] On 2 June Riga witnessed the holding of a conference by the Initiative Group of Deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, as well as from the Estonian congress and the citizens' congress of the Latvian Republic. Its participants discussed the problems of the present-day situation along with ways to restore full independence to the Baltic states.

The Initiative Group decided to address a proposal to the Supreme Soviets of the three republics involved, as well as to the congress of Estonia and the citizens' congress of the Latvian Republic for the purpose of forming a consultative organ to be known as the Permanent Baltic States' Conference.

Baltic Military District Protests New Laws

90UN2276D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "In the Military Council of the Baltic Military District"]

[Text] In recent times the leadership of the Soviet Baltic republics, having undertaken a course aimed at seceding from the USSR, has been conducting active propagandistic and legislative activity directed at undermining the unity of our state and its defense capability, infringing upon the rights and personal worth of military service personnel, along with workers and clerical personnel of the Soviet Army and members of their families.

Many laws, adopted in haste by the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, contradict the Constitution and laws of the USSR. All this has not only complicated the sociopolitical situation in the region, but also finds practical expression in the illegal actions of local organs of authority, which claim to have the right to things that do not belong to them: structures, property, lands, and available housing which belong to the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In connection with this, the Military Council of this district hereby informs the republic-level and local organs of authority, as well as all citizens that the personnel of the Baltic Military District shall be guided by the Ukases of the President of the USSR, the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the decrees of the Soviet government, as well as those laws of the Union republics which do not contradict the USSR Constitution.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Interrupts Tour, Returns to Moscow

Further on Visit to Sverdlovsk

LD1508201190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1418 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Report by correspondents Sergey Omelchenko and Yan Khutoryanskiy in Sverdlovsk]

[Text] [Omelchenko] Of course Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was fully in his element here in Sverdlovsk both because Sverdlovsk is his hometown where he is known and loved and because here in the industrial center of the Urals he has many fellow thinkers. However, here too in Sverdlovsk he had to explain many points of the program of the rebirth of Russia, raising the living standards, the economy, and culture of Sverdlovsk Oblast.

[Khutoryanskiy] To give the gist of the speeches and ensuing questions at the discussion they perhaps boil down to the fact that today the question on the agenda is that of the structure of power. The Urals people propose as an experiment the option of combining the functions of the executive committees and soviets. This option received Yeltsin's approval as did the idea that the soviets should be the owners of territory, that is, everything that is located on it should be theirs. At the meeting there was deep, analytical talk of the role of the banks, financial houses, small enterprises—incidentally, there are about 400 here. There was detailed examination of the various aspects of the development of foreign economic activity.

In this connection it was interesting for us, Urals people, to hear from the mouth of the chairman of the Russian legislature an important piece of news, that Sverdlovsk and later Sverdlovsk Oblast would in the near future becomes zones practically open for Western businessmen. Today's meetings were important not only for Sverdlovsk and Sverdlovsk Oblast but also for many other regions of our country, if only from this aspect: Sverdlovsk Oblast is profoundly industrial and here there is an acute problem of relations with agricultural regions of the country. Listen to an excerpt from a recoridng which we made during one of the meetings:

[Begin recording] [Yeltsin] As for the supply of meat, milk, and so on, well comrades, you are contradicting yourselves. First you say you want to keep everything in the oblast to yourselves and then you say why is Rostov taking food for itself.

[Unidentified man] We are fulfilling all our orders. Tyumen Oblast last year started an argument with us about settling accounts. [sentence indistinct] This year we are fulfilling all our contracts to the last Kopeck.

[Yeltsin] It's a question of 1991.

[Unidentified man] The year 1991. We have told all enterprises that as soon as the new year comes we should come to an agreement on how much we will give Tyumen and what they will give us, we have told this to all the ministries. [passage omitted]

[Yeltsin] Of course I realize we have to live through a period of organization. The year 1991 looks like being the most difficult. There is the establishment of all these horizontal ties between oblasts and republics and so on. There will be a federative treaty within Russia and as for beyond the confines of Russia there will be a treaty with each republic. [words indistinct] [end recording]

[Omelchenko] In the afternoon there was a tour of the town. Now, as this report is on the air, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is already on his way back to Moscow.

Meets Electorate in Sverdlovsk

LD1508172990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Report by correspondent E. Erkomayshivili from Sverdlovsk; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] To the people of Sverdlovsk Boris Niklolayevich Yeltsin is not only chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, but also RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy for the national-territorial constituency, and he started today by receiving members of the electorate. An extremely neglected social sphere is a typical feature of Urals towns. And at present, the streets are buzzing with rallies and pickets. The transportation workers have declared a warning strike. The hapless inhabitants in still existing slums are demanding normal housing. The people of Chelyabinsk and delegations from other neighboring towns have come in with their painful problems.

Those who came to the electorate meeting presented before their deputy questions on ecology and nuclear safety and insisted on transferring a number of administrative buildings over to the needs of health and culture. They asked for help in setting up a rehabilitation center for children and the disabled. Meetings took place with deputies and presidium members of the town and oblast soviets and with representatives of business circles. There was a discussion about local self-management, about the shaping of the budget, interaction between the soviets and economic bodies and other structures, and about the fact that the oblasts should become a part of the federation and have corresponding legislative powers. [video shows Yeltsin and entourage getting out of cars and meeting group of people holding banners with slogans such as: "The Urals Is No Place for a Nuclear Picnic," "An Indefinite Moratorium on Nuclear Tests," and "No To Nuclear Dumping in the Urals," Yeltsin shown chatting in room with various people and attending meeting]

Views 'Extortionate' Tax Law

LD1508182190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who was in Sverdlovsk today, told a TASS correspondent that he is satisfied with his trip around Russia. The people are supporting the reforms and the first steps of the Russian parliament and government. I have got to know the mood in the provinces and the sources of many problems better. I am grateful to Sverdlovsk residents for their support in the form of ideas, concepts, and suggestions. Russia is ready to take foreign trade operations rights away from the Union and hand it over to its oblasts and autonomous republics, he said.

Yeltsin has arrived in Sverdlovsk, whose residents elected him a deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, for just a day in the course of this trip around the republic. The chairman of the Russian parliament reported back to the representatives of local soviets, received voters, and met local soviet leaders, entrepreneurs, and managers of state enterprises.

The Union law on taxation brought a lot of questions from businessmen. Yeltsin called this law extortionate, and announced that its corresponding Russian act will allow greater freedoms to the collectives of state enterprises and entrepreneurs, he said.

The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet supported the suggestion to open Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Perm to foreigners and to set up a free economic zone in Sverdlovsk oblast.

The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has left for Moscow on a scheduled Aeroflot plane. He has interrupted his trip for 24 hours to hold consultations and an exchange of opinions with the group that is engaged in drafting a unified concept of the program for transition to the market. This group has been set up in accordance with the agreement between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Ryzhkov, and Silayev.

Wants 'Realistic' Market Plan

LD1508222290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] This evening Boris Yeltsin returned to Moscow in order to work with the group which is preparing the draft for the country's transition to a market economy. At Domodedovo airport a film crew from nighttime news was waiting for Russia's leader. The camera operator is (Igor Galperin) and the journalist Dmitriy Kiselev.

[Begin recording] [Kiselev] The news agencies are now full of reports that you are returning to Moscow only because your group of experts has not managed to reach agreement with Gorbachev's group of experts. Is this so, or was your return planned in advance?

[Yeltsin] When, on the day before taking off on this long working visit around Russia, I assembled the group—in accordance with the understanding then in force that the work on compiling the program was being carried out by Gorbachev and Yeltsin—I assembled it for my first check. And there, after a discussion which I consider was a businesslike and constructive one, we agreed that since my trip would last until 27 August—while the program has to be ready by 1 September—it was necessary to hold another similar monitoring check somewhere in the middle.

And so we agreed that I would interrupt it in the Urals and return to Moscow for 24 hours; and the meeting that we are to hold tomorrow was at that time scheduled for 1000 on the 16th.

[Kiselev] Have you maintained contact with this group during your trip? Do you know what stage the work is at now?

[Yeltsin] Yes, I know what stage the work is at since I have already been sent preliminary material. I know that Gorbachev has given his observations, and I have given mine. The group has been working on these observations, too. But tomorrow it will report in more detail on the status of our work.

I do not think we need to bring the discussion tomorrow to saying there is some lack of agreement with the program of the Union government. This is something that we do not need at all now. We are working on this program. And whatever the fate of this program may be for the Union, Russia is inclined to support it, and will implement only this.

[Kiselev] But, all the same, you are disposed for cooperation, not for confrontation, is that not so?

[Yeltsin] Absolutely. I would be very pleased if the comrades who are being capricious would accept that it is now high time to adopt the realistic position, that the people will not accept that program, and the Supreme Soviet of Russia, likewise.

[Kiselev] Many thanks. [end recording]

Kalugin Continues Campaign for People's Deputy

LD1608042590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] And now, information that will surely interest people who have been following the electoral campaign of Major General Kalugin of the Committee of State Security. It is known that on Sunday, 19 August, USSR people's deputies' elections will take place in national-territorial Constituency No. 15. A complex task has arisen before the electorate of Krasnodar Kray. Last year, only the candidacy of Polozkov, the former first secretary of the Communist Party Kray Committee and present leader of Russian Communists, was put forward for this constituency. After his rejection of a deputy's mandate, today 21 candidates are fighting for the right to become the people's elect. Among them are Kalugin, the demoted Major General of the Committee of State Security, known to the whole country; Beregovoy, pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR and hero of the Soviet Union; and Major General Seyn, head of the Political Directorate of the North Caucasian Military District. Now the last meetings of the candidates with the electorate are proceeding across the whole kray. Each candidate will have the opportunity to present his program on kray television. The extremely acute electoral battle is approaching its end. Who will become the country's people's deputy? Most probably, according to journalists of All-Union Radio, on 19 August, two candidates will be chosen, who will continue the fight for the mandate in a second round.

Leningrad's Gidaspov's Conservatism Assailed

90UN2441A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 25 1-8 Jul 90 p 6, 7

[Article by Andrei Chernov: "The Last First Secretary, or Three Myths About Boris Gidaspov"]

[Text] Leningraders think that if they ever put up a monument to Boris Gidaspov, the current first secretary of Leningrad's party organization, it should stand in the Letny Sad pulic garden opposite the statue of Janus. I don't think the joke quite does justice to the man: the word is that the last of the CPSU secretaries has three, not two faces.

For a city which suffered an austere and gloomy existence for many decades ruled by autocratic party leaders, Gidaspov's protean nature looks strange.

1. Climbing the Party Ladder

Boris Gidaspov's childhood was spent on the outskirts of Samara, a city on the Volga. He takes pleasure in recalling that as a boy he was always first in any game or fight. He was a soccer team captain as a young lad.

Let's hand it to him: Gidaspov willingly talks with reporters about himself (something most first secretaries never do). Old Leningraders find that he reminds them of Sergei Kirov, one of Lenin's associates. There really is something reminiscent of Kirov's dash and broad open smile. He does not look like a faceless apparatchik or a hardened old-type bureaucrat, but neither does he strike one as a "career politician", to use his own words.

His science career is spotless: graduating from the polytechnic in Kuibyshev (Samara) he did a postgraduate course in Leningrad before he took his master's and then doctoral degree. He had to spend some time in a director's chair before becoming a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. As a scientist and a first-rate production manager he worked in the defence industry, thus remaining until recently on a classified list and never allowed to travel abroad. It is ironic that, according to the U.S. Congressional Committee, the USSR was ahead of the U.S. only in chemical weapons out of twenty key technologies in 1985, suggesting that such travel restrictions were meaningless.

As is expected of a first party-secretary, he is rather ascetic. His breakfast consists of a glass of stewed fruit, bread and butter, and a cup of tea. He comes to his office in the Smolny at 8 a.m., scans through the letters prepared the evening before and the papers (starting with PRAVDA), next he reads KGB reports and other papers.

He works 16 hours a day and is offended when asked about privileges of the regional party committee workers. (He generally takes offence reading press reports). He says the perks that go with his office are worth just four hours of what he does in his office.

They tell stories about Gidaspov's dizzy party career. One has it that in the summer of 1989 Gorbachev offered him the position of Leningrad party boss, and when they met at the Pulkovo airport, Gidaspov said: "If it isn't me, then who?"

Member of the Academy Zhores Alferov has a different version:

I didn't see much of Gidaspov before December 1988 because our jobs were different. And then all of a sudden the then first secretary Yuri Solovyov offered us both seats in the regional party committee bureau.

Following his defeat in the 1989 national elections, Solovyov handed in his resignation. When he was refused, he applied yet again. Solovyov told us that the seat of the first secretary in Leningrad "could not be filled by a whimp". Then in early July there was a call from the regional party committee about Gorbachev's arrival the next day. Already in the airport Gidaspov told me that I should watch the ladder closest to the pilot, not the middle one that Gorbachev would use. If the man using the first ladder were so and so (he gave the name), then so and so would take over the city.

But it was the pilots who used the first ladder. So Gorbachev said:

"I've not brought anyone along, as you see. We are now leaving together with Solovyov for the Izhorsky factory. You put your heads together in the regional committee to decide who is to become first secretary."

They got into the car, and then and there the first secretary of the city party committee Anatoly Gerasimov said: "Boris, you are our choice."

We spent three hours waiting in the Smolny and when Gorbachev finally arrived Gerasimov again proposed that Gidaspov be elected first secretary. The bureau supported him, and Gorbachev asked what I thought. I said it would be right to ask what Yuri Solovyov thought because we were not going to remove him...

Solovyov only heaved a sigh:

What the General Secretary thinks is more important. If you ask me, I would nominate Gidaspov.

This account has an unusual ending. Hardly six months were up when the country was swept by an epidemic of resignations: passers-by discovered a hoard of goodies unavailable in ordinary shops in the trunk of a party official's limo, officials in the Far East went to Japan on a junket only to come back with cars they bought there on the cheap. All that was happening against the backdrop of revolutions sweeping East Europe.

It was in such a situation that the Leningrad TV announced on one of its most watched evening news programmes that former first secretary of the regional party committee Yuri Solovyov had pulled strings to buy a second-hand Mercedes.

Zhores Alferov told me as we sped in a train between Moscow and Leningrad:

"I was peering into a microscope in America when my American colleague burst into the lab: "Your Solovyov has been kicked out of the party. Why? Aren't party members supposed to buy second-hand cars? I later saw Gidaspov during the Central Committee plenary meeting and nodded my head at his greeting. 'Sore at me because of Solovyov?' he asked."

"Because of Solovyov, too."

"You don't understand. We've saved him."

"Well, I don't really understand. If Solovyov really did something bad, why keep it under wraps?"

The regional party committee's bureau retracted its decision. No one apologized to the former first secretary, though. So the people of the city started to guess whether the first secretary had been shafted or saved by his former comrades. If they had shafted him, why?

2. The Bible According to Smolny

Gidaspov is said to be able to change his logic in the process of uttering one single phrase. Other people argue that he practices what he preaches.

I think both contentions are wrong. While he likes improvisation, let's consider the careful way he orchestrated the "communist" rally in Leningrad on November 22.

Well in advance, the article by Yu. Denisov, a secretary in the Smolny, was published, hitting out at the intrigues of independent political organizations and clearly favoring the introduction of martial law in Leningrad. A week before the speeches by "the grass-roots of the party", there was a small public rally in the Vasilyevsky Ostrov district and a plenary meeting of the district party committee demanding the CPSU Central Committee's report at the extraordinary congress. The rehearsal proved a success. During the plenary meeting, the right-wingers exploited the left-wingers' dissatisfaction and demands. In this way a skilled helmsman can pilot his ship even into the wind. Next there was the city plenary meeting where Gidaspov secured his grip on party power in the region, becoming first secretary of both the region and the city. Only then did he start the last and decisive offensive at the city rally whose posters carried slogans, some of which Gidaspov himself later called "extremist".

Sakharov said about Gidaspov as a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Well, we nearly elected him to full membership. We well could have..."

Something got out of joint. In Moscow, the former Leningrad Party boss Lev Zaikov resigned from his position as first party secretary of Moscow to take a job to supervise the defence industry. Neither Moscow nor Leningrad supported Gidaspov.

The rally putsch staged by Boris Gidaspov fell through. He appeared at the anti-Gidaspov rally staged by Leningrad Communists on December 6. He was firm as a rock and was only accompanied by his bodyguards dressed in grey raincoats despite the freezing cold. The people filling the square chanted: "Resign!" and Gidaspov could not see that Pyotr Filippov who conducted the meeting was waving his hand trying to put down the wave of anger. But the wave, abating a little, swelled again.

Why face those people in the first place? I couldn't get it through my head for a long time, until Boris Gidaspov explained that those meetings had been a unique Leningrad experience which, he maintained, moved the Communists closer to dialogue, and triggered Leningraders' social activism. Thus he included both meetings, so to say, on the credit side of his account.

When the evening paper VECHERNY LENINGRAD published the call by a group of members of the City Soviet to the city's party organizations to hold a vote of confidence in Gidaspov, the newspaper LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA rejoined: "Why, having recalled one rally, did you forget the other one also addressed by Boris V. Gidaspov?"

The former party boss of Vasilyevsky Ostrov N. Korablyov even more fiercely defended the first secretary, saying that Gidaspov was misunderstood, that both rallies were aimed at dismantling the administrative system, that it was the Politburo that had taken offence, that they couldn't forgive Gidaspov for being so bold. The "image of the Leningrad regional committee and its leader sa the bulwark of the conservative forces within the CPSU" started being bandied about in the press with tacit consent from Moscow. This was implied to be the reason for the strengthening of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU and the victory of the Democrats in the city elections.

Luckily, the party apparat mouth-pieces gave Gidaspov's address in the November meeting of the Leningrad regional party committee word for word:

"The pseudo-democratic cudgel is being taken up against all who dare voice divergent views, by those who say that our society is beyond all cure... Human minds have become dazed by the images of omnipresent bureaucrats, apparatchiks, chauvinists, Stalinists and anti-Semites..."

Admittedly, I thought that Gidaspov had mentioned chauvinists and anti-Semites under the impact of the then gruelling political events. I couldn't see Gidaspov, a sworn internationalist, as a supporter of the Leningrad Pamyat society, known for its anti-Semitic ideas. Even today, reading his interview to NASH SOVREMENNIK which says that Boris Gidaspov thinks about the magazine's programme "with greatest respect", I find it hard to imagine Gidaspov, member of the Russian CPSU bureau, attending meetings of Pamyat. I may be mistaken for all I know.

Asked straight questions, Gidaspov gives you one of his Kirov smiles.

Question: Why do they regard you as a right-winger?

Answer: It's very simple. I always played right-wing in soccer.

Question: Why did the party take over the palaces of Leningrad?

Answer: I'll settle accounts with Nicholas II for the Smolny Palace. Since we took it away from him, I'll pay up.

This black humor is ingrained in him. When several Leningrad Democrats were leaving Gidaspov's office at the end of their discussion and said they would leave their phone numbers with Gidaspov's secretary, he gave a radiant smile: "Don't worry... Not a single person in Leningrad has so far been able to hide from me!"

His main task as first secretary is to maintain order in the city, to use his own words.

This is perhaps the reason why the city was in shock on the eve of February 25 in anticipation of the coming horror. That horror was a foretaste of the march planned by the Democrats. The rumors of the coming bloodbath and of troops allegedly brought to Leningrad reached a peak when Gidaspov told a news conference that he would not allow a single drop of blood spilled.

The coordinating council of the Leningrad Popular Front called off the march, but the TV didn't broadcast the call. So the Democrats were obliged to ferry the tape to Moscow TV.

Gidaspov accused the Popular Front of passing the buck and "chickening out," while the NEVSKY KURYER (published by the Front) spitefully quoted Pontius Pilate in Bulgakov's "Master and Margherita," who told the secret police chief of his hunch about the stabbing of Judas.

By now it's hard to say who was frightened the most and who was right and resolute—the independent organizations or the regional party committee. If one is to blame Boris Gidaspov, it is not for his outright perfidy but for his lack of political intuition and his frank unwillingness (or inability) to assess the real political forces at work. Shortly before the landslide victory by the Democrats during the elections, the Popular Front had suggested the idea of a round-table discussion which was dismissed by Gidaspov, who said that the regional party committee and the independent organizations were competing in "different weight categories".

Boris Gidaspov is noted for his ability to make outrageous mistakes. Even if they are insignificant. Once addressing the Congress of People's Deputies he revealed his ignorance about the composer Rodion Shchedrin. He boasted to a reporter about his long-standing association with Academician Lkhachev discussing the plight of the Pushkin Memorial House only to make the reporter aware that he was mistaking the place where Pushkin's manuscripts are stored for the library in Pushkin's House.

It is totally incomprehensible why he should hint, when asked what he thought about Yeltsin, at the fact that as chairman of the credentials committee at the Congress of People's Deputies, he read "in the line of duty all sorts of grievances", etc., and so he wouldn't answer similar questions (about what he thought about Yeltsin) "on moral grounds".

3. The Fallen Angel of Perestroyka

Once, Boris Gidaspov came up with his definition of the right-wing and left-wing extremism. I don't think it will be included into text-books but it is still of interest. His idea of left-wing extremism is "when someone fires a shotgun or a pistol", and right-wing "when a person's future is decided by a phone call".

Therein perhaps lies the clue to Gidaspov's political likes and dislikes. Fish do not see the water in the same manner as humans don't see the air. Like Nina Andreyeva, Boris Gidaspov does not see any Stalinists, anti-Semites, fascists or chauvinists on the right side of the political spectrum. This is perhaps why one of the posters during the November rally in Leningrad equated Gidaspov and Andreyeva.

But likes and dislikes are one thing and politics is quite another: the regional party committee had done a lot of organizing for the initiation congress of the Russian Communist Party only to say at the last moment that its participation would not be OK. The delegates appealed to Gidaspov in vain. They only knew from remote-controlled TV camera buzzing over them, that the Smolny saw and heard everything. As a matter of fact, the congress later dissociated themselves from Nina

Andreyeva, refusing to let her address the gathering no matter how hard she insisted.

Came June 9 and one of the handful of right-wing delegates at the second round of the congress called the current Leningrad city government "Sobchak's gang". This remark caused a scandal during the session with the speaker denying his words. When in Leningrad City Soviet, Gidaspov complained that the new Soviet government would soon come up against a force even more cruel than the United Front of Working People, i.e., the Russian Communist Party. A month later Boris Gidaspov spoke warmly about the initiation congress of neo-Stalinists, also meaning the congress of the Russian Communist Party.

Those are three glimpses of the last of the all-powerful first secretaries which eclipse one another.

One myth is that he is a major organizer in science and an honored scientist who declined the offer of a high academic rank and rushed to save the prestige of the Leningrad party organization and to protect the peace of Leningraders. A desperately daring but tragically incomprehensible person.

The second myth is that he is a political dabbler recruited by the system from outside, an actor on the political stage who has lost his standing in the city (his popularity rating is very low). He has also lost his popularity among the right-wingers.

The third myth is of a military-industrial complex henchman, an ambitious plotter out to become a party Napoleon but who made too much haste arranging a putsch, and is now biding his time waiting for a new opportunity to come along.

Each of the portraits can be expanded with facts or refuted. All these images are political myths. Boris Gidaspov, the unpredictable boss of the Smolny, has protected himself behind the safety of myths.

That about sums up the real image of the last first party secretary, I think.

A man who emerged from the depths of secrecy of the defence industry wanted to use the methods of classified factory manager to run politics. While working for defence he was in charge of producing certain products and was firmly in the clutches of the administrative system. His rapid ascent gave him something like the bends. He became confused in the absence of rigid ideology, cut and dry methods, and a clear-cut political goal.

It's not just because he is fond of paradoxes that he contradicts himself. The instinct of political self-preservation urges him to make statements that cancel each other out. According to a journalist on the staff in the magazine NASH SOVREMENNIK, Gidaspov rates in popularity only with Yeltsin. I can agree with only one reservation: Gidaspov is as unpopular as Yeltsin is popular. Gidaspov's rushing about the political stage only makes the audience generally annoyed with him. But paradoxical as it may seem the number of votes cast for the independents and the growth of the number of supporters of the Democratic Platform is due to Gidaspov's unpopularity.

If one has no political programme and has bad luck at every turn, this does not swell one's number of supporters.

The conference of Leningrad Communists last April re-elected Gidaspov but would not give their formal assessment of the regional committee's performance. They were formally right because Gidaspov had been in the position for less than one year.

Gidaspov gave up his scientific career for chasing the beautiful but whimsical bird which is power. That bird, it seems, has left him and prefers the company of Gidaspov's political opponents, independents and Democrats presided over by Anatoly Sobchak in the city soviet. Sobchak was the first who challenged Gidaspov last November to a political discussion on Leningrad TV. Gidaspov shied away sending his subordinates instead. The latter lost the debate to Sobchak as it was broadcast live.

Several months later, Gidaspov tried to summon members of the city soviet by phone. The latter politely asked him to come over to their headquarters instead. This he did, in the spirit of the times, to meet with those he had only recently denounced at important forums.

Remarkably, Gidaspov congratulated Sobchak on his election as chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet on the day of election. Gidaspov says he is prepared to transfer power to the Soviets (local councils) voluntarily. While history can take an unpredictable course, one thing is clear—Leningrad is not going to be a bulwark of conservatism. Its people proved that much last November and this past March.

Decidedly the first secretary is not the most important figure in the city. Even the policeman who guards his apartment, when asked by a reporter whom he guarded the flat against, answered absolutely without malice, "from the people".

Gidaspov has held on to his chair. But it's a different chair now. The leader who changes his ideas three times a day is a puzzle for even Smolny workers. Besides, the Smolny staff is being renewed, with masterminds of the November events once recruited by Gidaspov leaving too. Looks like Gidaspov, once a right-wing soccer defender, can't any longer defend his own team.

He withdrew from the race during the city soviet elections. Later, the party conference at the institute where he once took his degrees failed to elect him to the city party conference. It became known that his rival Sobchak was nominated as a delegate to the 28th CPSU

Congress. So Gidaspov hurriedly withdrew his candidacy from the institute and selected a more pliant party organization to elect him.

What can you do if a "non-professional politician" (Gidaspov calls himself that) has failed in all of his advertized initiatives. The Fifth Wheel TV programme, whose demise he predicted as early as last summer, is still very much alive, and the public would raise hell should he attempt to take the magazine LENINGRAD away from the writers' organization. There is really not much he can do to show he is still in control.

I don't know if they are going to put up a monument to Gidaspov in Leningrad, but the city will surely remember, and a chronicler will write about this exceptional figure, the last in the series of omnipotent party governors of the town.

Krasnoyarsk Transport Workers Strike 15 Aug

LD1608065190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] On 15 August, Krasnoyarsk public transport drivers went on strike, and the city of almost 1 million citizens found itself paralyzed. By midday, the bus drivers were joined by conductors. They are demanding a wage increase, longer holidays, privileged pensions, repairs to the roads, and the organization of decent meals. On the same day, a rally was held by the city's medical workers, who are also demanding an increase in wages, housing construction, and an improvement in working conditions. They are threatening to strike. At the entrance to the town executive committee, mothers with many children declared a hunger strike. According to a "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA", the situation is getting worse.

Military Trucks, Drivers To Help With Harvest

PM1408115490 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report: "Assistance From the Military"]

[Text] In accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers decision, the Defense Ministry is to send a further 10,000 trucks with drivers from its available fleet for the transportation of grain and other agricultural produce. Military commissariats have called on servicemen from the reserve for this purpose. Colonel General D.A. Grinkevich, chief of the Ground Forces General Staff, said:

"At the moment 50 out of 70 motor transport battalions set up by the Defense Ministry are working on gathering the harvest in 15 oblasts, three krays, and one autonomous republic of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. In the first 10 days servicemen have already transported over 1 million tonnes of agricultural goods from the fields of Russia, including over 700,000 tonnes of grain.

"In accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers' resolution, the USSR Defense Ministry is to send a further 3,000 trucks with drivers to the RSFSR. The motor transport battalions have started being dispatched. The military drivers' mood is combative: They are ready to honorably carry out the tasks that the government has set them."

Leningrad Journalists Stage Hunger Strike

LD1408222090 Moscow TASS in English 1832 GMT 14 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Arkatovskiy]

[Text] Leningrad August 14 TASS—The popular daily SMENA will not be published on Wednesday, August 15, as its journalists today went on a hunger strike near the Leningrad city council following a refusal by the city council's executive committee to register the newspaper as an independent youth publication.

The hunger strike was preceded by a conflict between the Leningrad Regional Komsomol Committee, whose organ SMENA had officially been, and the newspaper's editorial board. Appealing to the Soviet law on the press, both sides submitted applications to the Leningrad executive committee to register SMENA.

The regional Komsomol committee wants it to be a newspaper of the Young Communist Organisation while journalists want to make it an all-democratic newspaper.

The conflict was discussed by the commission on Glasnost and mass media of the Leningrad City Council. The commission decided to propose that the newspaper be registered as a youth daily whose founder is the editorial board.

The executive committee, referring to the need to elaborate registration documents, decided to discuss the issue on August 16. But SMENA employees demand the immediate registration in order to be registered by the last date fixed by the communications department—no later than August 15—for signing an agreement on holding a subscription campaign and on the distribution of the newspaper next year.

Leningrad to Launch 'All-Out Reform Effort'

LD1508202190 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent John Polishchuk]

[Text] Leningrad August 15 TASS—Leningrad Communists plan to win people's hearts by launching an all-out reform effort, Leningrad party chief Boris Gidaspov said on Tuesday.

Speaking to industrial managers, Gidaspov said his party organisation is working in close contact with local councils to implement the reform programme.

Other speakers called for the speedy privatisation of industries and services, saying this will smoothen the transition to a free- market.

Dwelling on the role of the party in promoting reforms, Gidaspov revealed that a total of 25,000 members left the Communist Party in Leningrad this year.

Although the situation was dramatic, "the party has strength to remain perestroyka's vanguard, acting through local councils and other mass organisations", he said.

Vladivostok Television 'Immediately Popular'

LD1508082490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] The first town television broadcasts have been aired and immediately become popular in Vladivostok. The programs from the new studio, which is operating independently of official channels, include local news, world events, and excerpts and video clips for children. They are put together by a small group of journalists who have resolved to grasp in practice the opportunity of organizing a joint stock television company.

Cable TV To Be Set Up in Yoshkar-Ola

LD1508094190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Summary] Mari television's "First Program" went on the air exactly 30 years ago and now transmits two all-Union and one local program in Russian and local languages. Work has started in the area across the river in Yoshkar-Ola to install cable television which will cover the whole autonomous republic in the near future.

Western Republic

Gurenko's Visit to Ukrainian Mines Detailed

PM1508120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

["Official" UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Meetings With Working People"]

[Text] S.I. Gurenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, was in the Donbas 9-11 August.

In Lugansk Oblast he visited the V.I. Lenin mine. There was a businesslike, relaxed conversation with representatives of the enterprise party-economic aktiv and with miners about the most topical and vital matters of concern to people.

Questions concerning our future are very acute at the moment, Gurenko noted. And the Politburo has no task more important than that of maintaining civil peace. Our ideological opponents, masking their goals and methods in various ways, are trying to deal a blow to the CPSU by demoralizing primary party organizations, particularly in coal-mining regions. They are heading a struggle to oust party committees from enterprise territories in order to set up their own party cells in their place and embark on a power struggle.

At a meeting with secretaries of oblast coal-mining regions' city committees [gorkoms] and rayon committees [raykoms], and mine party organization secretaries at Lutuginskiy Raykom, there was a discussion of social protection for party workers, inadequate information from the Central Committee, and errors in ideological work. The incomprehensible leniency toward the actions of destructive forces was mentioned. It was suggested that the party needs to be more resolute in restructuring itself, do more work with people, and not be afraid to have frank discussions with them and explain the position and aims of the CPSU.

In Donetsk Oblast Gurenko visited the "Kirovskaya" mine and the machine building plant named for the Leninist Communist Youth League of the Ukraine and participated in the work of a conference of secretaries of primary party organizations.

Ukrainian Deputy Premier on Market Transition

PM1508105290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V.P. Fokin, deputy chairman of Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) Council of Ministers, by correspondent M. Odinets in Kiev; date not given; published under the "Economic Panorama" rubric: "Reform: The View From Kiev"]

[Text] [Odinets] Vitold Pavlovich! What is being done in the Ukraine to prepare for the transition to market relations?

[Fokin] A lot. The republic Supreme Soviet has adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty and a package of laws on the republic's economic autonomy. At the present time we are working on formulating our own concept of transferring the republic to market relations, and we cannot help comparing our concerns with the actions of the Russian parliament which is also studying this. The main thing is the creation of a practical and effective mechanism for the social protection of the population from market forces. It is widely known that, in conditions of a high level of monopolization of production, the market system inevitably involves not only a rise in prices but also the ruin of low-profit enterprises.

It is especially worrying that, in pursuit of profits, producers will inevitably opt for the simplest routes even at the cost of reducing the number of employees. The Union government's assumption that the number of unemployed across the country as a whole will not exceed 2 million is, I think, wrong. Our calculations indicate that there will be this number in the Ukraine alone. This should have been foreseen earlier so as to draw up a system of measures for utilizing the people dismissed, taking their regional and national characteristics and sphere of activity into consideration.

[Odinets] But you know, many people say that the nonproduction sphere in the Ukraine has an unlimited demand for workers?

[Fokin] This is not strictly so. We have up to 400,000 unfilled jobs in the Ukraine. But it would be a mistake to think that people deprived of their normal work can be easily used in the consumer services, road construction, or gas production. For instance, the pace of this important business does not satisfy us, not because there is a shortage of workers but because of the lack of pipes, gas technology, and equipment. Imagine that it is not some faceless Ivan or Petr but members of our own families and friends who are being deprived of work and will be forced to abandon their nearest and dearest to go somewhere or other to build roads. Incidentally, there is not enough bitumen or cement to build them either. Furthermore, we simply cannot afford mass unemployment since paying the minimum benefits will come to 4-5 billion rubles a year. For the successful transition to market relations thorough groundwork and adequate funds and resources are needed. The creation of the appropriate reserve jobs is necessary.

[Odinets] The acceleration of the transition of the economy to market relations must be accompanied by a series of measures to reduce inflationary processes. What are these measures, in your view?

[Fokin] First of all, it is necessary to block all existing monetary bank deposits abroad for a certain time and reexamine tax and budget policy. In order to lower the level of unemployment it is essential to implement measures which are the opposite of anti-inflationary: unblock money resources, increase the issue of credits, and reduce interest rates.

[Odinets] Where does the novelty of the future structure of economic management lie, in your opinion?

[Fokin] Briefly it will be the state organ which, under conditions of genuine sovereignty and the transition to the regulated market, must become the general staff of the new government. To achieve this it would be logical to unite all the economic subunits of the republic into one bloc with a State Committee for Economic Questions at its head. At the basis of its activity is a twofold task: the creation of an economic strategy for the development of the national economy and the elaboration of a system of measures for its implementation.

[Odinets] What will be the practical steps in this direction?

[Fokin] One of the main directions is the elaboration of an economic and organizational mechanism for a gradual transition to a regulated market. The aim: to create conditions to ensure that contracting parties have the greatest possible interest in filling the market with competitive products. You see, a paradoxical situation has arisen: Goods producers are losing interest in increasing productivity, in selling output. Many people are trying to get rid of their money as quickly as possible, buying anything at all. It is hardly surprising that in these conditions speculation is acquiring such a crazy pace.

[Odinets] How do you propose to counteract these tendencies?

[Fokin] We must prepare a package of legislative acts to remove, on the one hand, restrictions on the income of collectives which increase the volume of production of output essential to the consumer market, and on the other to ensure the social protection of all strata of the population from price rises, unemployment, and inflation.

Ukrainian Soldiers' Hunger Strike Organized

LD1508211790 Kiev Intenational Service in English 2000 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] According to the POSTFAKTUM news agency, informed by the representative of the Rukh organization, that is People's Movement of the Ukraine, on 12 August 28 Ukrainian servicemen who now serve in the Primore region have gone on a hunger strike.

They demand that they should be sent to the Ukraine to continue their military service.

In this connection, the commander of the Far East Military District, General Novozhilov [as heard] said in his interview for the newspaper IZVESTIYA that there was no hunger strike as such, but just an attempt to organize it.

New Ukrainian Government Organs Approved

LD1508204890 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] The president of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers has approved new working bodies of the government. These are the State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers; the Council of Economic Reform and the Introduction of Market Relations; the Council on Science and Technical Strategy; and also such committees at the Council of Ministers as on prices; on agricultural machine-building; on the branches of heavy industry; on ties with USSR defense ministry; on managing state property; and a board of state customs control.

Discussed at the presidium of the Council of Ministers was also a draft law of the Ukrainian SSR on public associations in the Ukrainian SSR. After being finalized, the draft will be submitted for the consideration of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet.

Principles of Ukrainian Party Program Stated

90UN2045A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 Jun 90 pp 2, 3

["Program Principles of the Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] Soviet society is at a pivotal stage of its development and transition from an authoritarian-bureaucratic system to humane democratic socialism. Perestroyka, begun on the initiative of the CPSU, has released tremendous social energy and initiated profound changes in the political, economic, and spiritual spheres. The democratic process is intensifying and glasnost is becoming firmly established. A multiparty system is becoming a reality.

However, the absence in the leadership of the party and in the country of a profoundly developed plan of cardinal transformations as well as the appreciable miscalculations made in the process of perestroyka prevented us averting the exacerbation of the crisis phenomena in society, halting the development of negative trends in the economy, and changing people's lives for the better. There have been no appreciable changes in their being provided with housing, consumer goods, food, and medical services.

The political instability, social tension, decline in discipline, responsibility, and morality; increase in national and religious intolerance; and the continued exacerbation of the ecological situation, disrespect for the law, and the growth of crime are having a negative effect on the people's mood.

The fact that the party and state leadership of the republic has not always displayed decisiveness and independence in its own actions pertaining to the implementation of the policy of perestroyka has been taking its toll also.

The renewal of the party and its democratization are being impeded by conservatism and extreme radicalism. A process of the ideological and political differentiation of the main currents in the party is underway. A passive wait-and-see position is typical of many Communists. There is a real threat to the unity of the party ranks.

All this is damaging the authority of the CPSU and leading to the loss of political initiative and the people's trust.

The problems of the present day have their roots **in the past. Comprehension of its lessons is fundamental for a search for paths into the future.**

Our country and party have undergone unprecedented ordeals and withstood inconceivable difficulties. Generations of Communists have worked honestly and selflessly; served the people of the Ukraine; shared their joys, pain and concerns; and defended the ideals of the October Revolution and socialism. Under their decisive influence the Ukrainian people made their historic choice once and for all and have defended it in peaceful labor and the ordeals of war. It was in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] that Ukrainians' age-old dream—reunification in a single state—was realized. There have been both victories and failures and crude miscalculations on this path. A tragedy for the people of the Ukraine and the republic's Communists were the unjustified punitive measures of the 1930's-1940's and the start of the 1950's, the 1932-1933 famine, and the mass deportations of innocent people.

The Ukrainian Communist Party condemns **the crimes of the Stalin era** and dissociates itself from the unlawful forcible means of the solution of problems of social development. The distortions and abuses of every conceivable kind and the inordinate centralization of the leadership and the bureaucratization of all spheres of social life which became prevalent in the stagnation years merit unreserved condemnation.

We emphatically reject the attempts to shift the blame for the deformations of the theory and practice of socialism in the past onto the whole party and all generations of Communists. The Ukrainian Communist Party advocates the whole truth in illustration of the history of the Soviet state and the CPSU, and is opposed to attempts to rewrite it to indulge opportunist interests.

Having comprehensively analyzed the political, economic, and ideological situation in the republic and being aware of the extent of its responsibility for the past, for the present situation of the society and the party, and for the future of perestroyka and socialism, **the Ukrainian Communist Party offers the people of the republic its vision of the prospects of the Ukraine's development and the paths of its own renewal.**

Proceeding from the communist perspective and the need to really secure the free and all-around development of the personality, the Ukrainian Communist Party sets as its goal the building in the Ukraine of a socialist society in which the humanitarian and democratic ideals of the working people, freedom, and social justice are implemented and interests and values common to all mankind are realized.

Our reference points are:

the establishment of sovereign Ukrainian statehood, the democratic organization of political life, and full democracy based on legality and self-government;

a highly efficient, dynamic, and socially oriented economy based on the modern achievements of S&T progress and diverse forms of ownership;

a high level of public well-being and the dependable social, legal, and ecological protection of the citizens of the Ukraine;

the equality of the citizens of the Ukraine regardless of nationality, religious belief, and social and property situation;

the all-around development of the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people and all national groups residing on the territory of the republic;

the high political, legal, moral, and ecological culture of the population and the harmonization of the relations of society and nature.

The main purpose of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party is the good of the people of the Ukraine and their national revival.

Taking account of historical experience, the Ukrainian Communist Party recognizes that all this may be achieved only **given the establishment of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine in a renewed Union of equal socialist states.**

The Communist Party declares its fidelity to the ideals of October and the socialist choice of the Ukrainian people. **The fundamental ideas and principles and methodology of Marxism-Leninism,** proved by practice and time, are the ideological and theoretical basis of our activity. We are emphatically opposed to both the dogmatization and canonization of this essentially humanitarian teaching and attempts to discredit it.

We consider our duty the further **creative development of the theory of socialism** with regard for modern conditions, all progressive public opinion, and mankind's historical experience in the 20th century.

Expressing and defending the fundamental interests of the working class, working peasantry, intelligentsia, and employees, the Ukrainian Communist Party will struggle persistently for the right to the role of political vanguard of the Ukrainian people.

I. Man and Society, Social Policy

The republic Communist Party is fully aware that humane, democratic socialism will become a reality merely in the event of conditions worthy of man's day-to-day life and creative activity being created for him. It subordinates its entire policy to the interests of the Ukrainian people; their spiritual development, social well-being, civil rights and liberties, and dependable guarantees of their realization; the introduction of each inhabitant of the republic to the cultural treasure house of the Ukrainian nation, the peoples of the USSR, and all mankind; and the molding of a new attitude toward labor and one's obligations to society.

We regard the freedom of the individual and his rights and dignity as the highest of life's values. The Ukrainian Communist Party will strive for their reliable legislative, material, and political protection.

We consider the tasks of paramount importance to be the affirmation of social justice; equality regardless of racial, national, and religious affiliation; the authority of honest, conscientious labor; and the principle of the distribution of material benefits in accordance with its results. We are opposed to illegal benefits and privileges, wage-leveling, and other forms of parasitical living and group egotism.

The Ukrainian Communist Party advocates a sure guarantee of the working people's rights to labor—a fundamental social conquest of socialism—and the creation of an efficient state mechanism of the maintenance of employment, the training and retraining of personnel, and the protection of those who will be forced to change professions or be temporarily without work.

We will contribute to the elaboration of a system of **scientifically substantiated social priorities and standards** and their support mechanism, and the priority development of regions and localities of the republic which have lagged the most in the solution of social questions.

The Communists will work actively in the business of an improvement in the living conditions, material situation, and social **protection of war and labor veterans; invalids; widows; large, young, and needy families; soldier-internationalists; the elderly; and those who are on their own,** and also all **those who have suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station], orphaned children, and an expansion of benefits and social assistance for them.**

We will seek the immediate introduction of income indexing and an increase in pensions and other social payments, and also wages in accordance with the increase in prices and inflation and due social safeguards in the event of illness, accident, and a person's disability.

We will cooperate actively in the solution of these socially significant problems with state authorities, the work force, the unions, and other public organizations and religious communities.

We consider it necessary to accelerate the elaboration of **a government program** for a fundamental **improvement in the position** of women in society, protection of mother and child, the creation for them of the proper conditions for bringing up children and work and social life, and an increase in their role in the political life of the republic.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will seek to ensure the implementation of an efficient **youth policy** aimed at the creation of conditions for equal initial opportunities for young people and self-realization in work, creativity, and voluntary activity; and that laws and the decisions of state authorities at all levels take account of the interests of the youth.

We consider it our duty to involve ourselves persistently in the education of the younger generation in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, internationalism, and respect for its own people and their culture, traditions, and history. We would like to see our youth ideologically and morally conditioned, intellectually developed, physically strong, and capable of living and operating under the conditions of modern society, competition, broad democracy, and political pluralism.

The Communists support government and public efforts pertaining to a solution of a most acute social problem—**the provision of each family with a separate apartment or house**—and will strive for an expansion of the amount of housing construction at government expense and by the direct-labor, cooperative, and individual methods, and a redistribution of capital investments and capacity of the construction organizations from the production sphere to housing construction. The allocation of housing and the payment for it must be socially just.

We will work actively for a decisive switch of the republic's economy toward satisfaction of **man's multifaceted interests and requirements,** solution of the problem of the **saturation** of the consumer market with high-quality merchandise and food, and the elimination of the shortages and lines demeaning to human dignity and affecting the population's general social attitudes.

We see as a priority sociopolitical task a **fundamental improvement in people's health care.** Citizens of the republic should be assured high-quality free medical services. We will contribute in every possible way to realization of the republic "health" program. We will seek an increase in the proportion of the national income and the budgets of the local soviets spent on the creation of an integral system of medical assistance, the high-quality reinforcement of the physical plant of the medical establishments, an extension of the network thereof, and the creation of modern diagnostic centers in each oblast. We consider important the need for an increase in the wages of medical personnel. The Communists should actively support the efforts of the government authorities and public organizations pertaining to the development of mass physical culture and sport and the molding of a healthy lifestyle.

The Ukrainian Communist Party fully shares the concern of the public at large apropos the abrupt exacerbation of **ecological problems** and advocates the adoption of thorough measures for the recovery and protection of the environment.

We will strive for the speediest confirmation of a long-term official ecology program, the enactment of a law on environmental protection, and the rational use of natural resources and provision of the population with ecologically clean food. We support the creation of an efficient economic mechanism guaranteeing the priority nature of the solution of ecological problems and an increase in government capital investments and enterprise and organization resources for nature-conservation measures.

We are for the compulsory independent extra-departmental expert appraisal of plans for the construction and modernization of industrial facilities, of the iron and steel industry, of power engineering, of the chemical industry, and other ecologically dangerous enterprises primarily as well as for public supervision at the time of their realization.

The priority measures determined by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES; effective, all-around assistance to the affected population; and the movement of people away from areas where the radiation level is a threat to their health must be implemented as quickly as possible. It is the duty of each Communist of the republic to contribute to this. We will strive for the withdrawal from use prior to 1995 of all reactors of the Chernobyl AES and the limitation of the development of nuclear power in the republic.

The Ukrainian Communist Party advocates the implementation of a comprehensive program of protection of the Dnepr and other rivers, large and small; the land and forests; and the mobilization of resources for the accelerated recovery of the natural environment of large industrial cities of the republic and the development and protection of recreational zones.

The essence of our ecological policy is restoration of the natural environment for the sake of the health and well-being of the people of the Ukraine and the preservation of nature for future generations. We count in its realization on cooperation with government and public organizations, the Green World and Chernobyl Alliance societies, and other amateur nature-conservation associations.

An important area of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party is consistent implementation of the **restructuring of the higher school and high school and its alignment with the demands of the life of society,** and the elaboration and practical realization of a new democratic concept of education in which the national historical and cultural traditions and moral experience of the Ukrainian people and the national groups residing on republic territory are organically incorporated in the system of tuition and education. The Communists should turn public opinion in support of the priority nature of the development of education and its financing and material-technical support.

We are for the broad humanization of training and education, and a cardinal renewal of the content and the system of teaching social science disciplines. The school, college, and VUZ [higher educational institution] should train a creative, highly cultured personality professionally capable of active work for the good of society and mold the patriot and citizen of the Soviet Ukraine and the USSR.

We advocate the consistent democratization and autonomization of the activity of the Ukraine's VUZ's. The training of specialists should correspond primarily to the economic and cultural requirements of the republic and the multiplication of its intellectual potential.

We will strive to ensure that each VUZ student and technical school trainee be provided with a grant and hostel and have the proper conditions for study and social life.

We will contribute in every possible way to an enhancement of the social status of teachers, VUZ and technical school lecturers, and preschool tutors; an improvement in their material provision and daily life; and the enlistment of the family and the public at large in the solution of fundamental problems of training and education.

The Ukrainian Communist Party attaches exceptional significance to the revival and development of **Ukrainian national culture and the cultures of the national groups residing on the territory of the Ukraine—the spiritual foundation of the state sovereignty of the republic.**

We will contribute actively to the practical realization of the comprehensive program of the development of culture in the republic and strive for its essential material and technical and personnel support. We advocate new approaches in the financing of culture and the creation of additional sources for this. At the same time we are opposed to its excessive commercialization. We believe the enactment of a law on culture in the Ukrainian SSR is essential.

Current policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the sphere of culture is geared to the extensive democratization and humanization of cultural life, a solicitous attitude toward the cultural heritage of the people of the Ukraine and their customs and traditions, and their revival as a distinctive phenomenon of world civilization. We are opposed to administrative interference in the cultural process and support freedom of creativity, the all-around development of talent, and an attitude toward it as toward national property.

We will consistently pursue a policy of **affirmation of the status of Ukrainian as the official language** and satisfaction of the linguistic and cultural requirements of people of all the nationalities residing on the territory of the republic.

We regard mastery of Russian together with the language of one's nationality as an important medium of introduction of the republic's population to the achievements of science, technology, and domestic and world culture and the mutual enrichment of the cultures of the USSR peoples.

We will strive for government concern for Ukrainian culture and language outside of the Ukraine and for constant assistance in the preservation of the native language and culture to Ukrainian ethnic groups overseas.

The Ukrainian Communist Party looks in its political activity pertaining to the revival and development of national culture for active cooperation with the artistic intelligentsia, the artistic unions and academic establishments, and VUZ's.

We deem it necessary to emphasize that the scale and time frame of realization of social and ecological programs and the development of education and culture are directly dependent on a constant increase in the volume of production and the quality of output and an increase in the national income increment.

II. Priorities of Economic Policy

The core of the Ukrainian Communist Party's practical activity **is socioeconomic policy.** The main point therein is a cardinal recuperation of the republic's economy and its prompt reorientation toward satisfaction of the material and social requirements of the population of the Ukraine at the level of modern world living standards, the democratization of economic relations, and people's increased initiative and creative assertiveness.

We are convinced that **economic reform** in the Ukraine may be accomplished only on the paths of the establishment of the state sovereignty of the republic and the organization of economic life on the principles of self-management and economic independence and the establishment of a new type of relations in the national economic complex of the USSR with regard for the level of the interrepublic division of labor and national, regional, and all-Union interests which has been achieved.

We will seek the formulation and enactment in 1990 of **a law on the economic independence and self-management of the Ukrainian SSR,** at the basis of which we would place the following fundamental standpoints:

sole ownership by the people of the Ukraine of the land; its interior; mineral and raw material resources, forests, inland and territorial waters, and other natural resources; the basic means of production and transport; and also financial-credit institutions with the budget, credit, currency, and other resources formed on republic territory belonging to them;

the decentralization and de-monopolization of the economy and the independence of the state and economic leadership authorities in determination of its structure and the forms and methods of management and the control of social production and commodity-money circulation on its territory, the implementation of tax policy, and the distribution of national income;

the independence of labor collectives and organizations in economic activity and the establishment of economic relations at the republic, interrepublic, and international levels based on equivalent commodity exchange and current legislation with regard for social priorities;

the protection of the economic interests of the republic in relations with the other Union republics and central authorities and foreign countries.

The Ukrainian Communist Party **will struggle against trends toward economic self-isolation** and regional egotism, and will work persistently in the direction of the consolidation of just, mutually profitable economic relations with the center and the union republics on new contractual principles.

The Ukrainian Communist Party advocates **the development of all forms of ownership** and the creation of a mechanism of their realization which excludes man's exploitation of man.

Our fundamental position is that the decisive role in the republic should belong to public ownership in its demonopolized forms. The socialist essence of our society will depend on this.

We are convinced that merely given the substantiated use of economic methods of management; an acceleration of the rate of reproduction and commodity-money circulation; the active implementation of an anti-inflation policy; an improvement in the forms of remuneration; and high organization, discipline, and order in each job, the success of economic reform in the Ukraine is possible.

We support a policy aimed at **a staged transition to a controlled market economy,** the development of a republic market which is in organic unity with the Union and world markets and price reform. We believe that transition to the market should be undertaken with regard for the sum total of current social and production relations and that it should begin with the formation of organizational-production and monetary-finance prerequisites.

Questions of the social protection of the population require of the republic's Communists particular attention under the conditions of transition to a controlled market. Together with the unions, other public organizations, and the state authorities we will strive for the centralized regulation of the problems arising in connection with the intensification of economic reform and the development of market relations.

Under conditions of a planned-market economy, the Ukrainian Communist Party will endeavor to secure a proportion of state ownership which guarantees an opportunity for the implementation of an effective social policy and the working people's social protection.

Rectification of the deformations in the republic's economy requires the implementation on the basis of an integral and profound program of its structural reorganization and its reorientation toward the development of science-intensive industries and the priority development of processing, food, and light industry.

It is essential in the course of **conversion** to contribute to the preservation and multiplication of the engineering, technological, and personnel potential of the defense enterprises and orient them primarily toward the manufacture of quality high-technology consumer goods.

The Ukrainian Communist Party deems it necessary to increase the attention paid to the traditional sectors of the republic's industry in which large detachments of the working class work—the coal industry, ferrous metallurgy, the entire mining and iron and steel complex, and power engineering. We advocate an acceleration of the modernization and retooling of these enterprises and their progress toward the world technology level and a radical improvement in the work, living, and everyday conditions of miners, iron and steel industry workers, and the people working in the chemical industry and transportation.

Together with the state and law enforcement authorities and all honest people, the Communists will conduct a resolute struggle against the **shadow economy, mismanagement, the squandering of resources and capital, and unjustified price rises.** While supporting the development of cooperative and individual-labor activity as additional sources of satisfaction of the population's need for goods and services, we will at the same time be irreconcilable toward smart operators who engage in profiteering and rob people and the state.

The Ukrainian Communist Party's agrarian policy will be subordinated to the priority solution of the most acute problem—food—**on the basis of the social revival of the countryside, defense of the interests of the peasantry, and the priority development of agriculture and its scientific support.**

We see as the way toward this a real turnabout of the economy and the industrial potential of the republic toward the needs of the agro-industrial complex, statewide support for its development, and the strengthening and efficient use of the production potential of agriculture and the processing and food sectors. The rate of development and renewal of the food complex must be preferential in order that in terms of level of pay, capital-worker ratio, production technology, and product storage and processing the agro-industrial complex not be inferior to other sectors of the national economy.

We support the economic independence of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] and other agro-industrial formations and the accelerated development of various forms of contract, leasing, and peasant farms and agricultural cooperatives on terms of equal economic management opportunities. The rural workers are free to choose the form of ownership and management themselves.

We believe it is necessary to speed up land reform and enact republic land, property, and leasing laws.

We will strive for effective economic and social measures on the part of the government pertaining to protection of the interests of the peasantry and the establishment of a socially just system of purchases of farm products for all-Union and republic stocks; economically substantiated purchase prices for farm products; and their conformity to the prices of machinery, equipment, building materials, and mineral fertilizer and a balance between the amounts of state purchases of farm products and the material and technical support for their production.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will promote the development of the productive cooperation of the collectives of industrial enterprises and the production subdivisions of the republic's agro-industrial complex.

The efforts of the republic's Communists will be geared to an acceleration of the rate of the social re-arrangement of the countryside and its provision with natural gas; water; heat; electric power; and trade, consumer, and medical services on terms equal to those of the city. It is necessary to create for the peasants all the conditions of productive labor and to provide them with access to the achievements of science, medicine, education, and culture. An adjusted investment policy and the practical participation of the industrial and intellectual potential of the city should contribute to this.

We support the peasantry's demand for the social infrastructure of the countryside to be developed not only thanks to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes but, to an equal extent, thanks to the state also.

A particular part in the realization of agrarian policy should be played by the rural rayon committees of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The rural Communists should be true spokesmen for and defenders of the interests of the working peasantry.

In the formulation of economic and social policy and the accomplishment of the complex tasks of perestroyka, the Ukrainian Communist Party will rely actively on **the achievements of science** and cooperate creatively with the republic Academy of Sciences and scientists of VUZ's and sectoral research establishments. We are convinced that an underestimation of science and S&T progress leads to stagnation phenomena in the engineering and technological state of the republic's national economy and is an impediment to economic restructuring.

We are for the introduction of an economic mechanism of the acceleration of S&T progress; an intensification of the development of the basic sciences thanks to budget financing; an updating of the material and technical facilities of science; and the development of research into ecology and medicine, electronics and information science, materials science and energy saving, soil science and agronomy, and new fields of biology, economics, and social science. We advocate an improvement in the infrastructure of S&T progress and the creation of a dependable mechanism of the introduction of the achievements of science in practice. We attach great significance to the incorporation of research organizations in financially autonomous relations.

It is important in the organization of basic research to implement measures pertaining to the integration of academic, VUZ, and sectoral science and to struggle against a monopoly of scientific truth.

The humanization of science and the informationization of society are fundamental problems.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will contribute actively to realization of a new concept of the activity of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. Particular attention should be paid to a broadening of republic scientists' participation in international scientific cooperation.

We are convinced that the republic's economic recovery will depend on its incorporation in the international division of labor and cooperation with overseas partners. We support the enlistment of foreign companies in joint mutually profitable entrepreneurial activity.

III. Toward Law-Based Sovereign Ukrainian Statehood

The point of departure of the Ukrainian Communist Party's contemporary policy in the sphere of national-state building is the **establishment of the state sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR.** We regard it as the determining prerequisite of the Ukraine's full-fledged political, economic, social, and spiritual development on a socialist basis and the preservation and further flowering of the culture and language and the establishment of the national dignity and distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and all national groups which reside in the republic.

Our understanding of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine and the fundamental positions which we will uphold are as follows:

the sovereignty of the people of the Ukraine; the preeminence, independence, and fullness and indivisibility of power on their territory; and right to decide independently all questions of the political, economic, and cultural life of the republic and determine the forms and structure of the organs of state power and administration and symbols;

the right to the independent exercise throughout the territory of legislative, executive, and judicial authority; the priority of republic laws and the termination of Union laws and decrees of state power conflicting with republic laws or going beyond the limits of the authority delegated to the Union according to the treaty;

establishment of the institution of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

the right of the people of the Ukraine to the revival and preservation of their national-cultural distinctiveness, language, historical memory, and natural environment;

the formation of the Ukraine as a real subject of international relations and the right to enter into direct economic and cultural relations with foreign states and to exchange diplomatic and consular representations with them;

the right to association with other states and determination of its status in constitutional law in these associations and free withdrawal from them.

The Ukrainian Communist Party is emphatically opposed to attempts to take advantage of the process of the establishment of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR for selfish nationalist, separatist purposes and to national exclusiveness and egotism and the solution of the problems of some peoples at the expense of others.

The Ukrainian Communist Party considers a matter of immense importance active participation in the building and strengthening of a new Union—a state of equal, sovereign socialist states united on the basis of common goals and interests. It should be founded on the basis of a new Union treaty [Soyuzniy Dogovor] on the principles of voluntariness and the genuine equality of the nations which reserve the right to self-determination, including separation.

The Ukrainian Communist Party is firmly convinced that the creation on the basis of a new treaty of the Union [Dogovor Soyuza] of sovereign socialist states corresponds to the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people.

The basis and sole legitimate source of power in the republic is the sovereign will of the people of the Ukraine, which they realize on the basis of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution by way of referenda and through their representatives democratically elected to the organs of power.

Our fundamental position is that political power is achieved only through free democratic elections to the soviets. We are for the establishment of their real power and the creation for this of the necessary legal, material, and financial basis.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will strive to secure its political leadership in the soviets democratically, relying here on the trust of the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and all strata of the population of the republic. In the event of electoral victory it will form a government, nominate its representatives for the organs of state power, realize its election platform, and if necessary create party groups and interparty blocs.

We are for competition at elections to the soviets of all levels of the programs of various political forces and public organizations and movements operating within the framework of the law and for the democratic competition of ideas and personalities.

We advocate a decisive increase in the efficiency of the mechanism of executive authority and a strengthening and widening of the authority of the government of the republic in accordance with the Ukraine's new status as a sovereign state.

The Ukrainian Communist Party is for the new and **all-around control by society** over the state and economic apparatus and its restructuring and high professionalism, given its optimum manning level and unconditional subordination to the law. We are for a considerable reduction in departmental quota-setting.

We will strive for the consistent implementation in the republic of the principle of the separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—a strengthening of the independence of the court and procuracy and their enhanced status in society, and the increased role and authority of arbitration and the legal profession.

Advocating the building of a **state based on the rule of law,** the Ukrainian Communist Party directs its political activity toward the establishment in society of profound respect for the law as a social, cultural, historical, and universal value regulating the relations of the state, society, and the individual in the spirit of the ideas of equality and justice.

We see a state based on the rule of law not as an end in itself but primarily as an important means of the creation of a society based on the principles of self-government.

We will endeavor to ensure that the new Ukrainian SSR Constitution, the need for whose elaboration has become a reality, creates firm guarantees of the rights and liberties of the people of the Ukraine and each of its citizens in accordance with the requirements of the republic's socialist development.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will champion the maximum democratic and open approach of the legislative process in the republic and strive for its perfection in the direction of:

the assurance of the priority of interests common to all mankind over state and class interests and their harmonious combination and of the generally recognized rules of international law over the provisions of intrastate-state law;

the further improvement of guarantees of the realization and protection of socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and liberties;

the assurance of the freedom for citizens to associate in public, including public and political organizations, legal protection of their independent activity, and the introduction of fundamentally new relations between the state and public organizations;

the adoption of legislative instruments guaranteeing the impossibility of the creation and activity of parties and organizations inciting interethnic friction, sowing hostility between people, calling for the overthrow of Soviet power, and resorting to violence.

The Communists of the Ukraine are for the continued extended democratization of all spheres of the life of society and consistently oppose lawlessness and arbitrariness and political recklessness. Democracy is impossible without a dialectical combination of the rights and liberties of the individual and public obligations and compliance with the law.

We believe that the creation of a socialist state based on the rule of law demands immediate practical measures to reinforce legality and law and order and a decisive intensification of the fight against crime, organized crime primarily.

In order to ensure citizens' safety against encroachments on their rights, life, health, honor, and property we will strive for a fundamental improvement in the work of the law enforcement authorities, a reinforcement of their material and technical facilities, assurance of the social and legal protection of their officers, and an enhancement of the level of professional training and prestige. We consider paramount the Communists' participation in a recovery of the moral atmosphere in all spheres of social life and the active enlistment of the work force and the public at large in a strengthening of law and order.

The republic Communist Party supports the policy of the CPSU aimed at ensuring the country's sure defense capability, its internal and external security, and the defense of the Soviet system. We are for a united, renewed Soviet Army and new approaches in military organizational development on the principles of reasonable sufficiency with an orientation toward quality indicators. We are for an appreciable improvement in the preparation of the youth for performance of its constitutional duty in respect of defense of the motherland, a strengthening of the unity of the Army and the people, an enhancement of the prestige of military service, the implementation of additional measures pertaining to the assurance of social protection, and the creation of proper living conditions for servicemen of all categories and the members of their families and also those released into the reserve in connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and upon completion of their term of service.

The Ukrainian Communist Party proceeds in its practical activity **pertaining to the harmonization of interethnic relations** from the fundamental propositions of the CPSU platform on the party's nationality policy under modern conditions.

Our fundamental line in nationality policy is to preserve and enrich the national and cultural distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and the other national groups residing in the republic and strive for harmony in interethnic relations.

The Communists' efforts will be geared to the molding of a high culture of interethnic intercourse; the creation in the republic of an atmosphere of trust between people of different nationalities; mutual understanding, mutual respect and accord; and an expansion of internationalist processes of spiritual interaction. We look for cooperation in the solution of these questions with the national-cultural societies.

We are emphatically opposed to the division of citizens into the "indigenous" and "nonindigenous" population; the imposition of a "priority of the rights of the Ukrainian nation" policy; and the adoption of any legislative instruments abridging the rights and national interests of Russians, Jews, Belorussians, Moldavians, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, and people of other nationalities who live in the republic.

The fundamental position of the Ukrainian Communist Party is consistent internationalism. We are opposed to the incitement of interethnic hostility and will conduct a decisive struggle against manifestations of national narrowness, conceit, nationalism, chauvinism, and anti-Semitism.

In its attitude toward religion, the church, and believers, the Ukrainian Communist Party's policy is based on the principles of freedom of worship and the assurance of the citizens' freedom of religion and choice of philosophical principles and the creation for this of the necessary legal and material conditions and guarantees. While actively propagandizing the materialist world outlook, the Communists advocate tolerance, dialogue, and an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation between believers and atheists and the supporters of different religions and religious schools, and are opposed to confrontation between people on national-religious grounds, manifestations of clericalism, and the use of believers' religious feelings for political ends. We see the incitement of religious discord and intolerance as a threat to the national unity of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will support a stimulation of the Ukrainian SSR's efforts in the business of strengthening peace and international security. We attach much importance to the inclusion of the Ukraine in the all-European process and the establishment of equal, mutually profitable relations with all countries on a multilateral and bilateral basis.

IV. A Renewed Ukrainian Communist Party in the Republic's Political System

The Ukrainian Communist Party is a political internationalist party of a socialist choice, radical change, and revolutionary action.

Under the conditions of political pluralism and competition only **a renewed, essentially profoundly democratic party** is capable of performing its new role in society and the restructuring processes.

We understand the renewal of the Ukrainian Communist Party to mean:

a renunciation of political monopolism and direct power functions and all that has made the party an integral part of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system;

the return to it of its real purpose—being the political vanguard of the people of the Ukraine and effectively influencing all aspects of their life by actual fruitful work, initiative, and creativity. We will strive through the Communists in the state and social structures and the work force for the consolidation of all groups of the population on our program platform;

the revival of the principle of democratic centralism in the Leninist understanding; the cleansing thereof of deformations and extraneous features of the past and command approaches, a hierarchical character, and rigid centralization; and the extension and acceleration of the restructuring of intraparty life on the principles of humanitarian democracy, party comradeship, pluralism of opinions, and consideration of the interests and position of the minority and assurance of its right to defend its views in combination with high party discipline;

ensuring the leadership of the party masses and the elective authorities over the apparatus and the real opportunity for each Communist and each party organization to participate directly in the formulation and implementation of the Ukrainian Communist Party's policy line by way of republic-wide party debate and referenda and actively to influence the activity of the superior party authorities, the adoption and fulfillment of decisions, and the selection and assignment of personnel of the party authorities of all levels. We are for collegiality and openness in their work and freedom of criticism. The holding of republic party conferences should be regular;

the complete democratization of the formation of the party's directive authorities and delegates to party congresses and conferences based on direct, secret, multiple-choice elections. We are for the formulation of a precise mechanism of the recall of members of all elective bodies. The primary party organizations should have a decisive role in these matters.

The Ukrainian Communist Party considers a priority the improvement of the party structures and the democratization of relations between party committees of different levels and increased interaction between them, and advocates a transition from a party in which the central authorities determine everything to a party in which the primary organizations are its genuine foundation and in which they are freed from petty tutelage on the part of the party committees and are sovereign in decisions on all matters connected with their internal life and activity.

The primary party organizations should have the right with regard for actual conditions to determine the tasks and forms of their activity and the structure of their authorities and of the final decision on questions of admittance to the party and expulsion therefrom and the formation and use of their financial resources from the membership dues remaining at their disposal and other proceeds. Decisions adopted by them within the framework of their authority and informal documents may not be abrogated by superior party authorities.

We advocate the conclusive dismantling of the formal-official party schedule system of work with the personnel. In personnel policy priority is given personnel initiative and the search for and promotion of competent people with high political and moral attributes.

The delegating of Communists by the party organizations, in which they will regularly render account of their work, should be determining in the formation of the apparatus of the party committees. Its numbers and structure are determined by the party committee and the party organization. It works for the elective body; is subordinate to it; and performs for it theoretical-analytical, forecast-sociological, and consultative work.

We uphold the right of the Communists to associate in primary organizations on the production-territorial principle and also the need for the creation of strong, vigorous territorial primary party organizations. The Communists may associate per specific-goal, professional, functional, and other interests. At the same time we are opposed to the creation in the party of factions with their own internal organizational structure and discipline ignoring the party's statutory requirements and decisions. The Ukrainian Communist Party supports the realization in full of the right of Communists of the USSR Armed Forces, the law enforcement authorities, and the KGB to associate in primary organizations and participate in political activity.

The Ukrainian Communist Party organizes its life and activity as an **independent party** within a united CPSU in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the Ukrainian SSR Constitution on the basis of the CPSU Program and Rules and its own program and prescriptive documents.

It participates directly in the formulation and implementation of the CPSU's policy course and is autonomous in all its activity, including the formulation and pursuit of its own policy line corresponding to the republic's conditions and the people's national traditions. The Ukrainian Communist Party, as a political organization, makes decisions on a whole set of theoretical, ideological, organizational, personnel, and financial-economic questions and the creation of research establishments and educational institutions and press organs.

It builds its relations with directive bodies of the CPSU in accordance with the party rules and coordinates its actions on the basis of permanent representation in the party's central elective bodies.

While attaching importance to a broadening of the independence of the Ukrainian Communist Party, we at the same time believe that this should be dialectically combined **with a strengthening of the inter-nation, ideological, and organizational unity of the CPSU. It is this which we see as an important condition and the capacity of the party for performing its vanguard, consolidating role in society.**

Under the new conditions and in free and honest competition with other public and political forces, the Ukrainian Communist Party will defend its right to political leadership by its theoretical and practical activity and capacity for proposing to the Ukrainian people constructive ways of solving acute problems of the life of the republic.

Availing itself of legislative initiative, it will, through the communist people's deputies of soviets of all levels, strive for the realization of its program principles.

Under the conditions of philosophical and political pluralism the Ukrainian Communist Party will decisively defend its ideological positions and propagandize its policy and program goals, attracting representatives of the most populous social strata to its side and into the party ranks. **Ideological work** of the party organizations constructed on fundamentally new conceptual approaches should contribute to this. It must respond appropriately to the changes in society through a prompt change in the tactics, slogans, methods, and forms of the work of the party organizations.

Our ideological efforts will be geared to the propaganda and explanation of the essence of Marxist-Leninist teaching and socialist values and their creative development and enrichment and active defense and the molding in the population of the Ukraine of high political, moral, and spiritual culture; historical memory; and self-knowledge. Our ideas, values, and arguments should be competitive, conclusive, and attractive.

Not controlling the consciousness of the masses but developing and influencing it is the key task of ideological work. It must be the truly paramount cause of the entire Ukrainian Communist Party, each party organization, and each Communist, and it is essential to teach them the art of the propagandist and canvasser.

Ideological and mass-political work will acquire the necessary scientific, sociological, and personnel backing thanks to a reorganization and change in the status of the highest party educational institutions and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's Party History Institute and the creation of a special subdivision for the study of public opinion and analysis and forecasting of the social and political situation in the republic.

The Ukrainian Communist Party supports the principle of an **open policy and glasnost** and will struggle to ensure that the citizens of the republic have the right to full knowledgeability in respect of all aspects of social life.

It is necessary under multiparty conditions to change the content, role, functions, and structure of publications of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the party committees locally. They should be entirely subordinate to the party's interests. It is necessary to remove from practice administrative-command methods of leadership of the mass media. The relations of the party committees and the editorial collectives of the former's own publications will be built on the principles of partnership and cooperation. Freedom of creativity, the journalists' own vision of problems, and extensive glasnost should be organically combined with political balance, competence, responsibility, and objectivity. We will work on strengthening the physical plant of party publications and publishing houses; the creation of the proper conditions for journalists' life, daily reality, and work; and a fundamental improvement in the system of their training.

The Ukrainian Communist Party believes that all democratic forces should have access to the mass media.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will build anew its relations with **the unions and the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League]** on the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance, dialogue, and comradeship.

We support **the independence of trade unions,** the full development of democracy in their life, and an enhancement of their role in defense of the rights and interests of the working people and the prevention of labor conflicts. We will actively support the efforts of the republic's unions in this direction.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will contribute to the revival of the worker and peasant movements and support the public assertiveness of the intelligentsia and healthy constructive trends in their development.

Regarding the Leninist Communist Youth League of the Ukraine (MDS) as an independent public and political youth organization, political and ideological ally, and immediate reserve of the Ukrainian Communist Party, we will contribute to the renewal of the Komsomol and a strengthening of its authority and an enhancement of its role among the youth.

As a party of the solidarity of the working people, the Ukrainian Communist Party offers to cooperate with all **parties, public organizations, and amateur associations of a socialist orientation** operating within the framework of the law and on the basis of the USSR Constitution and for the good of the people of the Ukrainian SSR. We support constructive dialogue and a search for reasonable compromise and will emphatically oppose those who sow enmity between people and cleave to anticommunist positions. There can be no compromise at the expense of our principles and the interests of the Ukrainian people. Communists' membership in other parties and also public and political formations of an antisocialist focus is impermissible.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will continue and develop cooperation with the Communist, workers, and socialist parties and establish ties to the social democratic and national democratic parties and mass democratic organizations of foreign countries in the name of a strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between peoples.

The property of the Ukrainian Communist Party and economic activity are the material basis of its independence and means of defense of the Communists' interests. The budget of the republic Communist Party is uniform and is formed from the bottom up. All financial and economic activity, from the primary party organization through the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, will be conducted publicly under the actual supervision of the party masses.

We regard the proposed program principles of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party as political reference points for the practical work of the party organizations and Communists of the republic and the basis for formulation of the Ukrainian Communist Party Program.

Wages Increased in Radioactive Ukrainian Areas

LD1508170690 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] In addition to the previous documents [on the formation of government bodies and draft law on associations] the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has taken a new decision to introduce higher pay for work in all settlements where the level of radioactive contamination makes up from one to five curie per one square km in the area where a limited consumption was introduced of local food products, as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

The wages in the settlements have been increased by 20 percent. The settlements are situated in Zhitomir, Kiev, Rovno and Chernigov regions.

Low Ukrainian Citizen Registration Noted

90UN2574A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by A. Stepura: "You Have to Be a Citizen"]

[Text] Kiev—According to the Postfactum agency, those who organized citizen registration for the independent Ukrainian People's Republic are not quite happy with the procedure.

Representatives of the interparty Ukrainian Assembly which united the few radical nationalist-democratic organizations made the following data public. By 1 August 71.5 thousand people were registered in Lvov Oblast as renouncing USSR citizenship and wishing to become citizens of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). There were 30.5 thousand such people in Kiev Oblast.

In other areas the number of people willing to become citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic does not exceed several thousand. There is an obvious lack of support for the appeal of the interparty assembly to renounce USSR citizenship and register as Ukrainian People's Republic citizens. In Ternopol, for instance, only 3,000 people were registered for the Ukrainian People's Republic, and in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast the registration has been recently suspended.

Ternopol Obkom Leader Relieved of Duties

PM1508133790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

["Official" TASS report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] A Ternopol Ukrainian Communist Party Oblast Committee [obkom] plenum was held yesterday to examine an organizational matter. The plenum released V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy from the post of party obkom first secretary and bureau member in connection with his election as secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

Second secretary V.N. Shemchuk will act as first secretary of Ternopol Party Obkom. The question of the election of the oblast party organization leader will be finally decided, taking into account the opinion of party organizations, at the second stage of the oblast conference.

Moldavia Restores, Alters Former Settlement Names

LD1508142290 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 1 Aug 90 p1

["Decision of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet on alterations to and restoration of certain former names of settlements and rural soviets in the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] The Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To rename Dnestrovskiy Rayon, in the town of Kishinev, Chokana Rayon.

2. To rename the village and rural soviet of Yegorovka, in Sorokskiy Rayon, Yegoren.

3. To return the old name of Tsarigrad to the village of Glavan in Drokiyevskiy Rayon. To rename the Glavan rural soviet as Tsarigrad.

4. To return the old name of Aleksandr Ioan Kuza to the village of Suvorov in Vulkeneshtskiy Rayon. To rename Suvorov rural soviet Aleksandru as Ioan Kuza.

5. To return the old name of Chenusha to the village of Frunzen in Floreshtskiy Rayon.

[Signed] M. Snegur, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet
[Dated] Kishinev, 27 July 1990

Caucasus

Armenia Denies Plans of Transcaucasian Meeting

AU1508114190 Paris AFP in English 1101 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, Aug 15 (AFP)— Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan has denied press reports of plans for direct talks on ethnic rivalry in the region with leaders of the neighbouring Soviet republics Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Before the Armenian parliament Tuesday, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan said the Soviet news agency TASS reports Monday were based on "wrong information."

According to TASS and the Communist Party newspaper PRAVDA Monday, the leaders were planning to meet in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, on the initiative of Georgian President Givi Gumbaridze for the first direct talks since the beginning of ethnic clashes over two years ago.

They had agreed to discuss "vital issues of inter-republican ties," PRAVDA said, describing the move as "a major step towards direct political economic and cultural ties."

No date for the meeting was given.

Ethnic unrest in the area is concentrated in the Azerbaijani autonomous region Nagorno Karabakh, populated largely by Armenians who want the region to join with Armenia.

Ter-Petrosyan on Possible Talks with Azerbaijan

LD1508120590 Moscow TASS in English 1145 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Direct talks with Azerbaijan are possible, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan told the MOSCOW NEWS newspaper today.

"If there is mutual agreement," Ter-Petrosyan told the newspaper. "We are ready to sit down at the negotiating table immediately. Restoring Soviet power in Karabakh provides the basis for a compromise. So far the Army rules, fulfilling not only repressive but also political, administrative and economic functions [words indistinct] both legal and economic, do not operate."

He said the prime cause of the conflict with Azerbaijan was not religious, ethnic, or national.

"It is a conflict about international law on the people's self-determination. We do not divide the normalisation process from general processes in the country. Nagorno-Karabakh will get the status which autonomous entities will receive."

"We are for Karabakh to join Armenia, but as realists we are doing everything possible to improve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh step by step. We maintain contacts with the neighbouring republic at the level of informal links. An exchange of information between the Armenian National Movement and the Azerbaijan Popular Front is under way."

Ter-Petrosyan said agreement has been reached on putting the responsibility for the fulfilment of the presidential decree of July 25 (on disarming armed groups) on the republican authorities. The Soviet Army and Interior Ministry troops will not be called in. Tanks and armored personnel carriers have been removed from Yerevan streets.

"There are around 6,000 volunteers in the republic and not 160,000 or even 40,000. This is admitted by the Interior Ministry and the KGB," Ter-Petrosyan said. "As for the armed groups, they are made up of mainly healthy forces which will shortly join law enforcement agencies."

Asked if the Mafia operates in the republic, he stressed the Mafia worked against the national-liberation movement for two and a half years, its activity is supported by forces from the center.

According to the president, "The threat to the renewal process comes from the Army," where "perestroyka has stalled."

Ter-Petrosyan stressed that stabilising the situation in the republic is the main task at present.

Ter-Petrosyan Meets Diaspora Delegation 15 Aug

LD1508200790 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By ARMENPRESS correspondent Gagik Melkumyan]

[Text] Yerevan August 15 TASS—Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan met a delegation of an Armenian party abroad, Ramkavar Azatakan, one of the most influential parties of the Armenia diaspora. He showed interest in setting up the party's mission and official newspaper in Armenia.

Representatives of the liberal democratic bourgeois party Ramkavar Azatakan, which already has branches in the United States, Lebanon, France, and Egypt, arrived in Armenia to familiarise themselves with the situation in the republic and to explore possibilities for setting up their centre and newspaper in Armenia.

On the delegation are Yervand Azatyan, deputy chairman of the party's central board, Ruben Terzyan, member of the emergency commission for econmic aid to Armenia and chairman of the Armentoy joint-venture enterprise for the production of electronic toys in Armenia, and Akop Avetikyan, representative of the party's democratic press.

Matters of further policy of Armenian authorities concerning economic and political ties between the motherland and the diaspora, and Armenia's relationships with neighbouring countries were touched upon during the meeting.

The delegation delivered an official letter to the president from the central board of the party and invited Ter-Petrosyan to visit the United States and Canada.

'Armenian National Army' Numbers 160,000 Men

LD1608110690 Moscow World Service in Russian 0936 GMT 16 Aug

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] Vartan Vartanyan, the deputy commander in chief of the Armenian National Army, stated in an interview with the INTERFAX agency that there are 160,000 people in its ranks. He said that the army consists of armed detachments created for the defense of the Armenian people against the genocide unleased against it. We proceed from the assumption, Vartan Vartanyan stressed, that Armenia will always experience the threat of attack, both on part of neighboring Azerbaijan and on the part of Turkey. So the Armenian people, stressed the representative of the Armenian National Army, will never again be parted from its weapons.

Armenian Group Attacks TV Center, Makes Demands

LD1608101390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Information from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' Press Center: a complicated situation persists in the transcaucasus republics. Every day the sallies of illegal armed formations become more daring and dangerous.

On 14 August, at midday, an armed group of the unofficial organization Vrezharrouner—the Avengers—headed by its leader Kazaryan, burst into the building of the Armenian Television Center and demanded that a video recording about the organization's activities be aired. After television staff promised to have it broadcast, the group left the television center. The following morning, armed people again blockaded the television center building. Threatening to blow up the building and to make short work of the Militia detail protecting the building, they again put forward similar demands.

As a result of talks, taking part in which were deputies of the Republican Supreme Soviet, senior KGB and Interior Ministry staff, the attackers dispersed.

On 15 August, in Aygsk Rayon in Armenia, militants, armed to the teeth, attacked the rayon militia station and seized 18 pistols, one rifle, one hunting gun, and approximately 150 cartridges. A day before that, a similar group, only larger hijacked 22 UAZ-469 vehicles from the Armelektrosnab [Armenian Electric Power Supply] depot.

The situation in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic is likewise far from calm. On 14 august, in the evening, in the Agdzhabedinskii Rayon, criminals fired on Militia functionaries. Lieutenant Colonel Gasanov, chief of the Rayon Section of Internal Affairs, was wounded. Pursuing the attackers, militiamen wounded and detained one of them.

In the Agdamskii Rayon, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, a group of Azerbaijanis stopped a motor vehicle, beat up Movsisyan, who was taking mail to Stepanakert, and took his weapon and ammunition.

Baku Radio Updates Situation in Border Rayons

Situation 'Complex' 13 Aug

NC1608094890 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] According to information received by an AZERINFORM correspondent as of 1000 on 13 August, the situation in the Azerbaijani rayons bordering Armenia remains complex. The Internal Affairs Ministry of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic has reported that Armenian terrorists detonated an explosive device on the (?Kubyrly) bridge near the town of Chldran in Mardakertskiy Rayon on 11 August. The [word indistinct] road on the bridge was destroyed.

Hooligans in Askeranskiy Rayon stoned a bus and a ZIL-130 truck on the Agdam-Khodzhaly highway on 12 August. The (?Shaitly) farming settlement in Kel'badzharskiy Rayon was fired on once again on 11 and 12 August. The [name indistinct] farming settlement was also fired on from Armenia a few times. The attackers were driven away when the militia returned fire.

According to Guseynov, first secretary of the Kedabeksiy Rayon Party Committee, the border town of Mormor was fired on at about 1600 on 11 August. The internal troops and the militia units in [name indistinct] area were attacked on the night of 11-12 August. The attack was repulsed when the internal troops and the militia units returned fire. There were no casualties on the Azerbaijani side.

Residential buildings in the towns of [names indistinct] in Zangelanskiy Rayon were fired on from a car coming from the direction of Kafan in Armenia at about 2300 on 12 August. No one was wounded. Meanwhile, Armenian extremists cut a power line in Armenia, thereby disrupting the power supply to establishments and residential buildings in the towns of (?Gogebakan) and (?Daravar) in Azerbaijan's Tauzskiy Rayon. Water supply to the town of Alibeyli has also been cut. Efforts are under way to provide the town with water from other sources in the rayon.

The situation in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] remains tense. The people and the work collectives in the Nakhichevan ASSR are demanding that the USSR president's decree of 25 July be implemented in its entirety and all Armenian bandit groups in the border rayons immediately disarmed. The Nakhichevan ASSR and Kazakhskiy and Kubatlinskiy Rayons have not been fired on or attacked from Armenian territory in the past few days.

Rayons Still 'Tense' 14 Aug

NC1608101190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] According to information received by an AZERINFORM correspondent as of 1000 on 14 August, the situation in rayons bordering Armenia remains tense. Ismailov, first secretary of the Kel'badzharskiy Rayon Party Committee [Raykom], has said that the [name indistinct] and Sariyer farming settlements were fired on from a hilly area near Armenia during the day and at night on 13 August. Meanwhile, Mekhtiyev, first secretary of the Zangelanskiy Raykom, has said that armed men opened fire on the Azerbaijani-inhabited town of (?Muvadi), located in Armenia's Megrinskiy Rayon on the border with Azerbaijan, during the day and at night on 13 August. The Azerbaijanis resolutely rejected the Armenian extremists' demand that they evacuate the town. The guard detail of the USSR internal troops is protecting the town's residents. Provisions and other commodities required by the residents are being supplied from Azerbaijan's Zangelanskiy Rayon under the protection of the troops.

According to reports arriving from [name indistinct] Rayon, armed and extremist Armenian groups are massing in Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon. Guseynov, Kedabekskiy Raykom first secretary, has said that the internal troops in the rayon have been reinforced so that the roads used by the Armenian extremists between [names indistinct] towns can be brought under control. There were no reports of aggressive activites from Armenia against the rayon in the past 24 hours. There were also no reports of armed attacks in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the Kazakhskiy Rayon, and the Tauzskiy rayon.

Azerbaijan Presidential Council Holds Meeting

NC1608083590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] The first meeting of the Presidential Council of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] convened under President Ayaz Mutalibov on 14 August. Abbasov, Agayev, Asadov, Melikova, [name indistinct], Gasanov, and Guseynov, members of the council, participated in the session, which was also attended by Kafarova, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet; Muradaliyev, Musayev, and Orudzhev, secretaries of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; Abdullayev and Rasi-zade, first deputy chairmen of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers; and leading officials of the ministries, main administrations, and mass media organs. The rules for the Presidential Council were examined and approved.

The meeting examined the work carried out by the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for the Agro-industrial Complex to provide provisions for the republic's people. Following a speech by Abdullayev, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for the Agro-industrial Complex, a wide-ranging debate was held on ways to improve the agro-industrial complex in the republic.

Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, and Babayev, chairman of the committee on foreign economic relations affiliated with the council of ministers and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR State Planning Committee, briefed the meeting on the efforts to improve the Azerbaijan SSR's foreign economic relations and coordinate the activities of state, social, and other organizations. They also briefed the meeting on the preparations for the first international business congress in October 1990. Alekperov, deputy director of the Azerneft Union, addressed the meeting on the work carried out to establish a joint construction materials complex with the [name indistinct] through the funds acquired from the sale of fragmented metals. Mirzayev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR State Planning Committee, addressed the meeting on prospects for improving the production of [word indistinct] materials in the republic. Karayev, Azerbaijan SSR minister of finance, also briefed the session on the implementation of the decrees issued by the president of the Azerbaijan SSR on improving the material conditions, living standards, and social status of various catagories of citizens in the republic.

Gasanov also briefed the meeting on the results of the talks with Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and on the agreement signed between the Azerbaijan SSR and the Belorussian SSR on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations between the two republics.

The session concluded with an address by President Ayaz Mutalibov.

Georgian, Azeri Leaders Stress Improving Ties

LD1508193490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] A meeting was held in Tbilisi today between on the one hand Gumbaridze, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Chitanava, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and on the other Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijan SSR and first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, and Gasanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers.

There was a businesslike and constructive conversation on the whole spectrum of topical issues related to inter-republican ties. Concrete proposals for the develoment and strengthening of direct political, economic, and cultural ties between Georgia and Azerbaijan were discussed.

The leaders of both republics stressed the urgent need to impart a new quality to the traditional good-neighborly mutual relations of the Georgian and Azerbaijan people, and the importance of achieving mutual understanding and expanding cooperation for the sake of peace and national harmony in the region.

The talks resulted in the signing of documents on the main directions for developing and strengthening mutual links between Georgia and Azerbaijan.

KGB Ends Georgian Detention Center Siege

LD1508185490 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Follows the text of an official announcement by the Soviet KGB security service:

On August 11, seven inmates of a detention centre of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic's interior ministry, took their guards hostage and, using their keys, released 68 inmates from their cells.

They then broke into a weapons store, seizing more than 700 guns and ammunition.

The criminals demanded a helicopter and a van, threatening to kill the hostages. The detention centre is in the centre of Sukhumi and the situation was potentially explosive for city residents.

It was decided to implement a thorougly prepared operation to release the hostages and disarm the criminals.

The operation was carried out today by a special team of operatives from the Soviet KGB and Interior Ministry. Despite armed resistance, the hostages were released during the storming of the centre and all bandits were disarmed.

Ringleader Prunchak Pyotr Ivanovich, born in 1957 and arrested for the murder of two militiamen, with three previous convictions, including for murder, was seriously wounded in the operation.

A KGB officer, an Interior Ministry operative and two hostages were injured.

No one else was hurt.

Central Asia

USSR-Kazakh Consultations on Union Treaty

PM1608083390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "For Union of Sovereign States"]

[Text] At a consultative meeting with a USSR working group in Moscow 14 August plenipotentiary representatives of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic advocated the USSR's renewal on the basis of the Union republics' independence and their voluntary cooperation and mutual assistance.

In accordance with a decision of the USSR Federation Council and Presidential Council, since the beginning of August representatives of the USSR and the Union republics have by mutual agreement been formulating in separate sessions concepts of alliance relations conforming with modern conditions within the framework of a new Union treaty at a "roundtable" in the Hall of Facets in the Great Kremlin Palace.

"Our peoples are not drawing up the new treaty from scratch," R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, pointed out at the meeting. "Declarations and laws on the republics' sovereignty, the 1922 treaty on the creation of the USSR, the current USSR Constitution, and a number of laws on interethnic relations adopted at sessions of the present USSR Supreme Soviet all militate in favor of it."

Nishanov emphasized that the eight theses formulated by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev constitute a good legal basis on which relations between the future Union and the sovereign republics comprising it can be based.

Kazakhstan's emissaries submitted to the consultative meeting their own draft of the Union treaty prepared by a working group of deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet, members of the government, scientists, experts, and representatives of various public movements.

The consultations with the Union republics will be continued.

Secretary Stroyev Tours Northern Kazakhstan

PM1508111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[Text] Kokchetav, 10 Aug—Ye.S. Stroyev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is touring northern Kazakhstan.

He has met with economic, soviet, and party leaders and grain growers of Tselinograd, Kokchetav, and Kustanay Oblasts.

Kirghiz Officials Evade Censure for June Events

PM1608090190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 90 p 1

[Report by correspondent K. Bayalinov under the "Topically!" rubric]

[Text] An obkom [oblast party committee] plenum has taken place in Osh. It was convened to give a political assessment of the tragic events and, of course, to draw organizational conclusions.

On the eve of the plenum there were persistent rumors that the next "victims" (following the dismissal of Osh Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] Chairman Zh. Bekbolotov and Internal Affairs Administration Chief R. Tadzhibayev) will be Osh Obkom Second Secretary N. Davydov and Secretary S. Bakhapov. There were grounds for the rumors; this was the opinion formed by the republic commission.

But there was no mention of Osh Obkom First Secretary U. Sydykov. And this is understandable, since along with Sydykov, responsibility will have to be borne by top-level leaders—N. Chepelev, former oblispolkom chairman and currently Central Committee second secretary, and R. Kulmatov, former obkom first secretary and currently A. Masaliyev's deputy in the post of chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet. After all, it was with their connivance that the conflicts which led to the June explosion all became knotted together.

Apparently the principle of "party comradeship"—or, more simply, collective guarantees—still operates. Although when speaking at the Osh Obkom plenum A. Mameyev, chief of the KGB administration and bureau member, the same person who informed republic authorities of the possible bloodshed long before the events began, proposed to all bureau members that they tender their collective resignation, although A. Masaliyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, and chairman of the Kirghiz Supreme Soviet, admitted the republic leadership's mistakes and his own in particular, however...

Ending late at night, the plenum passed a vote of confidence by secret ballot in all obkom bureau members without exception...

One more thing. The postponement to the fourth quarter of 1990 of the extraordinary session of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet which was previously scheduled for 24 August has been announced in Frunze. Many regard this as an attempt to wait for the heat of the political passions and the activeness of the people's deputies to die down.

Kirghiz Official Interviewed on Weapons Seizures

PM1508104190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Major General V. Goncharov, Kirghiz minister of internal affairs, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka; place and date of interview not given; published under the rubric "Political Situation: Quiet Times Have Not Yet Arrived": "Kirghizia"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] How have the demands of the USSR president's decree "On Banning the Creation of Armed Formations Not Stipulated by USSR Legislation and Confiscating Illegally Stored Weapons" been implemented within the prescribed 15-day period on Kirghiz territory? Militia Maj. Gen. V. Goncharov, the republic's internal affairs minister, told our special correspondent about this.

[Semenyaka] Viktor Vasilyevich, there are no major legal armed formations in the republic. But the population has, unfortunately, amassed quite a large number of weapons. I saw this for myself once again when mass interethnic disturbances broke out in the south of the republic among the local population. What work has been done to confiscate these weapons?

[Goncharov] This work was carried out constantly in the republic prior to the president's decree. It was stepped up in June when a state of emergency was introduced in Frunze and Osh Oblast. To date 15,203 firearms, including 2,029 in Osh Oblast, have been confiscated in Kirghizia. I would note that more than 50 percent of these have been surrendered voluntarily. We are not satisfied with these figures. We have information that citizens still have weapons. We will continue to resolutely combat those people who "love" to illegally store and acquire weapons in contravention of the demands of Union or republic legislation. I will say once again that the offenders will be shown no mercy. Criminal proceedings will even be brought against them.

[Semenyaka] What forces were used to fulfill the decree's demands? What is your view of their actions?

[Goncharov] Union and republic law-enforcement personnel, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops, and Soviet Army servicemen have offered us active help.

I want to talk separately about internal troop personnel. They demonstrate supreme professionalism, enterprise, and constant readiness to help out people in trouble.

In addition to servicemen, former internationalist soldiers and members of workers' militia assistance detachments who are working to safeguard public order, maintain the curfew locally, and help internal affairs personnel confiscate weapons have proven their worth most positively in Osh Oblast during this period.

[Semenyaka] Persistent rumors are being put about in Osh City that former internationalist soldiers have received rifled firearms. Is that true?

[Goncharov] No, they have no weapons. During the operation of the curfew in this oblast center and other population centers they are serving in conjunction with internal affairs organ personnel. The latter are naturally armed with regular-issue firearms, including automatic weapons.

[Semenyaka] Is the crime situation in the republic arousing disquiet? What is being done to further stabilize the sociopolitical situation in Osh Oblast?

[Goncharov] The republic's leadership, the MVD, and our temporary press center at the local oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] internal affairs administration regularly inform the republic's and oblast's inhabitants about the status of the crime situation. Recently the situation has steadily tended to stabilize. Labor activity in Osh City has resumed. The work of local law-enforcement organs is returning to normal.

Admittedly, we are still experiencing some difficulties in Uzgen City and population centers in this rayon. Some trading points and consumer service and public catering outlets are still not operating. Local industrial enterprise are not working at full steam: the cannery, dairy, bakery, and motorized transport enterprises, the central rayon hospital, and other organizations.

It is therefore no coincidence that the leadership of the republic and Osh Oblast and the commandant's office have concentrated their attention on Uzgen. It has proved possible to ease the tension in the city over the last few days. Thus, Kirghiz nationals voluntarily returned to their apartments in one of Uzgen's residential districts. Let me note with satisfaction that we have not recorded any interethnic clashes over the last few days. But it is still too early for us to rest easy.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 13 Aug

LD1508211490 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1600 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Excerpts] A meeting of the presidium of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet was held on 13 August of the current year. The meeting discussed issues concerning the second session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. As has been reported, the second session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet will begin its work on 21 August of the current year.

The meeting, among other things, discussed the draft Tajik SSR law on ownership in the Tajik SSR. An interesting conversation developed at the meeting. Memebers of the presidium analyzed each article of the new draft law. An important characteristic of the draft law on ownership in the Tajik SSR is that our legislators have acknowledged various forms of ownership and at the same time have resolutely opposed private ownership of land. For instance, land could be leased for an indifinite period, but cannot be bought and sold. Such was the united thinking of the presidium's members.

Heated discussions on use of foreign investment was held. Various ideas were exchanged. Some were in favor of joint ownership of enterprises on the territory of the republic. Others were against this idea: any incorrect decision regarding this important issue will make it impossible to effeciently utilize foreign investment. [passage omitted]

The presidium discussed the draft declaration on state sovereignty of Tajik SSR. This most important document was discussed in detail. Members of the presidium introduced a number of important amendments, ideas, and observations. Among other things, it was added that supreme supervision on the precise and equal implementation of laws in the territory of the Tajik SSR be conducted by the procurator of the Tajik SSR, who will be appointed by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. The Tajik SSR procurator will be answerable to the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet and will report to it.

The presidium's meeting was chaired by Makhkamov, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. Full details of the meeting will be published in the press.

Alarmed Russians Still Leaving Tajikistan

90US1235A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by L. Latypova: "A Syndrome of Fear Is Forcing Many Inhabitants To Leave Dushanbe"]

Dushanbe—The Russian-speaking population in the capital of Tajikistan has suffered a second nervous shock since the tragic events of February. The cause seems almost trifling. The main commodities in the eastern bazaar—currants, dried apricots, sunflower seeds—have suddenly quintupled in price this spring. Tajik buyers at first turned their anger on Tajik sellers. And this is what happened after that.

According to official reports, at the "Barakat" market a conflict arose that could have led to mass disorders. Militia detachments that were called in arrested a group of the most aggressive persons. They included some who had been directly involved in the pogrom in February. And the next day the same kind of acute situation, threatening to escalate into mass disorders, arose at the market in the Zheleznodorozhnyy region. The inhabitants became alarmed. I later talked to the Dushanbe "Russkies."

"So why are you so upset? This is mainly a conflict between representatives of the indigenous population, is it not?"

The answer was a smile.

"But what if we had fallen into the 'hands of the hotheads'"?

And I imagined the possible picture of reprisals against "those responsible for all our ills," the "enslavers of the Tajiks." These thoughts have long been in the heads of the town criers from "Rastokheza" ("Rebirth"), the organization of the nationalists.

No, do not say that the local Russians living there are making mountains out of molehills. The incidents at the markets are not the only cause for alarm: Russian-speaking inhabitants sometimes feel that they are in a very awkward city. For example, some salespeople often "fail to notice" buyers who are not Tajiks. And if they do notice them they deliberately start to speak in Tajik. And if they do speak in Russian it is only to hurl abuse.

If only this unpleasantness were only felt on the domestic level. Any kind of meeting is conducted exclusively in Tajik. Appeals by republic leaders on television are also made "in the official language," with no translations. That was how they conducted the debates at the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, and the television relays were also not translated into Russian. It is not difficult to understand how many of the Russian-speaking audience felt about that...

It is common knowledge that in most republics in the Union priority is now given to the "indigenous" national population, and Tajikistan, of course, is no exception. But it so happens—and there is nothing for it—that about 600,000 people who come from other areas are living in the republic today. In Dushanbe almost half the population is Russian-speaking. Many were born there and grew old there. Have they not learned the language?

Unfortunately, up to now this has not been a requirement. So of what are these people guilty?

An "extraordinary situation" exists not only in Dushanbe City but also in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of people. Like it or not, you must hide any intonation of dissatisfaction, conceal even a reproachful opinion, remain silent, endure it, or otherwise as a minimum you may experience public humiliation.

The solution? First—and this is what many people have decided—just leave. But even the muster that has started is not protected against arbitrary rule. The waiting list for containers to ship household goods and chattels is "filled" to the end of the year. Often it is only by bribery that it is possible to obtain the "disposition" of transport (a statutory price of R100 to R300). Only bribes can save a person from a humiliating shaking-up of his things when they are packed. The "customs officers" do have their reasons: The republic government has prohibited the removal of consumer goods...

And who today will undertake to protect the Russian-speaking people in Tajikistan from all kinds of distortions and infringements? There are such people; they are members of the "Migratsiya" society. It is not officially registered and therefore it is as if it does not exist. But it has rapidly gained in popularity in Dushanbe. This organization tries to help people leave. It does not simply get people away who knows where, once they have "gathered together their belongings," but helps them to leave in an organized way after first having prepared the ground for them wherever they are going.

"Migratsiya" works thoroughly. One of the society's leaders, G. Belgorodskaya, deputy of the Dushanbe City Soviet, has been to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and met with B.N. Yeltsin, and talked with deputies in the Russian parliament. No, those leaving Dushanbe are not about to "become a burden" to someone. It is a question of giving migrants the status of those forcibly resettled. Many are prepared to settle in Russia in unfavorable cities, settlements, and villages and to "improve" them. For the first year or two people are prepared to live even in barracks. Prepared to build their houses and assume responsibility for finding work for themselves.

The businesslike approach of the leaders of the "Migratsiya" society is laudable. But this is the question: Why has this matter—one of state importance—been assumed only by a social organization? Is it really big enough for the job? The answer is simple: People who have trod the labyrinths of the employment offices and resettlement to no avail have no one else to turn to but the "informals" to organize themselves and fight for their vital interests.

What is the attitude of the authorities in Dushanbe? For "Migratsiya" has essentially encroached on their prerogatives. The application for registration has been with the republic Council of Ministers for a long time. They are not reviewing it because they think that this question is "not of priority importance" under the conditions of the emergency situation... But could this perhaps be a purely pro forma reason? And the reaction of those attending the session of the Dushanbe City Soviet, which responded in a unique way to the statement made by G. Belgorodskaya about the misfortunes of the "quitters," does not reveal the secret of the procrastination. They simply refused to listen to her, cutting her short with, "These problems do not exist here!"

Meanwhile, with the growing stream of migrants, entire production facilities are on the verge of closing down. There are already shortages of physicians and specialists of various kinds. At one of the city's largest enterprises—the "Tadzhikgidroagregat" Plant—about 500 people have left since February. And how many have left the city completely? In the procurator's office (these figures are no longer available from anywhere else) they quoted a figure of 12,000. In one of the stores that handles subscriptions for publications, in this latest period there have been double the usual number of changes of address for forwarding literature to post offices in cities in Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine.

The "Migratsiya" society has conducted its own independent sociological study. If we are to believe the figures, most of the Russian-speaking population is getting ready to leave the city. The authorities are perfectly well aware of all this. Moreover, their aim is to stop people from resettling. But how? Not by force? Early in July because of some unpublicized instructions (this author was unable to establish what instructions), the next migrants in line for shipping containers did not receive them. The black market reacted immediately: Prices were inflated to R500 and even R1,000 for a container. Members of "Migratsiya" were ready to appeal to the authorities: This is impossible! And how did they "react"? On the very same day they summoned the leaders of the society to the city soviet and procurator's office. Members of the city soviet commission that oversees observance of socialist legality, basing itself on the fact that the organization was not registered, demanded that it cease its activity. And Dushanbe Procurator S. Sharopov was even more categorical: He demanded a voucher stating that the activity of the organization had been halted...

The simple Tajik people cannot be blamed for what is happening today in the republic. Yes, the migration out of Tajikistan must be halted. But only one thing can force people to unpack their belongings and rid themselves of the "February syndrome": tranquillity. However, it will not come of its own accord. This is what the authorities should be thinking about...

* * *

When this article was being prepared for publication a meeting was held in the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee to review matters connected with population migration. At that moment 23,000 people had left the republic. As K. Makhkamov, Tajik Communist Party

Central Committee first secretary, remarked at the meeting, if the situation does not very soon change the number of migrants will reach 80,000.

Let us hope that steps will be taken now to help stabilize the situation in the republic.

Uzbek Party Adopts Cotton Harvest Decision

LD1508154490 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek 0100 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Excerpt] In the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan a decision was adopted on organizational and political activities of the party, soviet, and economic organs in the Dzhizak, and Syrdarya oblasts on the timely harvesting of cotton.

Organizational and political activities were adopted for the farms in Dzhizak and Syrdarya oblasts on the timely qualitative harvesting of cotton without loss by the worker of the farms, and without use of students. The oblast and rayon committees of the party and primary party organizations, the agricultural and industrial complex, were instructed to discuss the current activities in all the collectives and to adopt the corresponding political work for spreading the initiatives of the cotton gatherers of the Dzhizak and Syrdarya oblasts; to recommend to the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the Council of Ministers of the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and oblast political committees, Goskoopkomselkhoz of the Uzbek SSR [State Cooperative Committee for Agriculture] to examine a series of questions connected with carrying out agricultural and technical work for collecting crops, the preparation of the harvesting equipment, and it maximum exploitation during harvesting, so as to avoid the use of students studying in middle special institutes of education. [passage omitted]

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